Understanding and protecting closed-source systems through dynamic analysis by Dolan-Gavitt, Brendan
UNDERSTANDING AND PROTECTING CLOSED-SOURCE







of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy in the
School of Computer Science
Georgia Institute of Technology
December 2014
Copyright c© 2014 by Brendan Dolan-Gavitt
UNDERSTANDING AND PROTECTING CLOSED-SOURCE
SYSTEMS THROUGH DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
Approved by:
Wenke Lee, Advisor
School of Computer Science




School of Computer Science




School of Computer Science
Georgia Institute of Technology
Date Approved: 21 August 2014
To my parents,
Terry Dolan and Phil Gavitt.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am deeply grateful to my current advisor, Wenke Lee, for his guidance, support, and
understanding as I made my way, however circuitously, through the PhD program. My
erstwhile advisor Jon Giffin was an unfailing and invaluable source of insight and stimulating
conversation; I will always fondly remember hours-long conversations in my first few years at
Georgia Tech on topics ranging from program analysis and algorithms to Buffy the Vampire
Slayer. Finally, Patrick Traynor’s Destructive Research course my first fall semester helped
kickstart my research career, and I have always found his advice and insight valuable. My
mentors outside of Georgia Tech have also been crucial to my development: Weidong Cui
and David Molnar of Microsoft Research were sources of inspiration and invaluable guidance
during my summer in Seattle. I would especially like to thank Tim Leek of MIT Lincoln
Laboratory; during the five years I have worked with him he has proved himself to be not
only a brilliant collaborator and wise mentor but also a true friend.
My friends in Atlanta, Boston, and elsewhere have made the highs higher and the lows
endurable, and I could not ask for a smarter or kinder group of people in my life. My best
friends deserve special mention: Emily Wang, my oldest and dearest friend, whose friendship
has nourished me through hard and lean times; and Ying Xiao, the most intelligent and
learned man I know, who always challenges me to do and be better than I think I can. I
also give thanks, in no particular order, to Sarah Montgomery, Randall Munroe, Rosemary
Mosco, Patrick Hulin, Anthony Eden, Josh Hodosh, Ryan Whelan, Catherine Grevet, Yacin
Nadji, Chris Berlind, Emma Cohen, Sara Krehbiel, Anita Zakrzewska, Prateek Bhakta, and
everyone else that deserves a place here but whom I have momentarily forgotten. Your love
and friendship has made all the difference these past six years.
Annuska Riedlmayer has, for the past four amazing years, been my love, my partner in
adventure, my patient confidant, and my constant companion. Thank you for your patience
as I worked on this thesis so far away, for teaching me so much, and for bringing so much
iv
joy into my life.
Thomas Dolan-Gavitt, my brother and friend, talented writer and filmmaker, and all-
around wonderful human being, thank you for so many late-night talks, shared ideas, movie
and music recommendations, and moral support. I love you, bro.
Finally, I must thank my parents, Terry Dolan and Phil Gavitt, to whom this thesis
is dedicated, for their unconditional love and support. Growing up, I never once doubted
that they placed the interests of their children first, and I know they made many sacrifices
to ensure that we had the best education possible; I hope that my work, in some small
measure, can stand as a testament to their efforts.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
I INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Motivation and Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Thesis Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
II ROBUST SIGNATURES FOR KERNEL DATA STRUCTURES . . . 6
2.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.4 Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.4.1 Data Structure Profiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4.2 Fuzzing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.3 Signature Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.4.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5.1 Profile Generation and Fuzzing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5.2 Signature Generation and Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6.1 Profiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.6.2 Fuzzing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.6.3 Signature Accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.7 Other Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.8 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
2.9 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
vi
III VIRTUOSO: NARROWING THE SEMANTIC GAP IN VIRTUAL MA-
CHINE INTROSPECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.3 Introspection for Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.3.1 Scope and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.4 Virtuoso Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.4.1 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.4.2 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.4.3 Runtime Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.5 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.5.1 Trace Logging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.5.2 Preprocessing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3.5.3 Dynamic Slicing and Trace Merging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.5.4 Translation and Runtime Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.6 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.6.1 Generality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.6.2 Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.6.3 Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.6.4 Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.7 Limitations and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
IV TAPPAN ZEE (NORTH) BRIDGE: MINING MEMORY ACCESSES
FOR INTROSPECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2 Defining Tap Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.3 Scope and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.4 Search Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.4.1 Known Knowns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.4.2 Known Unknowns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.4.3 Unknown Unknowns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
vii
4.5 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.5.1 PANDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.5.2 Callstack Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.5.3 Fixed String Searching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.5.4 Statistical Search and Clustering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.5.5 Finding SSL/TLS Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.6 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.6.1 Known Knowns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.6.2 Known Unknowns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.6.3 Unknown Unknowns: Clustering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.6.4 Accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.7 Limitations and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.8 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
V IDENTIFYING FUNCTIONALITY IN PREVIOUSLY-UNSEEN MAL-
WARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3 Design and Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.3.1 Label Extractor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.3.2 Feature Extractors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.3.3 Feature Matching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.4 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.4.1 Carberp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.4.2 Zeus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.4.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.5 Conclusion and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
VI CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.0.1 The “Strong” Semantic Gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.0.2 Understanding Embedded Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
6.0.3 Reverse Engineering-Friendly Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
viii
APPENDIX A — SAMPLE TAP POINT CONTENTS FROM TZB . 117
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
ix
LIST OF TABLES
1 List of applications profiled, along with the number of fields in EPROCESS
accessed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2 Fields zeroed by our modified FU Rootkit, along with the scanners that
depend on that field. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3 Selected EPROCESS fields and the results of fuzzing them . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4 Constraints found for “robust” fields in the EPROCESS data structure . . . . 30
5 Tap points found that write the URL typed into the browser by the user. . 84
6 Tap points found that write the SSL/TLS master secret for each SSL/TLS
connection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7 Tap points found for file access on different operating systems. . . . . . . . 86
8 Tap points that write the system log (dmesg) on several UNIX-like operating
systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
9 Labels given to the sampled tap points by human evaluators . . . . . . . . . 92
10 Quality of clustering as measured by the Adjusted Rand Index . . . . . . . 92
11 Effect of threshold on performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
x
LIST OF FIGURES
1 The architecture of an intrusion detection system that attempts to place as
little trust in the operating system as possible. Because the OS cannot be
trusted, the security monitor must reproduce and understand implementation
details that are not normally made public. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 A näıve signature for the EPROCESS data structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3 A portion of the process list while a process hiding attack is underway . . . 12
4 The profiling stage of our signature generation system . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5 The architecture of the fuzzing stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6 Two sample constraints found by our signature generator . . . . . . . . . . 19
7 Access prevalence for EPROCESS for profiled applications. . . . . . . . . . . . 27
8 Fuzzing results for EPROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
9 An example of Virtuoso’s usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
10 A high-level conceptual view of our system for generating introspection tools 40
11 A sample program that gets the name of a process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
12 An example of an x86 instruction and the corresponding logged micro-instructions 46
13 In-guest code that signals the Trace Logger to begin tracing . . . . . . . . . 47
14 A malloc replacement that summarizes the effect of RtlAllocateHeap in
Windows using QEMU micro-ops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
15 An example of a non-additive coverage improvement from combining two traces 54
16 Results of testing a total of 17 programs across three different operating systems 58
17 Results of cross-validation for the pslist program on Windows . . . . . . . 59
18 Runtime performance of generated programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
19 Three different ways of defining a tap point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
20 Patterns of memory access that we might wish to monitor using TZB. . . . 75
21 The workflow for using TZB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
22 Design of function matching system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
23 The Carberp builder UI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
24 Code overlap in Carberp variants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
25 Function similarity results for bigrams in Carberp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
26 The Zeus builder UI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
xi
27 Function similarity results for bigrams in Zeus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
28 Detail from rendering of Graphviz file captured from a FreeBSD boot tap
point, apparently depicting disk geometry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
xii
SUMMARY
The modern world is critically dependent on complex software whose internal details are
often tenuously understood, even by their creators. In order to properly protect deployed
systems whose authors may be unable or unwilling to divulge critical details of their systems’
operation, we must develop ways of understanding deployed binary software; furthermore,
because the amount of deployed code vastly outstrips our ability to analyze it manually,
we need techniques that can automate these analyses. The techniques of program analysis,
originally created to help test software in development, have increasingly been used by those
in the security community to help understand binary programs without cooperation from
code creators. These analyses have typically focused on static analysis of the structure of
the code in question; while this can bear significant fruit at small scales, it usually cannot
handle large-scale software such as operating system kernels.
In this dissertation, we focus instead on dynamic analyses that examine the data handled
by programs and operating systems in order to divine the undocumented constraints and
implementation details that determine their behavior in the field. In doing so, we make
practical a wide variety of new security applications that previously depended on manual
reverse engineering, including RAM forensics and virtual machine introspection.
First, we introduce a novel technique for uncovering the constraints actually used in
OS kernels to decide whether a given instance of a kernel data structure is valid. Such
information is critical in developing intrusion detection systems and forensic tools that look
for hidden and unlinked structures, but previous approaches to finding these constraints
relied on unprincipled guesswork. Our system dynamically probes for enforced invariants
by mutating the content of existing data structure instances and monitoring the operating
system’s response to determine whether the modification has degraded system functionality.
In doing so we can infer which constraints on the structure’s fields are actually enforced.
xiii
Next, we further enable progress in secure system monitoring and forensics by tackling
the semantic gap problem – the disparity in semantic understanding between what is needed
by security systems and what is provided by low-level views (e.g., raw physical memory)
of running systems. We present a pair of systems that allow, on the one hand, automatic
extraction of whole-system algorithms for collecting information about a running system,
and, on the other, the rapid identification of ”hook points” within a system or program
where security tools can interpose to be notified of events such as file or URL access,
cryptographic key generation, and kernel log messages. Together, these bridge the semantic
gap by allowing periodic passive monitoring of system state and immediate notification
of specific security events, respectively. Each relies on dynamic analyses that start with
examples of security-relevant data and identify code within the system that handle or report
such data.
Finally, we present and evaluate a new dynamic measure of code similarity that examines
the content of the data handled by the code, rather than the syntactic structure of the
code itself. This problem has implications both for understanding the capabilities of novel




1.1 Motivation and Goals
We are surrounded by complex, closed systems every day. These deployed systems are
fragile and were often not created with security in mind, but are expensive to replace and
will likely be with us for decades. They often include software whose manufacturers have
long since gone out of business, and for which no detailed documentation still exists. Even
in cases where closed-source software still has vendor support, attitudes toward intellectual
property and trade secrets may prevent a vendor from divulging the internal workings of
their software.
Given the difficulty of getting code creators to willingly hand over implementation de-
tails, how can such systems be effectively protected? The inner workings of a system are of
vital interest to security systems: the difference between a simple bug and a major vulner-
ability quote often hinges on some minor detail of implementation; forensics software must
understand undocumented formats and algorithms in order to reconstruct a picture of a
suspect’s activity that will hold up in court; and intrusion detection and prevention systems
must understand the intentionally obscure techniques malware uses to insinuate itself into
a system and carry out attacks.
Beyond merely protecting existing systems, there are other security motivations for
developing a detailed understanding of the implementation details of closed-source software.
It may often be necessary to understand the undocumented behavior of some code without
cooperation from its author. In the case of malware, this point is obvious, but even for
benign software we may need to peer into its internals to verify that it works as claimed.
For example, in 2013, researchers challenged [99] Apple’s claims that messages sent by its
iMessage chat client could not be read by anyone but the intended recipient (including
Apple); in refuting this claim researchers had to reverse engineer the iMessage client. Even
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more disturbingly, by reverse engineering the TOM-Skype client (a special version of Skype
distributed in China) Knockel et al. [60] discovered a secret list of words that would trigger
censorship and surveillance. The question of whether the software one uses is acting in its
user’s interests can be critical to one’s safety and security and can often only be answered
through reverse engineering.
For these reasons, in order to protect deployed systems and understand what the soft-
ware we use is doing, we need automated techniques that can understand software based
only on binary artifacts. Although there has been a great deal of research in the past decade
on binary software analysis for vulnerability discovery, less work has been done on auto-
matically inferring the details of large scale systems such as operating systems. For such
systems, techniques such as static analysis often break down due to the large amount of
code and certain constructs prominent in systems code such as indirection through function
pointers.
In this work, we seek to develop techniques that can elucidate the internal workings and
assumptions of modern operating systems and programs. In particular, our focus will be on
techniques which allow security tools to effectively monitor the runtime state and behavior
of closed-source systems in order to provide services such as anti-virus monitoring, intrusion
detection, and rootkit detection. Our tools of choice will be dynamic analyses, for these
typically scale better to large code bases than static analysis, and will use the data handled
and output by the system as a guide to code analysis, as it is ultimately data, not code,
which determines the state of the system.
1.2 Thesis Overview
Security systems often cannot rely on the assumption that the operating system has not
been tampered with; because of this, they must come to their own understanding of the
high-level state of the system independent of the provided APIs. To achieve this goal, this
thesis presents novel dynamic analysis techniques for automatically understand-
ing closed-source systems in order to develop better protections. Our first three
chapters focus on the application of such techniques to intrusion detection systems depicted
2
in Figure 1, where an exteranal security monitor must understand internal details of pro-
gram and operating system implementation in order to detect threats. Our final chapter
discusses a more general approach to program understanding, in which dynamic features of










Figure 1: The architecture of an intrusion detection system that attempts to place as little
trust in the operating system as possible. Because the OS cannot be trusted, the security
monitor must reproduce and understand implementation details that are not normally made
public.
In Chapter 2, we examine the use of data structure signatures for detecting hidden and
unlinked structures in operating system memory. Such signatures rely on the fact that data
structure instances typically have invariants on their fields that allow them to be located
by looking for patterns in memory. These invariants, however, must be enforced by the
operating system, or attackers will still be able to hide kernel objects by manipulating the
structure’s fields in ways that violate the supposed “invariant”. Thus, to place memory
scanning techniques and develop robust signatures, we introduce a dynamic analysis based
on memory access profiling and fuzzing that probes data structure fields in order to detect
which invariants are actually enforced and can therefore be safely used in signatures. Armed
with such signatures, the security monitor in Figure 1 can compare the operating system’s
self-reported view of the system and what actually exists in memory.
Rather than scanning memory for relevant objects, intrusion detection systems may
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instead traverse the data structures that represent the system state in the same way that the
operating system or program would—i.e., by starting from some global variables, following
pointers that make up linked list or tree structures, and so on. This method, however, relies
on much more intimate knowledge of the structures and algorithms used by the system
and the burden of reverse engineering is correspondingly higher (this mismatch between
the high-level semantic view needed by a security monitor and a low-level view of e.g.
physical memory is often referred to as the semantic gap). In Chapter 3, we introduce
Virtuoso, a system which automatically extracts small subprograms from a larger operating
system or application that implement the work traversing the program’s data structures
and interpreting its internal state. This is done by identifying some API that outputs the
desired data and then using dynamic slicing and trace merging to identify and extract the
code responsible for computing that data. In essence, Virtuoso extracts and encapsulates a
program or operating system’s own mechanisms for interpreting its internal state and allows
them to be used independent of the original program. In the IDS shown in Figure 1, these
extracted programs can be used for periodic object traversal.
Passive monitoring is only half the story for an intrusion detection system, however.
Real-world security systems also need to support active monitoring, where events that
occur in the system trigger notifications to the security monitor. Such events include file
and URL accesses, log messages, cryptographic key generation (so that encrypted network
traffic can be monitored), and so on. In order to support this use case, we need ways of
quickly locating the code in a system that is responsible for carrying out the actions we
are interested in monitoring. In Chapter 4 we describe Tappan Zee (North) Bridge, or
TZB, a system that leverages the fact that the data associated with a security event will be
written to and read from memory when the event occurs; thus, by monitoring all memory
accesses made in the system and searching through these streams for data associated with
the event in question, we can locate the code location where a hook should be placed. This
information can the be provided to provide the final piece of the intrusion detection system
shown in Figure 1, the active monitoring component.
Finally, in Chapter 5 we examine a new technique for for detecting code with similar
4
functionality by looking at the content handled by functions during a dynamic trace. The
problem of identifying functionality in an unknown, binary code base is one that is relevant
to several security problems: malware analysts need to quickly determine the capabilities
of previously unseen malware and relate them to existing samples; vulnerability researchers
often need to quickly zero in on portions of code that are prone to vulnerabilities such as
input parsing; and reverse engineering efforts of all sorts can benefit from a high-level view
of what different sections of code are likely to do before performing a detailed analysis of
any one part.
We conclude in Chapter 6 by examining a number of broad, open problems in this area
and considering what changes new systems might incorporate in order to make themselves
more amenable to the kind of detailed internal inspection needed for security monitoring.
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CHAPTER II
ROBUST SIGNATURES FOR KERNEL DATA STRUCTURES
2.1 Motivation
Many successful malware variants now employ kernel-mode rootkits to hide their presence
on an infected system. A number of large botnets such as Storm, Srizbi, and Rustock have
used rootkit techniques to avoid detection. This has led to an arms race between malware
authors and security researchers, as each side attempts to find new methods of hiding
and new detection techniques, respectively. For example, the FU Rootkit [17] introduced
a means of process hiding known as Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM), which
unlinks the malicious process from the list of active processes maintained by the system.
In response, some forensic memory analysis tools [13,104,124] have started scanning kernel
memory using signatures for process data structures, and comparing the results with the
standard process list. Because signature-based scanning only requires access to physical
memory, scanners are most useful in an offline forensic context, but can be used for live
analysis as well.
However, a signature-based search can only be effective if it is difficult for an attacker
to evade. As Walters and Petroni [125] note, many current signatures for process data
structures in particular can easily be fooled by modifying a single bit in the process header.
Although this field is normally constant, its value is irrelevant to the correct operation of
the process, and so an attacker with the ability to write to kernel memory can easily modify
it and evade detection. This leads naturally to the question of which fields in a given data
structure are, in fact, essential to its function and would therefore be good features on which
to base a signature.
In this chapter, we describe a principled, automated technique for generating robust
signatures for kernel data structures such as processes. We employ a feature selection process
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that ensures that the features chosen are those that cannot be controlled by an attacker—
attempting to evade the signature by modifying the features will cause the operating system
to crash or the functionality associated with the object to fail. We use our methods to
derive a signature for EPROCESS, the data structure used to represent a running process in
Windows. By construction, an attacker attempting to evade the signature by altering the
fields of the process structure will harm the functionality of the OS or process. In addition,
we will show conclusively that current, manually generated signatures are trivially evadable
by attackers that can write to kernel memory.
Our feature selection mechanism uses two methods to determine which portions of the
data structure are critical to its function. First, we monitor operating system execution
and note which fields it reads and writes in the target structure. The intuition is that fields
that are never accessed cannot cause a crash if modified by an attacker and hence are poor
features for robust signatures. Next, we attempt to determine which fields can be modified
by an attacker without preventing the data structure from working correctly. This stage of
feature selection simulates the behavior of an attacker attempting to evade a signature: if
an attacker can arbitrarily modify a field, then any constraint we devise for that field could
be bypassed.
After robust features have been selected, we collect samples of those features in the
data structure from a large number of instances in memory images. We then use a dynamic
invariant detection technique [35] to find constraints on their values that can be used in a
signature. Our signature generator uses these constraints to create a plugin for the Volatility
memory analysis framework [124] that can find these data structures in memory.
We demonstrate the advantage of our automatically generated signatures over existing
solutions by creating a prototype rootkit (based on FU [17]). This custom malware hides
processes using a combination of DKOM and signature evasion techniques. By altering
unused fields in the process structure that current signatures depend on, the rootkit suc-
cessfully evades existing signature-based process scanners. We show that our scanner is
capable of detecting processes hidden using this method in Windows memory images.
We chose to apply our technique to the problem of finding processes in Windows memory
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images for several reasons. Reliable identification of running programs is a basic security
task that is a prerequisite for many other types of analysis. In addition, process hiding is
common feature of kernel malware; a single rootkit may be used to hide the presence of
wide variety of user-level malware. However, our techniques are general, and we will discuss
the possible application of our techniques to other kernel data structures in Section 2.7.
We make the following contributions: first, we provide strong empirical evidence that
existing signatures are trivially evadable. Second, we develop a systematic method for
securely selecting features from a data structure that can be used to create highly robust
signatures. Finally, we present a method for generating a signature based on robust features,
and use it to create a specific signature for process objects on Windows that is as accurate
as existing signatures for current malicious and non-malicious processes, but is resistant to
evasion.
These results are of immediate importance to a number of security tools which rely on
being able to locate data structures in kernel memory. The virtual machine-based “out-of-
the-box” malware detection system proposed by Jiang et al. [52], for example, uses several
invariant bytes found in the header of a process structure to find processes under Windows.
Cross-view detection approaches to detect hidden processes used by memory analysis tools
such as Volatility [124], memparser [13], and PTFinder [104] also make use of signatures
to locate key kernel structures. Finally, virtual machine introspection libraries such as
XenAccess [94] often use signature scans of guest memory to identify processes and provide
user-space address translation. The ability to locate data structures such as processes,
independent of any operating system-level view, is critical to the correct operation of these
tools, and all of them would benefit from the use of more robust signatures.
2.2 Related Work
Signature-based methods have repeatedly been proposed to identify particular classes of
security threats, and, in general, these methods have been found vulnerable to evasion in
the face of adversaries. In the area of virus detection, for example, the earliest detectors
(and, indeed, many modern commercial utilities) matched byte strings found in viral code
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that were unlikely to occur in innocuous programs. As the volume of viral code in the wild
increased, automated methods were developed to generate signatures based on known viral
samples [57]. These methods were thwarted by the appearance of polymorphic and meta-
morphic [119] viruses; with these techniques, virus creators could transform the malicious
code into a form that was functionally equivalent but had no meaningful strings in com-
mon with the original code. As a complexity theory problem, reliable detection of bounded
length metamorphic viruses has been shown to be NP-complete [114]. Empirical results
have confirmed the difficulty of the problem: by mutating Visual Basic viruses found in
the wild using techniques similar to fuzzing [39,85,86] and random testing, Christodorescu
and Jha [25] found that most malware detectors are vulnerable to even simple obfuscation
techniques.
The response to network-based worms followed a similar path. Initial attempts to detect
network worms used simple, handmade signatures for intrusion detection systems such as
Snort [100] that searched for static byte patterns in the network payload of the worm.
However, such manual processes did not scale to the large number of worm variants that
soon appeared, and numerous systems for automatic signature generation were proposed [58,
65,107]. These too, however, were soon defeated by polymorphic shellcode that altered the
syntactic structure of the worm payload without affecting its functionality [30]. Although
later signature generation systems [73,92] were able to create signatures based on invariant
features in certain classes of polymorphic shellcode, Gundy et al. [45] found that there were
some vulnerabilities that could not be captured by such systems. Indeed, further work by
Song et al. [113] demonstrated that the general problem of modeling polymorphic shellcode
was likely to be infeasible, and Fogla and Lee [38] found that detecting polymorphic blending
attacks is an NP-complete problem.
Although these results do not make the search for reliable kernel data structure signa-
tures look promising, there are key differences that allow signature-based methods to be
effective in this case. In the case of viruses and shellcode, the syntax of the malicious input
is under the control of the attacker; only its semantics must remain the same in order to
produce an effective attack. By contrast, the syntax of kernel data structures is controlled
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by the code of the operating system; an attacker can only modify the data contained in the
structure to the extent that the operating system will continue to treat it as a valid instance
of the given type. By identifying portions of these data structures that cannot be modified
by the attacker, we are able to generate signatures that resist evasion.
Our signature generation system uses dynamic analysis to profile field usage in kernel
data structures. A similar technique is employed by Chilimbi et al. [21] for a different
goal; their tool, bbcache, analyzes field access patterns in user-space data structures in
order to optimize cache performance. After the profiling step, we use a technique similar
to fuzzing [85] to identify unused fields in kernel data structures. Fuzzing was also applied
by Solar Eclipse [111] to determine which fields in the Portable Executable (PE) file format
were required by the Windows loader, in order to develop ways of decreasing the size of
Windows executables. Finally, our system finds invariants on the fields in the data structure
and produces a Python script that can be used to find instances of the structure in memory
images.
Another system that makes use of data structure invariants is Gibraltar by Baliga et
al. [7]. Their system creates a graph of all kernel objects in memory and records the values
of those objects’ members as the system runs. The dynamic invariant detector Daikon [35] is
then used to derive constraints on the objects’ data. Deviations from the inferred invariants
are considered to be attacks against kernel data. The goals and assumptions of our own
system, however, are substantially different: whereas Gibraltar assumes that the locations
of all kernel data structures can be found a priori and then attempts to enforce constraints
on those objects, our system seeks to find features of specific data structures in order to
locate them in memory. The two approaches can be seen as complementary; once security-
critical objects such as processes are located using our signatures, techniques similar to
Gibraltar may be employed to detect and enforce invariants on the data.
A number of approaches to detect hidden processes have been featured in other work.
Antfarm [53] and Lycosid [54] track the value of the CR3 register as a virtual machine
executes to identify unique virtual address spaces, which correspond to distinct processes.
Although this approach is quite useful in a live environment, it cannot be used for offline
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forensic analysis. Some offline methods have been proposed as well: Klister [102], for
example, attempted to find hidden processes by relying on the scheduler’s thread list rather
than the systemwide process list, which thwarts some kinds of DKOM attacks. An evasion
for this kind of detection has been demonstrated [2], however: an attacker can replace the
OS scheduler with a modified copy, bypassing any tool which relies on the original list.
Signature scanning is less vulnerable to such attacks, as any changes an attacker makes to
the layout of a data structure must be reflected in any OS code that uses the structure.
Finally, other recent work has focused on finding data structures in memory. Laika
[27] infers the layout of data structures and attempts to find instances in memory using
unsupervised Bayesian learning. Because their system assumes that the data structures are
not known in advance, it may be useful in cases where data structure definitions are not
available. This flexibility comes the cost of accuracy, however: whereas our process scanner
found all instances of the structure in all tested memory images with no false positives,
Laika had false positive and negative rates of 32% and 35%, respectively.
We anticipate that rootkit authors will soon add signature evasion techniques to their
standard toolkits. Evasion of signatures for kernel data has already been publicly dis-
cussed: Walters and Petroni [125] demonstrated that changing a single bit in the Windows
process data structure was sufficient to evade all known signatures without harming the
functionality of the running process. Similarly, in response to Rutkowska’s signature-based
modGREPER [103], valerino [120] described an evasion technique that altered a number
of fields in the driver and module structures. Finally, bugcheck [15] described a number of
methods (including signatures that match fixed strings) for finding kernel data structures
in Windows memory and explored several evasion techniques that could be used to hide
objects from those techniques. As tools that find hidden objects through memory scans
become more common, we believe malware authors will adapt by attempting to evade sig-
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Figure 2: A näıve signature for the EPROCESS data structure. The constraints shown are a
subset of those used in PTFinder’s process signature. Because the Size field is not used by
the operating system, an attacker can change its value, hiding the process from a scanner
using this signature.

































Figure 3: A portion of the process list while a process hiding attack is underway. The
hidden process has been removed from the doubly linked list, and its Size field has been
changed to evade the signature above.
2.3 Overview
A signature-based scanner examines each offset in physical memory, looking for predefined
patterns in the data that indicate the presence of a particular data structure. These patterns
take the form of a set of constraints on the values of various fields in the structure. For
example, Figure 2 shows a simple signature for a process data structure in Windows (called
EPROCESS; this structure holds accounting information and metadata about a task). The
constraints check to see that the Type and Size fields match predefined constants, that the
ThreadListHead pointer is greater than a certain value, and that the DirectoryTableBase
is aligned to 0x20 bytes. These invariants must be general enough to encompass all instances
of the data structure, but specific enough to avoid matching random data in memory.
An adversary’s goal is to hide the existence of a kernel data structure from a signature-
based scanner while continuing to make use of that data structure. We assume that the
attacker has the ability to run code in kernel-mode, can read and modify any kernel data,
and cannot alter existing kernel code. This threat model represents a realistic attacker: it
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is increasingly common for malware to gain the ability to execute code in kernel mode [37],
and there are a number of solutions available that can detect and prevent modifications to
the core kernel code [97,105], but we are not aware of any solutions that protect kernel data
from malicious modification.
To carry out a process hiding attack, such as the one shown in Figure 3, an attacker
conceals the process from the operating system using a technique such as DKOM. This
attack works by removing the kernel data structure (EPROCESS) representing that process
from the OS’s list of running processes. The process continues to run, as its threads are
known to the scheduler, but it will not be visible to the user in the task manager. However,
it will still be visible to a signature-based scanner [13,104] that searches kernel memory for
process structures rather than walking the OS process list.
To evade such scanners, the attacker must modify one of the fields in the process data
structure so that some constraint used by the signature no longer holds. The field must also
be carefully chosen so that the modification does not cause the OS to crash or the malicious
program to stop working. In the example shown in Figure 3, the attacker zeroes the Size
field, which has no effect on the execution of his malicious process, but which effectively
hides the data structure from the scanner.
In order to defend against these kinds of attacks, signatures for data structures must
be based on invariants that the attacker cannot violate without crashing the OS or causing
the malicious program to stop working. The signature’s constraints, then, should be placed
only on those fields of the data structure that are critical to the correct operation of the
operating system. Rather than relying on human judgement, which is prone to errors, our
solution profiles OS execution in order to determine the most frequently accessed fields, and
then actively tries to modify their contents to determine which are critical to the correct
functioning of the system. Such fields will be difficult for an attacker to modify without
crashing the system, and are good candidates for robust signatures.
Finally, we will demonstrate that it is possible to automatically infer invariants on these
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Figure 4: The profiling stage of our signature generation system. As the OS executes, ac-
cesses to the target data structure are logged. These logs are then combined with knowledge
of the field layout in the structure to produce an access profile.
2.4 Architecture
Our system architecture generates signatures using a three step process. We first profile
the data structure we wish to model to determine which fields are most commonly accessed
by the operating system (Section 2.4.1). This is done to narrow the domain of the data
that we must test in the fuzzing stage: if a field is never accessed in the course of the
normal operation of the OS, it is safe to assume that it can be modified without adversely
affecting OS functionality. Next, the most frequently accessed fields are fuzzed (Section
2.4.2) to determine which can be modified without causing a crash or otherwise preventing
the structure from serving its intended purpose. Finally, we collect known-good instances
of the data structure, and build a signature based on these instances that depends only on
the features that could not be safely modified during fuzzing (Section 2.4.3).
Profiling and fuzzing are both essentially forms of feature selection. Each tests features
of the data structure to determine their suitability for use in a signature. Features that
are unused by the operating system or are modifiable without negative consequences are
assumed to be under the control of the attacker and eliminated from consideration. Includ-
ing such weak features would allow an attacker to introduce false negatives by violating the
constraints of a signature that used them, in the same way that a polymorphic virus evades
an overly specific antivirus signature. At the other end of the spectrum, if too few features
remain at the end of feature selection, the resulting signature may not be specific enough
and may match random data, creating false positives.
The profiling and fuzzing stages are implemented using the Xen hypervisor [9] and
VMware Server [123], respectively. Because profiling requires the ability to monitor memory
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access, we chose to use Xen, which is open source and allowed us to make the necessary
changes to the hypervisor to support this monitoring. However, Xen lacks the ability to
save and restore system snapshots, a feature needed for reliable fuzz testing, so we use
VMware Server for this stage. Also, because VMware’s snapshots save the contents of
physical memory to disk, we were able to easily modify the memory of the guest OS by
altering the on-disk snapshot file.
2.4.1 Data Structure Profiling
In the profiling stage (shown in Figure 4), we attempt to determine which structure fields are
most commonly accessed by the operating system during normal operation. Fields which
are accessed by the OS frequently are stronger candidates for use in a signature because it
is more likely that correct behavior of the system depends upon them. By contrast, fields
which are rarely accessed are most likely available to the attacker for arbitrary modification;
if the OS never accesses a particular field in the data structure, its value cannot influence
the flow of execution.
In our implementation, we make use of a modified Xen hypervisor and the “stealth
breakpoint” technique described by Vasudevan and Yerraballi [121] to profile access to the
data structure. Stealth breakpoints on memory regions work by marking the memory page
that contains the data to be monitored as “not present” by clearing the Present bit in the
corresponding page table entry. When the guest OS makes any access to the page, the page
fault handler is triggered, an event which can be caught by the hypervisor. The hypervisor
then logs the virtual address that was accessed (available in the CR2 register), emulates the
instruction that caused the fault, and allows the guest to continue. These logs can later be
examined to determine what fields were accessed, and how often.
For example, to monitor the fields of the Windows EPROCESS data structure, we launch
a process and determine the address in memory of the structure. We then instruct the
hypervisor to log all access to that page, and then allow the process to run for some time.
Finally, the logs are examined and matched against the structure’s definition to determine
how often individual fields were read or written. This process is repeated using several
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different applications; only the fields that are accessed during the execution of every program
will be used as input for the fuzzing stage.
We note in passing that determining the precise field accessed requires access to the data
structure’s definition. On open source operating systems, this information is easy to come
by, but for closed source OSes such as Windows it may be more difficult to obtain. For our
implementation, which targets Windows XP, we used the debugging symbols provided by
Microsoft; these symbols include structure definitions for many kernel structures, including
EPROCESS.
2.4.2 Fuzzing
Although a field that is accessed frequently is a stronger candidate than one which is
never accessed, this condition alone is not sufficient to identify truly robust features for
use in signatures. For example, the operating system may update a field representing a
performance counter quite frequently, but its value is not significant to the correct operation
of the OS. Thus, to be confident that a signature based on a particular field will be robust
against evasion attacks, we must ensure that the field cannot be arbitrarily modified.
The actual fuzzing (shown in Figure 5) is done by running the target operating system
inside VMware Server [123]. As in the profiling stage, we first create a valid instance of the
data structure. Next, the state of the guest VM is saved so that it can be easily restored
after each test. For each field, we then replace its contents with test data from one of several
classes:
1. Zero: null bytes. This is used because zero is often a significant special case; e.g.,
many functions check if a pointer is NULL before dereferencing.
2. Random: n random bytes from a uniform distribution, where n is the size of the
field.
3. Random primitive type: a random value appropriate to the given primitive type.
In particular, pointer fields are fuzzed using valid pointers to kernel memory.















Figure 5: The architecture of the fuzzing stage. Starting from some baseline state, a test
pattern is written into a field in the target data structure in the memory of the virtual
machine. The VM is then resumed and tested to see if its functionality is intact. If so, the
modification was not harmful and we consider the field a weaker candidate for a signature.
(i.e., structure). Embedded structures are replaced by other valid instances of that
structure, and pointers to structures of a given type are replaced by pointers to that
same type. Currently implemented as a random choice of value from that field in
other instances of the target data structure.
After the data is modified, we resume the guest VM and monitor the operating system
to observe the effects of our modifications. To determine whether our modification was
harmful, we must construct a test, φ, which examines the guest and checks if the OS is
still working and the functionality associated with the target data structure instance is still
intact.
For a process data structure, φ could be a test that first checks to see if the OS is
running, and then determines whether the associated program is still running. This check
may be simpler to program if the behavior of the application in question is well-known. In
our experiments (described in Section 2.5.1), we used an application we had written that
performed some simple functions such as creating a file on the hard drive. This allowed φ to
check if the program had continued to run successfully by simply testing for the existence
of the file created by the program.
To actually inject the data, we pause the virtual machine, which (in VMware) writes the
memory out to a file. We then use the memory analysis framework Volatility [124] (which
we modified to support writing to the image) to locate the target instance and modify the
appropriate field with our random data. Volatility was ideal for this purpose, because it has
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the ability to locate a number of kernel data structures in images of Windows memory and
provides a way to access the data inside the structures by field name. The modifications to
allow writing to the image (a feature not normally supported by Volatility, as it is primarily
a forensics tool) required 303 lines of additional code.
Finally, we resume the virtual machine and check to see if φ indicates the system is still
functioning correctly after some time interval. This interval is currently set to 30 seconds to
allow time for the VM to resume and any crashes to occur. Software engineering studies [90]
have found that crashes typically occur within an average of one million instructions from
the occurrence of memory corruption; thus, given current CPU speeds, it is reasonable
to assume that this 30 second delay will usually be sufficient to determine whether the
alteration was harmful to program functionality. The result of the test is logged, and we
restore the saved virtual machine state before running the next test. Any fields whose
modification consistently caused φ to indicate failure are used to generate a signature for
the data structure.
2.4.3 Signature Generation
The final signature generation step is performed using a simplified version of dynamic
invariant detection [35]. For each field identified by the feature selection as robust, we first
gather a large number of representative values from all instances of the target data structure
in our corpus of memory images. Then, for each field, we test several constraint templates
to see if any produce invariants that apply to all known values of that field. The templates
checked are:
• Zero subset: check if there is a subset of the values that is zero. If so, ignore these
values for the remaining checks.
• Constant: check if the field takes on a constant value.
• Bitwise AND: check if performing a bitwise AND of all values results in a non-zero
value. This effectively checks whether all values have any bits in common.
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class Scan ( RobustPsScanner ,
PoolScanProcessFast2 . Scan ) :
def i n i t ( s e l f , p o f f s e t , outer ) :
RobustPsScanner . i n i t ( s e l f ,
p o f f s e t , outer )
s e l f . add cons t ra in t (
s e l f . c h e ck ob j e c t t ab l e
)
s e l f . add cons t ra in t (
s e l f . check g rantedacce s s
)
[ . . . ]
def ch e ck ob j e c t t ab l e ( s e l f , buf , o f f ) :
va l = read ob j f r om bu f ( buf ,
types , [ ‘ EPROCESS ’ ,
‘ ObjectTable ’ ] , o f f )
r e s = ( va l == 0 or
( va l & 0xe0000000 ==
0xe0000000 and
va l % 0x8 == 0))
return r e s
def check grantedacce s s ( s e l f , buf , o f f ) :
va l = read ob j f r om bu f ( buf ,
types , ‘ EPROCESS ’ ,
‘ GrantedAccess ’ ] , o f f )
r e s = va l & 0 x1 f07 fb == 0 x1 f07 fb
return r e s
Listing 1: Two sample constraints found by our signa-
ture generator. If all constraints match for a given data
bu!er, the plugin will report that the corresponding lo-
cation in memory contains an EPROCESS instance.
2
Figure 6: Two sample constraints found by our sign ture generator. If all constraints match
for a given data buffer, the plugin will report that the corresponding location in memory
contains an EPROCESS instance.
• Alignment: check if there is a power of two (other than 1) on which all values are
aligned.
First, because many fields use zero as a special case to indicate that the field is not in
use, we check if any of the instances are zero, and then remove these from the set to be
examined. Constraints are then inferred on the remaining fields, and zero will be included as
a disjunctive (OR) case in the final signature. The other templates will produce conjunctive
constraints on the non-zero field values.
The constant template determines whether a field always takes on a particular value.
This is useful, for example, for data structures that have a “magic” number that identifies
them uniquely. Because the features that are used for signature generation are known to
be robust (as these were the selection criteria described in Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2), we can
have some confidence that the operating system performs sanity checking on such constant
values.
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The two remaining tests are particularly useful for finding constraints on pointer values.
The bitwise AND test simply performs a bitwise AND of all values observed. In many
operating systems, kernel memory resides in a specific portion of virtual address space,
such as (in Windows) the upper 2 gigabytes. One can determine if a 32-bit pointer always
points to kernel memory, then, by simply checking that the highest bit is set.
Finally, the alignment test attempts to find a natural alignment for all values. As an
optimization, many OS memory managers allocate memory aligned on a natural processor
boundary, such as eight bytes. As a result, most pointers to kernel objects will likewise
have some natural alignment that we can discover and use as a constraint.
Our signature generator takes as input a comma-separated file, where each row gives the
field name and a list of values observed for that field. For each field, it applies the constraint
templates to the values listed and determines a boolean expression that is true for every
value. It then outputs a plugin for Volatility, written in Python, that can be used to scan
for the target data structure in a memory image. An excerpt of the plugin generated to
search for instances of the EPROCESS data structure is given in Figure 6.
The signature generation mechanism produces extremely robust results in practice: as
we describe in Section 2.6.3, the signature we generated for Windows process data structures
found all instances of the data structure in memory with no false positives or negatives.
Should this technique prove insufficient for some data structure, however (for example, if
only a few features are robust enough to use in a signature), more heavyweight techniques
such as dynamic heap type inference [98] could be used.
2.4.4 Discussion
Our experiments (described in Section 2.6) show that these techniques can be used to
derive highly accurate signatures for kernel data structures that are simultaneously difficult
to evade. There are, however, certain drawbacks to using probabilistic methods such as
dynamic analysis and fuzz testing. In particular, both techniques may suffer from coverage
problems. In the profiling stage, it is highly unlikely that every field used by the operating
system will actually be accessed; there are many fields that may only be used in special cases.
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Likewise, during fuzzing, it is possible that although the operating system did not crash
during the 30 seconds of testing, it might fail later on, or in some special circumstances.
In both of these cases, however, we note that these omissions will only cause us to ignore
potentially robust features, rather than accidentally including weak ones. Moreover, from
an attacker’s point of view, the malware need not work perfectly, or run in every special
case: sacrificing correct operation in a tiny fraction of configurations may be worth the
increased stealth afforded by modifying these fields. Thus, a short time interval for testing
is conservative: it will never cause a weak feature to be used in a signature, as only features
whose modification consistently causes OS crashes form the basis of signatures. However,
it may cause fields to be eliminated that would, in fact, have been acceptable to use in a
signature. If too many fields are eliminated, the resulting signature may match random
data in memory, creating false positives. In any case, this limitation is easily overcome by
increasing the amount of time the fuzzer waits before testing the OS functionality, or by
exercising the guest OS more strenuously during that time period.
However, there are some coverage issues that could result in weak signatures. Because
fuzzing is a dynamic process, it is possible to only inject a subset of values that causes
the OS to crash, while there exists some other set of values that can be used without any
negative effects. In this case, we may conclude that a given feature is robust when in fact
the attacker can modify it at will. For most fields it is not practical to test every possible
value (for example, assuming each test takes only five seconds, it would still require over
680 years to exhaustively test a 32-bit integer). In Section 2.8, we will consider future
enhancements to the fuzzing stage that may improve coverage.
Finally, we note that although the features selected using our method are likely to be
difficult to modify, there is no guarantee that they will be usable in a signature. For example,
although our testing found that the field containing the process ID is difficult to modify, it
could still be any value, and examining a large number of process IDs will not turn up any
constraints on the value. In practice, though, we found that most of the “robust” features
identified were fairly simple to incorporate into a signature, and we expect that this will be
true for most data structures.
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2.5 Methodology
Signature search is essentially a classification problem: given an unknown piece of data, we
wish to classify it as an instance of our data type or as something else. Our experiments,
therefore, attempt to measure the performance of the signatures using standard classification
metrics: false positives and negatives. A false positive in this case is a piece of data that
matches the signature but would not be considered a valid instance of the data structure by
the operating system. Conversely, a false negative is a valid instance that is not classified as
such by our signature. False negatives represent cases where the attacker could successfully
evade the signature, whereas false positives could introduce noise and make it difficult for
to tell what processes are actually running.
For our purposes, we only consider false positives that are syntactically invalid. We
note that an attacker could generate any number of false positives by simply making copies
of existing kernel data structures. These structures would be semantically invalid (the
operating system would have no knowledge of their existence), but would be detected by
a signature scanner. The possibility of such “dummy” structures is a known weakness of
signature-based methods for finding kernel data structures [125]; however, a solution to this
problem is outside the scope of this work.
For our experiments, we chose to generate a signature for the Windows EPROCESS data
structure, which holds information related to each running process. This structure was
chosen because it is the most commonly hidden by malicious software, and there are a
number of existing signature-based tools that attempt to locate this data structure in mem-
ory [13, 104, 124]. We compare the success of our signature with these tools. However, our
work can also be applied to generate signatures for other data structures.
2.5.1 Profile Generation and Fuzzing
During the profiling stage, we examined access patterns for fields in the EPROCESS data
structure. To ensure that our data represented a wide range of possible application-level
behavior, we chose twenty different programs that performed a variety of tasks (see Table 1
for a full list). To obtain a profile, we first launched the application and noted the address of
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Command shell 5.1.2600.5512 135




Internet Explorer 7.0.5730.13 153










Notepad (debugged) 5.6.2600.5512 145
Windbg (debugging) 6.9.0003.113 x86 146
Communications
Name Version Fields




Pidgin Installer 2.4.0 188
Antivirus / Antispyware
Name Version Fields
Avira AntiVir 8.2.0.337 130
Spybot Search & Destroy 1.6.0.0 136
Network Servers
Name Version Fields
Apache HTTPd 2.2.11 108
network listener N/A 139
Multimedia
Name Version Fields
Windows Media Player 9.00.00.4503 142
iTunes 8.0.2.20 142
its associated EPROCESS structure using the kernel debugger, WinDbg. We then instructed
the Xen hypervisor to monitor access to the page, and used the application for a minimum
of five minutes.
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We note that in addition to differences caused by the unique function performed by
each application, other activities occurring on the system may cause different parts of the
data structure to be exercised. In an attempt to isolate the effects caused by differences
in program behavior, as each profile was generated we also used the system to launch
several new tasks (Notepad and the command shell, cmd.exe), switch between interactive
programs, and move and minimize the window of the application being profiled.
After profiling the applications, we picked only the features that were accessed in all
twenty applications. This choice is conservative: if there are applications which do not
cause a particular field to be exercised, then it may be possible for an attacker to design a
program that never causes the OS to access that field. The attacker would then be able to
modify the field’s value at will and evade any signature that used constraints on its value.
As described in Section 2.4.2, features that were accessed by all programs profiled were
fuzzed to ensure that they were difficult to modify. Checking that the EPROCESS data
structure is still functioning after each fuzz test is much simpler if the associated program
has known, well defined behavior. For this reason, we chose to create a program called
network listener that opens a network socket on TCP port 31337, waits for a connection,
creates a file on the hard drive, and finally exits successfully. The baseline snapshot was
taken just after launching network listener inside the guest VM.
Because the program behavior is known in advance, the test to see if the OS and program
are still working correctly (φ) becomes simple. From the host, we perform the following
tests on the virtual machine:
1. Determine if the virtual machine responds to pings.
2. Check that the program is still accepting connections on port 31337.
3. Check for the existence of the file written by the application (using the VMware Tools
API).
If all tests pass, then φ returns true, indicating that the modification was accomplished
without harming OS or program functionality. If instead φ returns false, then the OS has
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crashed or some aspect of the program associated with our EPROCESS instance has stopped
functioning. This latter case indicates that the OS will not accept arbitrary values for the
field, and provides evidence that we can safely build a signature based on the field.
2.5.2 Signature Generation and Evaluation
Finally, we generated a signature using the method described in Section 2.4.3. The features
chosen were the 15 most robust, as measured by the tests done during the fuzzing stage.
For each of these fields, we extracted from our corpus of memory images (our training set)
a list of the values it contained for all processes found in the image. The four images in the
training set were not infected by malware, and were taken from systems running the 32-bit
version of Windows XP, Service Pack 2. Processes were located in the memory image by
walking the operating system’s process list; in the absence of maliciously hidden processes,
this serves as “ground truth” for the list of valid process data structures. We then used
our signature generator to find constraints on the observed values. The signature generator
outputs a plugin for Volatility that can be used to search for a data structure matching the
constraints found in a memory image.
The generated scan plugin was used to search for processes in a number of memory
images. For this purpose, we used two images provided by the NIST Computer Forensic
Reference Data Sets (CFReDS) project [91] and a paused virtual machine on which a process
had been hidden by our own custom rootkit. The number of false positives and negatives
were measured for each test image, and compared against two existing signature-based tools,
PTFinder [104] and Volatility’s psscan2 module.1
Our custom malware, which is a slightly modified version of the FU Rootkit [17], hides
processes using DKOM (as in the original FU), and additionally attempts to evade known
process signatures by zeroing non-essential fields in the process data structure. The fields
modified, shown in Table 2, were chosen by finding those fields that were used by common
scanners but that our initial structure profiling indicated were unused by the OS.
1Note that Volatility also includes a process scanner called psscan. This scanner uses the same constraints
as PTFinder, and hence is vulnerable to the same evasions, so we do not consider it here.
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The experimental results are given below. We describe the outcome of profiling twenty
different applications and present the results of the fuzzing stage. These features are used
by the signature generator to find constraints and create a new process scan module for
Volatility. Finally, we compare the accuracy of our scanner with other popular scanners.
Throughout, we also consider what our results tell us about the features used by another
popular signature (PTFinder’s signature for EPROCESS). We find that after fuzzing and
profiling, only two of its nine features are resistant to evasion; the remaining invariants are
not sufficient to avoid matching random portions of memory.
2.6.1 Profiling
After profiling the twenty applications described in Section 2.5.1, we can confirm our hy-
pothesis that some fields are accessed only rarely, if ever. Of the 221 fields in the EPROCESS
data structure, 32 were never accessed during the execution of the profiled programs. At
the other extreme, 72 were accessed for every application and are thus strong candidates
for a process signature. In between are 117 fields that were accessed by some programs, but
not others; Figure 7a gives a histogram detailing precisely how many programs accessed
each field.
Included in the 32 fields that were never accessed are three of the nine used by PTFinder
to locate processes in memory dumps; a further four are only accessed by a subset of the
programs profiled (the profiling results for the fields used by PTFinder are shown in Figure




















(a) Number of profiled programs in which EPROCESS fields were accessed. Only fields accessed by all



















(b) Access prevalence of fields used by PTFinder’s EPROCESS signature. Note that the signature
relies on field values never used by the OS, so an attacker can safely change these values to evade
the signature.
Figure 7: Access prevalence for EPROCESS for profiled applications.
be met in order to report a match), and the attacker has complete control over three of
the fields used in the signature, we can conclude that this signature can be trivially evaded.
The features chosen by PTFinder’s author did not correspond to those used by the OS,
demonstrating that human judgment may not be sufficient to determine what fields are
appropriate for use in data structure signatures.
2.6.2 Fuzzing
We then took the 72 fields identified as always accessed during the profiling stage and fuzzed
them using the four different data patterns (zero, random, random primitive, and random
aggregate), modifying each field with each pattern five times, for a total of 1,440 distinct
tests. The overall number of failed tests for each field is shown in Figure 8. However, this























Fuzzing Results for EPROCESS
Unused
by OS
Figure 8: Fuzzing results for EPROCESS. The y-axis represents the total number of tests
for which φ returned false, indicating that the process was no longer functioning correctly.
Higher bars indicate stronger features.
data patterns caused the OS to fail. It may be acceptable to use a field in a signature
even if it is possible to write zeroes to that field, for example, because the constraint could
include zero as a special case. We have, therefore, included several sample fields in Table
3, in order to give an idea of what the result data looks like.
We find, as expected, that there are many “essential” fields upon which we may base
our signature. Five fields failed every attempt at manipulation, and a further 12 failed
more than half of the tests (i.e., more than 10). This will give us a set of robust features
that is large enough to ensure that the number of false positives found by the signature is
minimized.
As in the profiling stage, we also note that these results give us a very strong indication
of what fields not to choose. Of the 72 fields from profiling, 29 passed every test (their
modification did not result in any loss of functionality); these, again, would be a poor basis
for a signature as their values can be controlled by an attacker.
2.6.3 Signature Accuracy
With a list of robust features in hand, we used our signature generator to find constraints
on the values of each feature. The field values were collected from 184 processes across the
four images in our training set and constraints were inferred using the templates described
in Section 2.5.2, producing the constraints shown in Table 4. The signature generator
produced a plugin for Volatility that uses the constraints found to search for EPROCESS
instances in memory images.
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Table 3: Selected EPROCESS fields and the results of fuzzing them. The values indicate the
number of times a given test caused φ to return false, indicating that the OS or program
had stopped working correctly. The columns indicate number of OS crashes when testing
with the Zero, Random, Random Primitive, and Random Aggregate patterns.
Field Z R P A Total
ActiveProcessLinks.Flink 5 5 5 5 20
Pcb.DirectoryTableBase[0] 5 5 5 5 20
Pcb.ThreadListHead.Flink 5 5 5 5 20
Token.Value 5 5 5 3 18
Token.Object 5 5 5 1 16
VadHint 5 5 2 0 12
UniqueProcessId 1 5 5 1 12
We then evaluated the accuracy of three process scanners: our own automatically gen-
erated scanner, Volatility’s psscan2 module, and PTFinder [104]. Using each scanner, we
searched for instances of the EPROCESS data structure in the three memory images listed in
Section 2.5.2. The output of each tool was compared against the OS’s list of running pro-
cesses (found by walking the linked list of process data structures using Volatility’s pslist
module). In the case of the non-NIST image, we also checked for the presence of our hidden
process, which was not visible in the standard OS process list.
We found that all three scanners had equal detection performance on the NIST images
and found every process data structure with no false positives. However, only our own
scanner was able to detect the hidden process in the third image, demonstrating that an
attacker could potentially evade both psscan2 and PTFinder with minimal effort. We
believe our signature will also prove resistant to evasion against real-world attackers, as the
features it uses are demonstrably difficult for an attacker to alter.
Aside from the active processes in the images, we also noted some discrepancies between
the three scanners with respect to terminated processes whose EPROCESS structure was still
in memory and had not yet been overwritten. Although PTFinder and psscan2 were vul-
nerable to the evasion by our custom malware, they also found these terminated processes,
which our scanner missed.
As terminated processes could be of forensic interest, we checked whether there was some
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Table 4: Constraints found for “robust” fields in the EPROCESS data structure. The operators
shown have the same meaning as in C; % stands for the mod operation, and & represents
bitwise AND. && and || are the boolean operators for “and” and “or”, respectively.
Field Constraint
Pcb.ReadyListHead.Flink val & 0x80000000 == 0x80000000 && val % 0x8 == 0
Pcb.ThreadListHead.Flink val & 0x80000000 == 0x80000000 && val % 0x8 == 0
WorkingSetLock.Count val == 1 && val & 0x1 == 0x1
Vm.VmWorkingSetList val & 0xc0003000 == 0xc0003000 && val % 0x1000 == 0
VadRoot val == 0 || (val & 0x80000000 == 0x80000000 && val % 0x8 == 0)
Token.Value val & 0xe0000000 == 0xe0000000
AddressCreationLock.Count val == 1 && val & 0x1 == 0x1
VadHint val == 0 || (val & 0x80000000 == 0x80000000 && val % 0x8 == 0)
Token.Object val & 0xe0000000 == 0xe0000000
QuotaBlock val & 0x80000000 == 0x80000000 && val % 0x8 == 0
ObjectTable val == 0 || (val & 0xe0000000 == 0xe0000000 && val % 0x8 == 0)
GrantedAccess val & 0x1f07fb == 0x1f07fb
ActiveProcessLinks.Flink val & 0x80000000 == 0x80000000 && val % 0x8 == 0
Peb val == 0 || (val & 0x7ffd0000 == 0x7ffd0000 && val % 0x1000 == 0)
Pcb.DirectoryTableBase.0 val % 0x20 == 0
subset of our “robust” features that would find such processes without introducing false pos-
itives. By modifying our scanner to report the result of each constraint for the terminated
processes, we found that Windows appears to zero the Token.Object and Token.Value
fields, which refer to the process’s security token, when the process exits. Once we re-
moved these constraints from our signature, we were able to find the terminated processes
reported by other tools without introducing false positives. We note that our scanner re-
mains resistant to evasions, as the remaining fields are all robust. The terminated processes
demonstrate the importance of generating signatures from a training set that represents the
full range of objects one wishes to detect.
2.7 Other Structures
Although our experiments have only been run on EPROCESS, we are confident that the
technique will generalize to other data structures. Certain structures in particular, such
as threads (represented by ETHREAD in Windows) and files (FILE OBJECT), would be good
candidates for signature generation, as they contain a wealth of information about the
runtime state of the system that is useful for forensic analysis. We will briefly consider
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what changes might be needed to generate signatures for these structures.
The profiling stage is essentially the same for any structure: the objects are created
by some user-level program (i.e., by spawning a thread or opening a file), their location in
memory is determined, and the memory region is monitored to log access to the structure.
In the fuzzing stage, the only significant challenge is creating an appropriate functionality
test φ. As threads contain executable code, one could simply use the same test as for
processes: attempt to create a file and ensure that the file is created successfully. For file
objects, one could test functionality by performing a range of operations on the open file,
such as reading, writing, seeking, and closing the file. Finally, our signature generator is
not specific to any one object type and could be used as-is: the only input required is a list
of observed values for each field in the data structure.
One final complication may arise if the target structure is fairly small. In this case,
it may be that after eliminating weak features, there will not be enough left to create a
reliable signature (in the sense of having few false positives). In this case, we might employ
a more sophisticated search technique: rather than simply using basic pattern matching
to find instances of the structure, we could take advantage of information such as the
types of objects to which it points. This technique has previously been used successfully in
other work to identify the types of objects on the heap [98], and this additional contextual
information could improve signature accuracy.
2.8 Future Work
As discussed in Section 2.4.4, obtaining full coverage during fuzzing is impractical; however,
but it may be possible to improve our coverage through more judicious selection of random
data. For example, we might incorporate mutation fuzzing [93], which generates fuzz data
by creating small, random variations on existing values. This would help us more efficiently
explore the space of possible values, as for many fields legal values will be clustered fairly
close together.
The profiling stage could also be made more accurate by switching from simply mon-
itoring whether a field is accessed to attempting to determine how it is used. This would
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involve the use of taint tracking [11] to find out whether the value of a given field actu-
ally influences the execution of the OS. We expect that this could significantly reduce the
number of fields that would need to be fuzzed.
Finally, although the automatically generated signatures from our method appear to
work well, they are based on dynamic analysis and may therefore suffer from coverage
problems. Gaps in coverage could lead to false negatives and evasions in the signature
matching process: a constraint inferred on a small number of samples may not be represen-
tative of the full range of values that field uses, and thus be overly restrictive. To improve
confidence in such constraints, one could also use static analysis to attempt to prove that
the inferred constraints do, indeed, hold in all cases.
2.9 Conclusions
We have successfully demonstrated that it is possible to automatically select robust fea-
tures of data structures and generate evasion-resistant signatures based on them. More
importantly, we have described a systematic way of determining which features to use when
creating a data structure signature. To our knowledge, no such method was previously
available, and we believe that many applications will benefit from this technique.
Our work resulted in a new signature for process data structures on Windows, which
can be used immediately by applications which require the ability to locate processes in
memory. We also showed that existing signatures used by memory analysis applications were
vulnerable to evasion, and in the case of PTFinder we described precisely which constraints
could be violated by an attacker. These concrete contributions significantly increase the
difficulty of hiding process objects from signature scans on Windows systems.
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CHAPTER III
VIRTUOSO: NARROWING THE SEMANTIC GAP IN VIRTUAL
MACHINE INTROSPECTION
3.1 Motivation
As kernel-level malware has become both more common and more sophisticated, some
researchers have advocated protecting insecure commodity operating systems through the
use of virtualization-based security [42, 55, 69, 95]. By moving protection below the level of
the OS, these solutions aim to provide many traditional security services such as intrusion
detection and policy enforcement without fear of subversion by malicious code running on
the system. At the same time, because the code base of the hypervisor is small, there is
some hope that it can be verified and provide secure isolation for the virtual machines it
supervises.
This enhanced security and isolation comes at a cost, however. Because the guest
operating system is untrusted, information about its state can not be reliably obtained by
calling standard APIs within the guest. Instead, security tools must use introspection to
retrieve information about the current state of the guest OS by examining the physical
memory of the running virtual machine and using detailed knowledge of the operating
system’s algorithms and data structures to rebuild higher level information such as lists
of running processes, open files, and active network connections. Even if the guest OS is
compromised, the tools using introspection will continue to report accurate results, so long
as the underlying internal data structures used by the operating system are intact.
The creation and maintenance of introspection tools, therefore, is dependent on detailed,
up-to-date information about the internal workings of commodity operating systems. Even
for systems where the source code to the kernel is available, acquiring this knowledge can be
a daunting task; when source is not available, prolonged effort by a skilled reverse engineer
may be required. Moreover, the time and effort spent divining the internals of a particular
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version of an operating system may not be applicable to future versions. This problem
of extracting high-level semantic information from low-level data sources, known as the
semantic gap, presents a significant barrier to the development and widespread deployment
of virtualization security products.
The fact that creating introspection tools by hand is difficult has multiple security
implications. Security professionals and system administrators rely upon the output of
hand-built introspection tools; at the same time, these tools are fragile and often cease to
function upon application of operating system patches. Currently, therefore, one must often
choose between keeping an up-to-date system and maintaining a working set of introspec-
tions. Moreover, hand-built introspection tools may introduce opportunities for attackers
to evade security tools: to the extent that introspection must replicate the behavior of in-
guest functionality, the developer must have an accurate model of the OS’s inner workings.
Garfinkel [41] has demonstrated, with numerous examples drawn from his experience with
system call monitors, that any divergence between reality and the model assumed by a
security program can provide opportunities for evasion.
In this chapter, we both ease the burden of maintaining introspection-based security
tools and make them more secure by providing techniques to automatically create programs
that can extract security-relevant information from outside the guest virtual machine. Our
fundamental insight is that it is typically trivial to write programs inside the guest OS that
compute the desired information by querying the built-in APIs. For example, to get the
ID of the currently running process in Linux, one need only call getpid(); by contrast,
implementing the same functionality from outside the virtual machine depends on intimate
knowledge of the layout and location of kernel structures such as the task struct, as well as
information about the layout of kernel memory and global variables. Our solution, named
Virtuoso, takes advantage of the OS’s own knowledge (as encoded by the instructions it exe-
cutes in response to a given query) to learn how to perform OS introspections. For example,
using Virtuoso, a programmer can write a program that calls getpid() and let Virtuoso
trace the execution of this program, automatically identify the instructions necessary for
finding the currently running process, and finally generate the corresponding introspection
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code.
Virtuoso takes into account complexities that arise from translating a program into a
form that can run outside of its native environment. It must be able to extract the program
code, and its dependencies; to do this, we use a dynamic analysis that captures all the
code executed while the program is running. At the same time, Virtuoso must be able to
distinguish between the introspection code and unrelated system activity, a challenge that
we overcome by making use of dynamic slicing [63] to identify the exact set of instructions
required to compute the introspection. Finally, the use of dynamic analysis means that a
single execution of the program may not cover all paths required for reliable re-execution.
To ensure that our generated programs are reliable, we introduce a method for merging
multiple dynamic traces into a single coherent program and show that its use allows our
generated programs to achieve high reliability.
3.2 Related Work
Most closely related to our own techniques are two recent works which perform extraction
of binary code for security purposes. Binary Code Reutilization (BCR) [18] and Inspector
Gadget [62] focus on the problem of extracting subsets of binary code, particularly in order
to reuse pieces of malware functionality (such as domain name generation or encryption
functions). While the former primarily uses static analysis and recursively descends into
function calls, the latter adopts a dynamic approach similar to our own. Inspector Gadget
performs a dynamic slice on a log collected from a single run of the malicious code and
changes half-covered conditional branches into unconditional jumps (the authors do not
discuss the possible correctness issues that may arise from this strategy, nor do they say
whether their system can combine multiple dynamic traces into a single program). Both
systems are more limited in scope than Virtuoso and do not consider kernel code. They
make extensive use of domain knowledge about the target operating system, and would
therefore be difficult to adapt to new platforms. By contrast, Virtuoso uses no domain
knowledge aside from understanding the x86 platform, and performs whole-system binary
code extraction.
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More generally, virtual machine introspection has played an integral role in a number
of recent security designs. Garfinkel and Rosenblum [42] first proposed the idea of per-
forming intrusion detection from outside the virtual machine. Their system introspects on
Linux guests to detect certain kinds of attacks; higher level information is reconstructed
through the use of the crash utility [87]. Since then, other researchers have proposed using
virtualized environments for tasks such as malware analysis [31,52] and secure application-
layer firewalls [116]; these systems all make heavy use of virtual machine introspection and
therefore must maintain detailed and accurate information on the internals of the operating
systems on which they introspect.
Introspection can also be useful in contexts outside of traditional virtualization security.
Petroni et al. [96] presented a system called Copilot that polls physical memory from a PCI
card to detect intrusions; such detection needs introspection to be useful. Malware analysis
platforms that run samples in a sandboxed environment, such as CWSandbox [128] and
Anubis [10], can also benefit from introspection: by extracting high-level information about
the state of the system as the malware runs, more meaningful descriptions of its behavior
can be generated. At the same time, this introspection must be secure and unobtrusive,
as the guest OS is guaranteed to be compromised. Our work can help provide higher-level
semantic information to such systems.
Originally proposed by Korel and Laski [63], the dynamic slicing at the heart of our
algorithm has been used in several other recent security tools, such as HookMap [127] and
K-Tracer [68]. The former makes use of this technique to identify memory locations in
the kernel that could be used by a rootkit to divert control flow, while the latter uses
a combination of dynamic backward and forward slicing (also known as “chopping”) to
analyze the behavior of kernel malware with respect to sensitive data such as process listings.
Additionally, Kolbitsch et al. [61] described a malware detection system that uses dynamic







































Figure 9: An example of Virtuoso’s usage. A small in-guest training program that retrieves
the name of a process given its PID is executed in the training environment a number of
times, producing several instruction traces. These traces are then analyzed and merged to
create an introspection program that can be used to securely introspect on the state of a
guest virtual machine from outside the VM. We explain further details of this diagram in
Section 3.4.
3.3 Introspection for Security
To motivate the design of Virtuoso, we consider the common scenario where secure intro-
spection into the state of a running virtual machine (known as the guest) from outside that
VM (i.e., from the host) is needed. This need may arise when performing out-of-the-box
malware analysis or debugging [52,55], or when attempting to secure a commodity operating
system by placing security software in an isolated virtual machine for intrusion detection [42]
or active monitoring [95]. In cases such as these it is easy to see why in-guest monitoring
is undesirable: if the guest OS can be compromised, then the in-guest tools themselves can
become corrupted or the system APIs can be altered to return false information (such as
by omitting a malicious process from a task list).
Developing tools to perform such introspections, however, is no easy task: extracting
even simple information such as the current process ID or a list of active network connections
requires deep understanding of the operating system running in the VM. In particular, the
location of the data, its layout, and what algorithms should be used to read it must all
be known. While some recent work has addressed the problem of automatically reverse
engineering data structure layouts [70,77,109], the overall task of creating introspections is
still largely a manual effort. With Virtuoso, however, another option is available: by simply
writing small programs (which we refer to as training programs) for the guest OS that
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extract the desired information, host-level introspection tools can be automatically created
that later retrieve the same information at runtime from outside the running VM.
To illustrate how Virtuoso can be used to quickly create secure introspection programs,
consider the running example shown in Figure 9. Here, a developer wishes to create an
introspection that obtains the name of a process by its PID. To do so, he first writes
an in-guest program that queries the OS’s APIs for the information. Such programs are
generally trivial to create for even modestly skilled programmers. The program is then
run inside Virtuoso, which records multiple executions, analyzes the resulting instruction
traces, and creates an out-of-guest introspection program that can retrieve the name of a
process running inside a virtual machine. This program can then be deployed to a secure
virtual machine and used to obtain this security-relevant information at runtime. The
generated program does not call any in-guest APIs, but rather contains all the low-level
instructions necessary to implement that API outside of the virtual machine. This entire
procedure involves only minimal effort on the part of the developer, and requires no reverse
engineering or specialized knowledge of the OS’s internals.
Tools generated in this way are specific to the operating system for which the corre-
sponding training programs were developed; that is, if the developer writes a program that
gets the current process ID in Windows XP, the generated out-of-the-box tool will only work
for Windows XP guests. However, supporting a new platform only requires adapting the
training program to a new OS and its API, rather than costly reverse engineering or source
code analysis by a specialist. Moreover, different releases of various operating systems are
often backwards compatible at either the source or binary level. This is the case, for ex-
ample, with Microsoft Windows: programs written for Windows NT 3.1 (released over 15
years ago) can run without modification on Windows 7. In this case Virtuoso could analyze
the behavior of the same program under each release of Windows, generating a suite of
host-level introspection tools to cover any version desired with no additional programmer
effort. Changes in the underlying implementations of the OS APIs would be automatically
reflected in the generated host introspection tools.
Once the introspection tools have been generated for a particular OS release, they can
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be deployed to aid in the secure monitoring of any number of virtual machines running
that OS. The generated introspection tools will provide accurate data about the current
state of the guest VM, even when the code of that VM is compromised.1 Thus, Virtuoso
produces tools that enable secure monitoring of insecure commodity operating systems, and
accomplishes this task with only minimal human intervention.
3.3.1 Scope and Assumptions
Although we believe Virtuoso represents a large step forward in narrowing the semantic
gap, there are some fundamental limitations to our techniques and constructs that Virtuoso
is not currently equipped to handle. First, Virtuoso is, by design, only able to produce
introspection code for data that is already accessible via some system API in the guest.
These introspections are a subset of those that could be programmed manually, and it
is possible that some security-relevant data are not exposed through system APIs. For
those functions that are exposed through system APIs, Virtuoso greatly reduces the cost of
producing introspections; we describe six such useful introspections in Section 3.6.
Second, there are certain code constructs that are difficult to reproduce, such as syn-
chronization primitives (which may require other threads to act before an introspection can
proceed) and interprocess communication (IPC). These limitations are not neccessarily fun-
damental, but they require additional research to overcome. We discuss these limitations
further in Section 3.7.
Finally, if an introspection requires interaction with a hardware device, such as the disk
or a network interface, the introspection cannot currently be generated by Virtuoso. In Sec-
tion 3.7 we discuss possible extensions to Virtuoso that could enable automatic generation
of some such introspections, however, for some devices any interaction might irreversibly
perturb the guest state (for example, if an introspection must access the network, there is
no way to reverse its effects—the packets cannot be “unsent”). This would leave the guest
in an inconsistent state and may cause the system to become unstable; it also violates the
principle that introspection should not alter the guest.
1As with all introspection, malicious alterations to the guest’s kernel data structure layouts, locations,
or algorithms may still cause incorrect results to be reported.
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Figure 10: A high-level conceptual view of our system for generating introspection tools.
This view corresponds to the training and analysis phases shown in Figure 9. The pro-
grammer creates an in-guest program that computes the desired introspection quantity by
calling standard OS APIs. This in-guest program is then run repeatedly under various
system states, and the instructions executed are logged. These instruction traces are then
analyzed to isolate just the instructions that compute the introspection quantity, merged
into a unified program, and then translated into an out-of-guest introspection tool.
3.4 Virtuoso Design
At a high level, Virtuoso creates introspection tools for an operating system by converting
in-guest programs that query public APIs into out-of-guest programs that reproduce the
behavior of the in-guest utilities. This is done in three phases (Figure 10): a training
phase, in which an in-guest program that computes the desired information is run a number
of times, and a record of each execution is saved; an analysis phase, which extracts just
the instructions involved in computing the data required for the introspection, merges the
traces into a single program, and translates that program into one that can be executed from
outside the virtual machine; and finally a runtime phase, in which the generated program is
used to introspect on a running virtual machine. These steps are described in more detail
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Figure 2. A high-level conceptual view of our system for generating
introspection tools. This view corresponds to the training and analysis
phases shown in Figure 1. The programmer creates an in-guest program
that computes the desired introspection quantity by calling standard OS
APIs. This in-guest program is then run repeatedly under various system
states, and the instructions executed are logged. These instruction traces are
then analyzed to isolate just the instructions that compute the introspection
quantity, merged into a unified program, and then translated into an out-
of-guest introspection tool.
traces are translated into an out-of-guest introspection pro-
gram. The programs generated by Virtuoso consist of a set
of basic blocks together with successor information. Within
a basic block, each individual instruction is implemented by
a small snippet of code in a high-level language. The use of
a high-level language allows our generated programs to be
usable in many different contexts: forensic memory analy-
sis, virtual machine introspection, and low-artifact malware
analysis.
C. Runtime Environment
The translated code, however, cannot be executed directly.
Instead, it must be provided with an appropriate runtime
environment in which to execute. The runtime environment
(shown on the right in Figure 1), is installed on the host and
getpsname.exegetpsname.exe


































Figure 1. An example of Virtuoso’s usage. A small in-guest training program that retrieves the name of a process given its PID is executed in the training
environment a number of times, producing several instruction traces. These traces are then analyzed and merged to create an introspection program that
can be used to securely introspect on the state of a guest virtual machine from outside the VM. We explain further details of this diagram in Section V.
# i n c l u d e <windows . h>
# i n c l u d e <p s a p i . h>
#pragma comment ( l i b , ” p s a p i . l i b ” )
# i n c l u d e ” v m n o t i f y . h ”
i n t main ( i n t argc , char ∗∗ a rgv ) {
char ∗name ;
HANDLE h ;
DWORD p i d = a t o i ( a rgv [ 1 ] ) ;
name = ( char ∗ ) m a l lo c ( 1 0 2 4 ) ;
vm mark buf in (& pid , 4 ) ;
vm mark buf in (&name , 4 ) ;
h = OpenProcess (PROCESS QUERY INFORMATION, 0 , p i d ) ;
Ge tProcess ImageF i l eName ( h , name , 1 0 2 4 ) ;
vm mark buf out ( name , 1 0 2 4 ) ;
re turn 0 ;
}
Listing 1. A complete sample program that gets the name of a
process given its PID under Windows. Programs such as these are
easy to write from inside the operating system using documented APIs.
GetProcessImageFileName and malloc are standard API calls
known to Windows programmers. vm_mark_buf_in and out notify
Virtuoso of input and output.
number of times, and a record of each execution is saved; an
analysis phase, which extracts just the instructions involved
in computing the data required for the introspection, merges
the traces into a single program, and translates that program
into one that can be executed from outside the virtual
machine; and finally a runtime phase, in which the generated
program is used to introspect on a running virtual machine.
These steps are described in more detail below.
A. Training
For the training stage of our system, we assume the
developer can create a small, in-guest program that computes
the data needed for the introspection tool. This places a
very minimal burden on the programmer: because ordinary
programs running inside the target operating system need
to query many of the same kinds of information desired by
introspection tools, OS designers typically make rich APIs
available for finding out this information. Additionally, such
APIs are generally easy to use, stable, and well-documented,
as they are the primary interface through which programs
talk to the OS.
A sample program that obtains a list of running pro-
cesses under Windows is shown in Listing 1. The pro-
gram, annotated with markers that indicate where to be-
gin and end tracing (vm_mark_buf_in and out), in-
vokes the Windows API functions OpenProcess and
GetProcessImageFileName to get the list of running
processes. The annotations also record the addresses of input
and output buffers for the program; these will ground the
data flow analysis performed to help identify what portions
of the system’s execution are necessary to compute the
introspection quantity (in this case, the process name).
Even for simple programs like the one described above,
there may be a number of different execution paths taken
through the program depending on the state of the OS when
the program is executed. To produce a program that works
correctly in all situations, we run the program repeatedly in
an instrumented environment and collect traces that record
all instructions executed by the program and operating
system. These execution traces are then analyzed and merged
together to produce an out-of-guest introspection tool that
can be used to reliably provide security-relevant information
for monitoring applications.
B. Analysis
Although the execution traces gathered in the training
phase contain all the instructions needed to compute the
introspection quantity, they also contain a large amount of
extraneous computation. This extra “noise” is present be-
cause our traces record the execution of the whole system: in
addition to computing the introspection quantity, the traces
Figure 3. A complete sample program that gets the name of a
process given its PID under Windows. Programs such as these are
easy to write from inside the operating system using documented APIs.
GetProcessImageFileName, OpenProcess, and malloc are stan-
dard API calls known to Windows programmers. vm_mark_buf_in and
out notify Virtuoso of input and output.
runs the transla ed instructions in a context tha gives th m
access to the resources (such s CPU regi ters and memory)
of the guest virtual machin without perturbing its state.
In particular, low-level operations that affect registers or
memory are wrapped so that they enforce copy-on-write
(COW) behavior. Whenever a write to memory occurs, it
is redi ected to the COW memory space (shown in the
right panel of Figure 1); when a read occurs, it first checks
whether the data exists in COW memory. If so, it reads from
the COW spac . Otherwise, the read is serviced directly from
guest memory. A similar scheme is used to h ndle egister
access. This allows introspections to access the state of the
running s stem without int rfering w th its operation.
There is some subtlety to the question of how to obtain
values from the memory of the guest. Certain data seen
during training may be specific to the training program (for
example, static data such as strings), while other data may
be part of the system’s state as a whole. In the former
case, we would want to use the values seen in training (as
they may not be available in the environment in which the
introspection program is run), whereas in the latter we would
want to obtain the values from the guest itself (since the
point of introspection, after all, is to obtain the state of the
system). To differentiate between these two types of data,
we currently make the simplifying assumption that kernel
data seen during training is global, and should be read from
the guest, while userland data is specific to the training
program, and should be saved during training and re-used
at runtime. This reflects the nature of the introspections we
wish to capture, which obtain information about the state of
the system as a whole rather than any individual process.
When performing an introspection (even with hand-
generated tools), the guest CPU is paused in order to prevent
Figure 11: A complete sample program that gets the name of a process given its PID under
Windows. Programs such as these re easy to write from inside the operating syste using
do umented APIs. GetProce sImageFileName, OpenProcess, nd malloc a e standard




The training phase is shown in Figure 9, our running example: the training program,
getpsfile.exe, is run several times in the training environ ent to capture a variety of
program paths, producing a number of instruction traces. For this stage, we assume the
developer can create such small, in-gu st programs that compute the data needed for the
introspection tool. This pl ces a ver minimal burden on the pr grammer: because ordinary
programs running inside the target operating system need to query many of the same
kinds of information desired by introspection tools, OS designers typically make rich APIs
available for finding out this information. Additionally, such APIs are generally easy to use,
stable, and well-documented, as they are the primary interface through which programs
talk to the OS.
A sampl program that retrieves the name of a process under Windows is shown in
Figure 11. The program, annotated with markers that indicate where to begin and end
tracing (vm mark buf in and out), invokes the Windows API functions OpenProcess and
GetProcessImageFileName to get the process name. The annotations also record the ad-
dresses of input and output buffers for the program; these will ground the data flow analysis
41
performed to help identify what portions of the system’s execution are necessary to compute
the introspection quantity (in this case, the process name).
Even for simple programs like the one described above, there may be a number of
different execution paths taken through the program depending on the state of the OS when
the program is executed. To produce a program that works correctly in all situations, we
run the program repeatedly in an instrumented environment and collect traces that record
all instructions executed by the program and operating system. These execution traces are
then analyzed and merged together to produce an out-of-guest introspection tool that can
be used to reliably provide security-relevant information for monitoring applications.
3.4.2 Analysis
Although the execution traces gathered in the training phase contain all the instructions
needed to compute the introspection quantity, they also contain a large amount of extra-
neous computation. This extra “noise” is present because our traces record the execution
of the whole system: in addition to computing the introspection quantity, the traces also
contain unrelated events such as interrupt handling and unrelated housekeeping tasks per-
formed by the kernel. Because we are only interested in the code that is necessary for
producing a working introspection program, we must excise these extraneous parts of the
traces. We accomplish this by first throwing away or replacing parts of each trace that
we know a priori to be unrelated to the introspection, such as hardware interrupts and
memory management. Next, we identify the instructions that actually compute the output
by performing a dynamic data slice [63] on each trace. Finally, we merge the slice results
across basic blocks and traces, producing a unified program that can be translated into an
out-of-guest introspection routine.
In order to produce a working routine, the inputs and outputs to the training program
must be identified. To do so, we look for places in the trace where buffers marked as inputs
are used. These instructions are marked as places where input data is used so that, at
translation time, we can generate code that splices in the program inputs at these points.
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Similarly, as the location of the output buffer may change depending on the current environ-
ment (for example, if the output buffer is on the stack, its location will change depending
on the value of ESP when the introspection tool is run), the analysis determines which in-
structions are immediately responsible for writing the data to the output buffer. These
“output-producing instructions” are marked; the translator will handle such instructions
specially, so that the output data can be found independent of the runtime CPU state.
Once the instruction trace has undergone slicing, merging, input splicing and output
instruction marking, the merged traces are translated into an out-of-guest introspection
program. The programs generated by Virtuoso consist of a set of basic blocks together with
successor information. Within a basic block, each individual instruction is implemented by
a small snippet of code in a high-level language. The use of a high-level language allows
our generated programs to be usable in many different contexts: forensic memory analysis,
virtual machine introspection, and low-artifact malware analysis.
In our example (Figure 9), we can see that the Trace Analyzer and Instruction Translator
together comprise the analysis phase, and create the final introspection program getpsfile
from the instruction traces generated during training.
3.4.3 Runtime Environment
The translated code, however, cannot be executed directly. Instead, it must be provided
with an appropriate runtime environment in which to execute. The runtime environment
(shown on the right in Figure 9), is installed on the host and runs the translated instructions
in a context that gives them access to the resources (such as CPU registers and memory)
of the guest virtual machine without perturbing its state.
In particular, low-level operations that affect registers or memory are wrapped so that
they enforce copy-on-write (COW) behavior. Whenever a write to memory occurs, it is
redirected to the COW memory space (shown in the right panel of Figure 9); when a read
occurs, it first checks whether the data exists in COW memory. If so, it reads from the
COW space. Otherwise, the read is serviced directly from guest memory. A similar scheme
is used to handle register access. This allows introspections to access the state of the running
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system without interfering with its operation.
There is some subtlety to the question of how to obtain values from the memory of
the guest. Certain data seen during training may be specific to the training program (for
example, static data such as strings), while other data may be part of the system’s state as
a whole. In the former case, we would want to use the values seen in training (as they may
not be available in the environment in which the introspection program is run), whereas
in the latter we would want to obtain the values from the guest itself (since the point of
introspection, after all, is to obtain the state of the system). To differentiate between these
two types of data, we currently make the simplifying assumption that kernel data seen
during training is global, and should be read from the guest, while userland data is specific
to the training program, and should be saved during training and re-used at runtime. This
reflects the nature of the introspections we wish to capture, which obtain information about
the state of the system as a whole rather than any individual process.
Although this policy currently limits the type of introspections that can be generated to
those that inspect systemwide state, one could define other policies that make introspection
into specific processes possible. If Virtuoso were provided with some means of locating the
appropriate process context at runtime, one could define a policy that reads all data directly
from the guest, allowing introspection into the memory of a specific process.
When performing an introspection (even with hand-generated tools), the guest CPU is
paused in order to prevent the contents of memory from changing during the introspection.
It might seem that one could keep the CPU running, improving performance by allowing
the introspection to be carried out in parallel with the guest’s execution. This performance
boost would come at the cost of reliability, however, as changes to the underlying data ex-
amined by the introspection tool would almost certainly cause it to crash or report incorrect
results. In addition, we have noticed that most generated introspections must be run when
the CPU is in user mode. This is because the traces are recorded based on a userland pro-
gram, and so some assumptions may be made about the state of global registers in userland
that do not hold in kernel mode. To ensure reliability, our runtime environment polls for a
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user-mode CPU state and pauses the guest before performing any introspection.2
Finally, the Instruction Translator has special handling for instructions marked by the
Trace Analyzer as inputs or outputs. Instructions that require input are replaced with
equivalent instructions that explicitly take input from the environment in which the intro-
spection tool runs. Output-producing instructions are translated so that their output is
placed in a special buffer at a known location; when the program terminates, the contents
of this buffer containing the desired introspection quantity are returned so they may be
used by security tools. In our running example (Figure 9), we can see that the generated
introspection program is provided with the PID 384 as input, and produces the output
“chrome.exe”.
Note that the contents of the output may still need to be interpreted (for example, by
decoding the binary data as a string or integer, or even more complex interpretations such
as displaying a timestamp in human-readable form). We provide a basic facility by which
the user can provide a function that interprets the output from the runtime environment;
however, we do not attempt to include this functionality in the generated introspection tool
itself. We feel that this approach is justified, as the output will be the same as that produced
by APIs within the guest OS, which we have assumed are well-documented. Therefore, the
format of their outputs will most likely also be documented by the OS vendor.
3.5 Implementation
Having given a high-level view of our system, we now turn to the details of its implemen-
tation. Virtuoso’s trace logging portion is built on top of QEMU [12], a fast emulator and
binary translator. Our Trace Analyzer is written in Python, and consists of 1,843 SLOC;3
the majority of this code consists of the data flow transfer functions for each QEMU micro-
instruction. Finally, the Instruction Translator and runtime environment are 431 and 1,095
lines of Python code, respectively. These components, and their logical relationship, are
2Rather than polling, it is also possible to set up a callback within the guest whenever there is a transition
from kernel to user mode, using the techniques described by Dinaburg et al. [31].
3Source line counts were generated using David A. Wheeler’s ‘SLOCCount’.
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Original x86 instruction:




LDL T0, A0 ; 0x1b1acf00
MOVL EDI, T0
Figure 11: An example of an x86 instruction and the corresponding logged micro-
instructions. The implicit pointer dereference has been made explicit, and the referenced
address has been recorded to enable data flow analysis.
shown in Figure 8 on page 36. We will discuss in detail the implementation of each compo-
nent in this section.
3.5.1 Trace Logging
Our trace logger, which is shown on the left in Figure 8, is a modified version of QEMU.
QEMU works by dynamically translating each guest instruction to a series of operations in a
micro-instruction language. The micro-instructions are implemented by small C functions,
which are compiled to host-level code and chained together to emulate the guest code on
the host.
To enable logging, we inserted small logging statements into each micro-instruction’s
implementation. These logging statements record the current operation, along with its
operands and any dynamic information needed to enable the data flow analysis (see Section
3.4.2 for more details). Thus, when the guest code is translated by QEMU, the generated
code will be interleaved with logging functions that record the micro-instructions executed.
This interleaving is necessary because accurate logging depends on dynamic information
that will only be available once the previous instruction has finished executing.
Our logging functions record the current micro-operation, its parameters, and concrete
physical memory addresses for each load and store instruction. Using the physical address
allows data flow to be reconstructed even when multiple virtual addresses reference the same
physical memory (this often occurs when a bu↵er is shared between a user application and
the kernel, for example). Finally, we record the page table dependencies for each memory
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Figure 12: An example of an x86 instruct on a d the corresponding logg d m ro-
instructions. The implicit pointer der fe nce has been made explicit, and the referenced
address has been recorded to enable data flow analysis.
shown in Figure 9 on page 37. We will discuss in detail the implementation of each compo-
nent in this section.
3.5.1 Trace Logging
Our trace logger, which is shown on the left in Figure 9, is a modified version of QEMU.
QEMU works by dynamically translating each guest instruction to a series of operations in a
micro-instruction language. The micro-instructions are implemented by small C functions,
which are compiled to host-level code and chained together to emulate the guest code on
the host.
To enable logging, we inserted small logging statements into each micro-instruction’s
implementation. These logging statements record the current operation, along with its
operands and any dynamic information neede to enable the data flow analysis (see Section
3.4.2 for more details). us, when the guest code is tr n lated by QEMU, the generated
code will be interleaved with loggi g functions that record the micro-instructions executed.
This interleaving is necessary because accurate logging depends on dynamic information
that will only be available once the previous instruction has finished executing.
Our logging functions record the current micro-operation, its parameters, and concrete
physical memory addresses for each load and store instruction. Using the physical address
allows data flow to be reconstructed even when multiple virtual addresses reference the same
physical memory (this often occurs when a buffer is shared between a user application and
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# d e f i n e MAGIC IN 0 x d e a d b e e f
void vm mark buf in ( void ∗buf , i n t l e n ) {
void ∗b = buf ;
i n t n = l e n ;
/ / [ r e g i s t e r save o m i t t e d ]
asm MOV EAX, 0
asm MOV EBX, MAGIC IN
asm MOV ECX, b
asm MOV EDX, n
asm CPUID
/ / [ r e g i s t e r r e s t o r e o m i t t e d ]
}
Listing 1. In-guest code that signals the Trace Logger to begin tracing.
Code that simply saves and restores clobbered registers has been omitted.
address the memory was read from to capture any data flow
dependencies. Finally, the value read is transferred to the
EDI register.
These micro-instructions provide a natural IR for our
analyzer. Not only are QEMU micro-ops simple to log, they
also satisfy the requirement of performing relatively simple
operations with few side effects. This greatly simplifies the
task of tracking data flow, as the data defined and used by
each micro-instruction is generally easy to understand.
Inside the guest, the training program (described in Sec-
tion IV-A) must be able to signal the Trace Logger and
inform it of the beginning and end of the introspection
operation, as well as the location of the buffer where the
output has been placed. Our implementation accomplishes
this by co-opting the x86 CPUID instruction. When a magic
value is placed in the EBX register, our modified QEMU will
interpret CPUID as a signal to start or stop logging, and will
record the values of ECX and EDX as the buffer’s start and
size, respectively. This allows us to bound our trace so that
it includes only the operations relevant to introspection, and
also provides the Trace Analyzer with the locations of the
input and output buffers. The in-guest code that implements
the notification is given in Listing 1.
B. Preprocessing
As discussed in Section IV-B, the trace is preprocessed
before slicing and translation in order to remove hardware
interrupts and replace calls to memory-allocating functions
with function summaries. Filtering interrupts has two bene-
fits: it reduces the amount of code we need to analyze, and
it eliminates many accesses to hardware devices (which may
not be available at run time). Replacing memory allocation
functions (such as malloc and realloc), while not necessary
in theory, is currently required by our implementation, as
portions of the OS-provided memory allocation facilities are
carried out in the page fault handler, and we do not support
hardware exceptions in our runtime environment.
Interrupt filtering is performed in the obvious way, by
matching up pairs of interrupts (which are logged by the




LDL T0, A0 ; 0x1e7beb4
ADDL ESP, 0x10
JMP T0
Figure 5. A malloc replacement that summarizes the effect of
RtlAllocateHeap in Windows. The summary reads the size of the
allocation from the stack, has a placeholder op for the actual allocation,
reads the return address, cleans arguments from the stack, and executes the
return.
the x86 architecture to return from an interrupt). Because
interrupts may be nested arbitrarily deep, we use a counter
to ensure that we have matched a given iret with the ap-
propriate interrupt. Once the outermost interrupt and iret
have been identified, they can be excised from the trace.
There are two exceptions to interrupt filtering, however.
First, software interrupts (i.e., those triggered by an int
instruction) are part of the code of the program and are
treated in much the same way as a standard function call.
Second, the x86 architecture, starting with the Pentium,
includes an Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller
(APIC) unit, which gives the operating system more control
over how and when it receives interrupts. Among the capa-
bilities provided by the APIC is the ability to send interrupts
to other processors (including itself). When combined with
the ability to defer interrupts by setting the Task Priority
Register (TPR) on the APIC, this provides a mechanism that
can be used by the OS to perform asynchronous procedure
calls. Because these are effectively software interrupts (they
originate in OS code), we include them in our analysis and
in the generated program.
Finally, we provide replacements for the memory allo-
cation functions of some operating systems. To do so, we
make use of three pieces of domain knowledge about the
OS being analyzed: the virtual address of the function, the
number of argument bytes (to enable callee-cleanup, if the
calling convention requires it), and the position of the “size”
argument relative to the stack. With this information, one
can edit the trace and replace a call to (e.g.) malloc with a
summary that allocates memory on the host. A summary
for RtlAllocateHeap on Windows is shown in Figure 5.
We currently replace RtlAllocateHeap/RtlFreeHeap
[22] on Windows, and malloc/realloc/calloc/free
on Linux. In our testing, programs generated for the Haiku
operating system did not need malloc summaries.
C. Dynamic Slicing and Trace Merging
In order to extract the subset of the micro-instruction trace
that computes the desired information, our Trace Analyzer
uses executable dynamic slicing [16] to trace the flow of
information through the program, starting with the output
buffer specified in the log. For a detailed discussion of the
algorithm, refer to Korel and Laski [16]; however, we will
Figure 5. In-guest code that signals the Trace Logger to begin tracing.
Code that simply saves and restores clobbered registers has been omitted.
address the memory was read from to capture any data flow
dependencies. Finally, the value read is transferred to the
EDI register.
These micro-instructions provide a natural IR for our
analyzer. Not only are QEMU micro-ops simple to log, they
also satisfy the requirement of performing relatively simple
operations with few side effects. This greatly simplifies the
task of tracking data flow, as the data defined and used by
each micro-instruction is generally easy to understand.
Inside the guest, the training program (described in Sec-
tion IV-A) must be able to signal the Trace Logger and
inform it of the beginning and end of the introspection
operation, as well as the location of the buffer where the
output has been placed. Our implementation accomplishes
this by co-opting the x86 CPUID instruction. When a magic
value is placed in the EBX register, our modified QEMU will
interpret CPUID as a signal to start r stop l gging, and will
record the values of ECX and EDX as he buffer’s start
size, respectively. This allows us to bound our trace s that
it i cl des only the op ations relevan t introspection, and
also pr vides the Trac A alyzer with the locations of the
input and output buffers. The in-guest code that implements
the notification is given in Figure 5.
B. Preprocessing
As discussed in Section IV-B, the trace is preprocessed
before slicing and translation in order to remove hardware
interrupts and replace calls to memory-allocating functions
with function summaries. Filtering interrupts has two bene-
fits: it reduces the amount of code we need to analyze, and
it eliminates many accesses to hardware devices (which may
not be available at run time). Replacing memory allocation
functions (such as malloc and realloc), while not necessary
in theory, is currently required by our implementation, as
portions of the OS-provided memory allocation facilities are
carried out in the page fault handler, and we do not support
hardware exceptions in our runtime environment.
Interrupt filtering is performed in the obvious way, by




LDL T0 A0 ; 0x1e7beb4
ADDL ESP, 0x10
JMP T0
Figure 6. A malloc replacement that summarizes the effect of
RtlAllocateHeap in Windows using QEMU micro-ops. The summary
reads the size of the allocation from the stack, has a placeholder op for
the actual allocation, reads the return address, cleans arguments from the
stack, and executes the return.
Trace Logger) and iret instructions (which are used in
the x86 architecture to return from an interrupt). Because
interr pts may be nested arbitr rily deep, we use a counter
to ensure that we have matched a give i e with the ap-
propriate nterrupt. Once the outermost interrupt and iret
have b en identified, they can be excised f om t e trace.
There are two exceptions to inter upt filtering, however.
First, s ftw re interrupts (i.e., those triggered by an int
instruction) are part of the code of the program and are
treated in much the same way as a standard function call.
Second, the x86 architecture, starting with the Pentium,
includes an Advanced Programmable Interrupt Controller
(APIC) unit, which gives the operating system more control
over how and when it receives interrupts. Among the capa-
bilities provided by the APIC is the ability to send interrupts
to other processors (including itself). When combined with
the ability to defer interrupts by setting the Task Priority
Register (TPR) on the APIC, this provides a mechanism that
can be used by the OS to perform asynchronous procedure
calls. Because these are effectively software interrupts (they
originate in OS code), we include them in our analysis and
in the generated program.
Finally, we provide replace e ts f r the memory allo-
cation functions of some operating systems. To do so, we
make use of thr e pieces f domain know dge about the
OS being analyzed: the v rtu l address of the function, the
numb r of argument bytes (to enable callee-cleanup, if the
calling convention requires it), and the position f the “size”
argument relative to the stack. Wit this information, one
can edit the trace and replace a call to (e.g.) malloc with a
summary that allocates memory on the host. A summary
for RtlAllocateHeap on Windows is shown in Figure 6.
We currently replace RtlAllocateHeap/RtlFreeHeap
[22] on Windows, and malloc/realloc/calloc/free
on Linux. In our testing, programs generated for the Haiku
operating system did not need malloc summaries.
C. Dynamic Slicing and Trace Merging
In order to extract the subset of the micro-instruction trace
that computes the desired information, our Trace Analyzer
uses executable dynamic slicing [16] to trace the flow of
information through the program, starting with the output
buffer specified in the log. For a detailed discussion of the
Figure 13: In-guest code that signals the Trace Logger to begin traci g. Code that simply
saves and restores clobbered registers has been omitted.
the kernel, for example). Finally, we record the page table dependencies for each memory
operation. This is necessary because each memory load or store implicitly depends on the
addressing structures used: if another instruction in the trace has modified the virtual
to physical address map, that instruction must also be included in order for the resulting
program to function correctly. By recording the address of the page directory and page table
entries used in calculating the address of the load or store, our dynamic slicing algorithm
(described in Section 3.5.3) can automatically determine what page table-manipulating code
must also be included.
In Figure 12, we give an example of an x86 inst ucti n and he corresponding QEMU
micro-operations that are reco de by the Trace Logger. The x86 instruction is decomposed
into a series of simpler operations: first, a memory address is computed by taking th value
in the EBP register and adding 0x10 to it. Next, the LDL micro-op retrieves the value from
memory at that address and stores it in the temporary register T0. Along with the micro-
op, the logger records the address the memory was read from to capture any data flow
dependencies. Finally, the value read is transferred to the EDI register.
These micro-instructions provide a nat ral IR for our analyzer. Not only are QEMU
micro-ops simple to log, th y also satisfy the requirement of pe forming relatively simple
operations with few side effects. This greatly simplifies the task of tracking data flow, as
the data defined and used by each micro-instruction is generally easy to understand.
Inside the guest, the training program (described in Section 3.4.1) must be ab e to signal
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the Trace Logger and inform it of the beginning and end of the introspection operation, as
well as the location of the buffer where the output has been placed. Our implementation
accomplishes this by co-opting the x86 CPUID instruction. When a magic value is placed in
the EBX register, our modified QEMU will interpret CPUID as a signal to start or stop logging,
and will record the values of ECX and EDX as the buffer’s start and size, respectively. This
allows us to bound our trace so that it includes only the operations relevant to introspection,
and also provides the Trace Analyzer with the locations of the input and output buffers.
The in-guest code that implements the notification is given in Figure 13.
3.5.2 Preprocessing
As discussed in Section 3.4.2, the trace is preprocessed before slicing and translation in
order to remove hardware interrupts and replace calls to memory-allocating functions with
function summaries (this is part of the analysis phase, i.e., the middle portion of Figure 9).
Filtering interrupts has two benefits: it reduces the amount of code we need to analyze, and
it eliminates many accesses to hardware devices (which may not be available at run time).
Replacing memory allocation functions (such as malloc and realloc), while not necessary in
theory, is currently required by our implementation, as portions of the OS-provided memory
allocation facilities are carried out in the page fault handler, and we do not support hardware
exceptions in our runtime environment.
Interrupt filtering is performed in the obvious way, by matching up pairs of interrupts
(which are logged by the Trace Logger) and iret instructions (which are used in the x86
architecture to return from an interrupt). Because interrupts may be nested arbitrarily
deep, we use a counter to ensure that we have matched a given iret with the appropriate
interrupt. Once the outermost interrupt and iret have been identified, they can be excised
from the trace.
There are two exceptions to interrupt filtering, however. First, software interrupts (i.e.,
those triggered by an int instruction) are part of the code of the program and are treated
in much the same way as a standard function call. Second, the x86 architecture, starting





LDL T0, A0 ; 0x1e7beb4
ADDL ESP, 0x10
JMP T0
Figure 13: A malloc replacement that summarizes the e↵ect of RtlAllocateHeap in Win-
dows using QEMU micro-ops. The summary reads the size of the allocation from the stack,
has a placeholder op for the actual allocation, reads the return address, cleans arguments
from the stack, and executes the return.
Among the capabilities provided by the APIC is the ability to send interrupts to other
processors (including itself). When combined with the ability to defer interrupts by setting
the Task Priority Register (TPR) on the APIC, this provides a mechanism that can be used
by the OS to perform asynchronous procedure calls. Because these are e↵ectively software
interrupts (they originate in OS code), we include them in our analysis and in the generated
program.
Finally, we provide replacements for the memory allocation functions of some operating
systems. To do so, we make use of three pieces of domain knowledge about the OS being
analyzed: the virtual address of the function, the number of argument bytes (to enable
callee-cleanup, if the calling convention requires it), and the position of the “size” argument
relative to the stack. With this information, one can edit the trace and replace a call to (e.g.)
malloc with a summary that allocates memory on the host. A summary for RtlAllocateHeap
on Windows is shown in Figure 13. We currently replace RtlAllocateHeap/RtlFreeHeap
[76] on Windows, and malloc/realloc/calloc/free on Linux. In our testing, programs
generated for the Haiku operating system did not need malloc summaries.
3.5.3 Dynamic Slicing and Trace Merging
After preprocessing the trace, our Trace Analyzer uses executable dynamic slicing [59]
to trace the flow of information through the program, starting with the output bu↵er
specified in the log. For a detailed discussion of the algorithm, refer to Korel and Laski [59];
however, we will summarize the idea here. Note that because we do not have access to
the full program, our dynamic slicing algorithm cannot calculate full control dependency
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Figure 14: A malloc replacement that summarizes the effect of RtlAllocateHeap in Win-
dows using QEMU micro-ops. The summary reads the size of the allocation from the stack,
has a placeholder op for the actual allocation, reads the return address, cleans arguments
from the stack, and executes the r turn.
which gives the operating system more control over how and when it receives interrupts.
Among the capabilities provided by the APIC is the ability to send interrupts to other
processors (including itself). When combined with the ability to defer interrupts by setting
the Task Priority Register (TPR) on the APIC, this provides a mechanism that can be used
by the OS to perform asynchronous procedure calls. Because these are effectively software
interrupts (they originate in OS code), we include them in our analysis and in the generated
program.
Finally, we provide replacements for the memory allocation functions of some operating
systems. To do so, we make use of three pieces of domain knowledge about the OS being
analyzed: the virtual address of the function, the number of argument bytes (to enable
callee-cleanup, if the calling convention requires it), and the position of the “size” argument
relative to the stack. With this information, one can edit the trace and replace a call to (e.g.)
malloc with a summary that allocates memory on the host. A summary for RtlAllocateHeap
on Windows is shown in Figure 14. We currently replace RtlAllocateHeap/RtlFreeHeap
[83] on Windows, and malloc/realloc/calloc/free on Linux. In our testing, programs
generated for the Haiku operating system did not need malloc summaries.
3.5.3 Dynamic Slicing and Trace Merging
After preprocessing the trace, our Trace Analyzer uses executable dynamic slicing [63]
to trace the flow of information through the program, starting with the output buffer
specified in the log. For a detailed discussion of the algorithm, refer to Korel and Laski [63];
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Algorithm 1 Trace Merging Algorithm. P is the final, merged program, which consists of
a number of blocks and corresponding successors. T is the set of traces. Each trace t ∈ T
consists of a sequence of ops. slice[t] is the subset of ops in t that are needed, initialized
with a dynamic data slice on the output. dyn slice() is an instantiation of the dynamic
slicing algorithm, and find block() identifies a basic block to which an op belongs.
1: slices← ∅, blocks← ∅
2: for t ∈ T do
3: slice[t]← dyn slice(t, t.output)
4: blocks[t]← split basic blocks(t)
5: end for
6: repeat
7: P.blocks← ∅, P.succs← ∅
8: for t ∈ T do
9: for op ∈ slice[t] do
10: op block ← find block(blocks[t], op)
11: if (op block ∈ P.blocks) then
12: p op block ← find block(P.blocks, op)
13: p op block.add(op)
14: else
15: P.succs[op block]← op block.succs




20: for block ∈ P.blocks do
21: if P.succs[block].size > 1 then
22: conds← find exit conds(block)
23: for t ∈ T, block ∈ t do
24: br ops← dyn slice(t, uses(conds))




29: for t ∈ T do
30: for op ∈ slice[t] do
31: for t′ ∈ T, t′ 6= t, op ∈ t′ do




36: until nothing changed
however, we will summarize the idea here. Note that because we do not have access to
the full program, our dynamic slicing algorithm cannot calculate full control dependency
information as in the original dynamic slicing algorithm. Instead, we include every control
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flow statement (and its dependencies) that was observed to have more than one successor
in the dynamic control flow graph. This is safe (in the program analysis sense of the word),
but may over-approximate the dynamic slice.
Dynamic slicing works backward through the trace, looking for instructions that define
the desired output data. For each instruction, the set of data defined by the instruction is
examined. If the data it defines overlaps with the working set, then the instruction handles
tracked data, so we must add it to the slice. The working set is then updated by removing
the data defined by the instruction and adding the data used by the instruction. The
algorithm terminates when top of the trace is reached. The output, an executable dynamic
slice, is precisely the sequence of instructions used to compute the data in the output buffer.
Virtuoso builds the final introspection program from a training set of more than one
trace. This is crucial to achieving reliability: except in the case of fairly trivial introspec-
tions, a single trace is unlikely to include enough code to adequately cover all important
functionality. Consider the fact that many of the kinds of introspections we want to support,
such as enumerating running processes or loaded modules, involve traversing collections such
as linked lists or arrays. Typically, the code that accesses these data structures includes
logic (and therefore multiple paths through the program) to cover corner cases, such as
when the collection is empty. If we want our final introspection tool to be able to handle
these uncommon (but hardly rare) situations correctly, we must build our program from
multiple traces. In practice, to ensure reliability, we generate increasingly reliable programs
iteratively: after generating an initial program, it is tested on a variety of system states,
and the failing test cases are then used as new training examples. Although this cycle of
testing and training is currently done manually, it could easily be automated.
The trace merging algorithm works as follows. First, a merged control-flow graph is
constructed from the control flow graphs of the individual traces (lines 8–19 in Algorithm 1).
Second (lines 20–28), for each block which has more than one successor (meaning there was
a branch or a dynamic jump), a slice is performed on the data neccessary to compute the
branch condition (i.e., x86 status and condition flags or the dynamically computed jump
target); this step ensures that both loops and branches are faithfully reproduced in the
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generated program. Third, Virtuoso performs a slice closure (lines 29–35): if an op is in
some but not all of the slices, then it is added to the other slices, and a new dynamic slice
is performed on the dependencies of that op (this has the same effect, and is done for the
same reason, as Korel and Laski’s Identity Relation (IR) [63]). Finally, because each of
these steps may have introduced new ops into the slices in ways that require recomputing
information in previous steps, we repeat the process until a fixed point is reached.
3.5.3.1 Correctness
We argue the correctness of our trace merging algorithm in two parts. First, the algorithm
certainly reaches a fixed point and terminates within a finite number of iterations. The
traces used as input are finite in number and length. This means that the number of
micro-operations initially marked as “in a slice” by the dynamic slicing algorithm of Korel
(which has, itself, been shown to complete in a finite number of steps) is also finite. Thus,
the number of micro-operations as-yet unmarked is also finite. With each iteration of the
algorithm, we either add no new ops to a slice, in which case we have reached a fixed point
and terminate, or we add some finite number of ops to some slices and loop. Thus, the
algorithm will, at worst, add one op to each slice with each iteration, ending with every
op in every trace marked, but even this will happen in a finite number of iterations of the
algorithm.
Second, to see that our algorithm correctly merges multiple traces, consider combining
traces T and T ′, each of which (when we run our algorithm on it individually) produces
programs PT and PT ′ , which each have the correct output given their respective input (we
can assume this because in this base case our algorithm is equivalent to that of Korel and
Laski [63]). By examining Algorithm 1, when we produce a program P from the combination
of T and T ′, we can see that there are only two cases where P will differ from PT or PT ′ :
Case 1 We include a branch statement that was not included in T or T ′ by itself. But
by including this branch, we include the ops necessary to decide which way to go at that
branch. So when P is run with the inputs provided to T , the branch will evaluate as it did
in T , and the successor will be the same as for PT . The same argument applies when P is
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run with the inputs for T ′.
Case 2 We include an op (and the ops necessary to compute the dependencies of that
op) that was in T and not T ′ (or vice versa). Assume without loss of generality that the
op was in T and not T ′. Then the ops added to T ′ do not affect the output value along
the path taken by T ′ (or they would have been added by the dynamic slice that initialized
slice(T ′)). So when P is run with the inputs for T ′, it will produce the same output as PT ′ .
This argument extends by induction to show that given an arbitrary number of traces
{T1, . . . , Tn}, if the corresponding programs {P1, . . . , Pn} are correct with respect to their
inputs, the merged program will be correct with respect to all their inputs. We have also
validated the correctness of our algorithm experimentally, as we describe in Section 3.6.2.
3.5.3.2 Fortuitous Coverage Enhancement
We have demonstrated that a merged program P can surely execute correctly on guest states
from one of its constituent traces. However, aside from this additive effect, combining traces
can also allow the program to generalize better to guest states not seen during training.
To see why this is the case, consider Figure 15, which depicts two program paths that are
merged by our algorithm. In addition to the two paths covered by each individual trace
(A → C → D → E → G and A → B → D → F → G), the merged program also covers
paths A→ C → D → F → G and A→ B → D → E → G). Depending on the relationship
between the branch conditions at A and D, these paths may be infeasible, but in the best
case, the merged program will be able to generalize to guest states that differ from the
training states along these paths.
In our experience with Virtuoso, we have noticed several instances of this “fortuitous”
coverage improvement. For example, while testing the pslist program for Windows (see
Section 3.6), we generated two versions of the program from two different training runs.
Out of three system states in our testing corpus, we observed the following behavior:
• The first program worked correctly on states 1 and 2, but not state 3.

















Trace 1 Trace 2 Merged+ =
Figure 15: An example of a non-additive coverage improvement from combining two traces.
Rather than the expected two paths covered, we in fact cover four program paths.
• The merged program, generated from both training runs, worked correctly on all three
system states.
While this is an isolated example, it suggests that such non-additive coverage improvements
can boost the reliability of the generated introspection programs. We hope to make this
notion more rigorous in future work, and explore its potential for producing more reliable
introspection programs in conjunction with static analysis.
3.5.4 Translation and Runtime Environment
Our Instruction Translator (shown below the Trace Analyzer in Figure 9) takes the sliced
micro-op traces and creates an equivalent Python program that can be run outside the VM.
Currently, the code produced takes the form of a plugin for Volatility [124], a framework
for volatile memory analysis written in Python. Volatility was chosen because it already
provides certain facilities needed in our runtime environment, such as x86 virtual address
translation, and the ability to analyze the memory of a virtual machine running under
Xen [9] (through the third-party extension PyXa, included in the XenAccess library [94]).
Moreover, it features an API that makes it easy to layer new functionality on top of existing
address space objects, which we use to implement copy-on-write semantics for the guest
memory (see below).
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The translation of QEMU micro-instructions to host code is fairly direct. The translation
works one basic block at a time, starting with the output of Algorithm 1. Each individual
op is mapped to a simple Python statement. At the end of the block, if there is only one
successor, an unconditional jump to that successor is produced. Otherwise, the appropriate
conditional or dynamic jump is output.
The runtime environment itself, shown on the right in Figure 9 is implemented as a
plugin for Volatility. The introspection tool is output by the trace analyzer as a dictionary
of blocks of Python code, keyed by the EIP of the original x86 code. The plugin performs
some initial setup, and then loads and executes the block marked “START”. When the
block finishes, it sets a variable named label that determines the successor (this variable
can be set conditionally, unconditionally, or dynamically, to implement the three successor
cases outlined above). This process continues until the successor returned is “EXIT”. At
the end, the contents of the output buffer are displayed to the user. The details of the
runtime environment, including input and output handling, are presented below.
Registers are modeled as variables in the generated code; thus, to implement copy-on-
write behavior for registers, we simply initialize the values of the register variables before the
generated code. Any references to a register that occur before the generated code assigns to
it will therefore retrieve the value from the guest VM, as desired. Assignments to registers,
by contrast, will simply overwrite the Python variable, and will not affect the running VM.
Access to memory is handled by translating load and store operations into read and
write operations on a copy-on-write address space object in Volatility. The COW space
is initialized by passing it the currently active virtual address space for the VM (on x86
guests, this boils down to using the current value of the guest’s CR3 register to map virtual
addresses to physical). All reads and writes are then done on this space, which implements
copy-on-write as described in Section 3.4.3.
The runtime environment also provides a host-side memory allocator for use with the
malloc summaries described in Section 3.5.2. Before the program is run, the runtime en-
vironment scans the guest page tables for an unused virtual address range. It then adds
page table entries (as always, making changes to the copy-on-write space—the guest’s state
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is not modified) to create a heap that can be addressed as though it were actually inside
the guest. To prevent conflicts, the physical pages are reserved by choosing a range above
the amount of physical memory available to the guest.4 Reads and writes to that physical
range are redirected to the host memory area.
Inputs to the program are represented by an array named inputs. When the Instruction
Translator comes across a micro-op that is marked as reading input data, it translates it into
a simple assignment that takes the value from the input array. For example, if a micro-op
such as LDL T0, A0 is marked as needing the first input parameter to the program, the
code produced will be T0 = inputs[0]. The inputs array is populated at runtime via a
command line option to the Volatility plugin.
Finally, output-producing operations are translated into two separate Python state-
ments. The first performs the write to memory normally, while the second writes the data
into a special output memory space and tags it with a label that identifies which output
buffer it was associated with. Once the plugin has finished executing the translated code,
it dumps the contents of the output memory space. The user can also optionally pass in
a function to interpret the output (e.g., by converting it from little-endian Unicode to a
string, or to interpret a 64-bit integer as a human-readable time).
3.6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate Virtuoso using a number of different criteria: generality, reli-
ability, security, and performance. To evaluate the generality of Virtuoso, we look at the
diversity of operating systems and the different types of programs for which introspections
can be generated. Next we discuss the reliability of the resulting introspection programs—
that is, their ability to function correctly when examining a system at runtime. Finally,
we examine the resilience to attack of programs output by Virtuoso, and we discuss their
runtime performance.
4Although this means that in a 32-bit environment we cannot support guests with 4 gigabytes of RAM,
we note that this is only a peculiarity of our implementation; see Section 3.7 for details of how we plan to
remove this limitation. Also, the move to 64-bit architectures will provide ample physical address space for
Virtuoso to use if needed.
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3.6.1 Generality
Because Virtuoso uses very little domain knowledge about the target OS, it is easy to
generate new introspection programs for operating systems that run on the x86 architecture.
To demonstrate this capability, we created six training programs for three different OSes.
These programs were chosen because they represent common actions that might be needed
for passive and active security monitors: a security system may need to list drivers to audit
the integrity of kernel code, or enumerate processes in order to scan them for malicious
code, and so on. Some of these functions are also implemented for Windows targets in tools
such as Volatility [124]; however, our own tools required no reverse engineering and were
generated automatically.
The six programs performed the same function on all three operating systems:
• getpid Gets the process ID of the currently running process.
• gettime Retrieves the current system time.
• pslist Computes a list of the PIDs of all currently running processes.
• lsmod Retrieves a list of the base addresses of all loaded kernel modules.5
• getpsfile Retrieves the name of the executable associated with a given PID.
• getdrvfile Retrieves the name of a loaded kernel module, given its base address.
The three operating systems used were Windows XP SP2 (kernel version 5.1.2600.2180),
Ubuntu Linux 8.10 (kernel version 2.6.27-11), and Haiku R1 Alpha 2 [46]. Windows and
Linux were chosen because they are both in common use,6 and thus represent practical,
real-world scenarios. Haiku, a relatively obscure clone of BeOS, was chosen for two reasons:
(1) to our knowledge, we are the first to do virtual machine introspection or memory analysis
on a Haiku target, making it a compelling example of Virtuoso’s ability to deal with diverse
5In the Linux version, this reads the contents of /proc/modules, which contains both the names and base
addresses of kernel modules, so getdrvfile is not needed on Linux.
6Although use of OS X is also widespread, its design isolates the kernel in a separate address space.
Due to limitations in our current implementation discussed in Section 3.7, we were unable to test OS X
introspection.
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OS Program Original Post Final
Windows
getpid 3549 106 12
gettime 7715 1081 233
pslist 302082 230366 75141
lsmod 195488 157440 84973
getpsfile 49588 23865 10074
getdrvfile 194765 157696 92109
Linux
getpid 133047 4055 1706
gettime 75074 3882 1592
pslist 6107214 2265667 1095963
lsmod 1936439 852299 414670
getpsfile 14752561 6323249 2913064
Haiku
getpid 18242 3985 1719
gettime 9982 585 237
pslist 362127 290078 160830
lsmod 850363 702277 423438
getpsfile 249663 152896 78107
getdrvfile 522299 399175 234527
Figure 16: Results of testing a total of 17 programs across three different operating systems.
“Original” refers to the size of the trace before any processing, “Post” is the size after
interrupt filtering and malloc replacement, and “Final” gives the size of the program after
slicing; all sizes given are in number of IR ops. The numbers given refer to processing of a
single dynamic trace.
operating systems; and (2) none of the authors had any prior knowledge of the internals
of the Haiku kernel, so there was no way to “cheat” by incorporating additional domain
knowledge.
The results of our testing are shown in Figure 16. To verify that each program worked
correctly, we ran it on a sample memory image taken at a different time from when the
trace was captured, and then verified the output by hand (with help from existing in-guest
tools). The numbers shown are for programs generated from a single trace.
With one exception, the generated programs all worked correctly—gettime for Haiku
failed to obtain the correct system time. Upon inspection, we determined that this was
due to the way Haiku keeps time: rather than continuously updating some global location,
Haiku stores the boot time and then calculates the current time by calling rdtsc to read
the Time Stamp Counter (TSC), which contains the number of cycles executed since boot.
Because our runtime environment does not have access to the TSC when operating on a




















Figure 17: Results of cross-validation for the pslist program on Windows. The error bars
indicate the standard error of each sample.
that when provided with the correct TSC value, the generated program functions correctly.
Figure 16 also shows the effect of preprocessing and slicing on the size of the generated
program. One clear point emerges from examining these figures. Preprocessing removed
between 17% and 97% of the initial traces (it removed 55% on average), and slicing reduced
the number of remaining instructions in the trace by 40%–89% (56% on average). Because
the resulting programs do, in fact, work, we can conclude that a large portion of the
computation seen in the initial traces is irrelevant to the final output. Also, we can observe
that were we to run all the code seen in the trace, the time required to run the introspection
programs would dramatically increase.
3.6.2 Reliability
Because our introspection programs are based on dynamic analysis of the training programs,
they do not, in general, contain all the code needed to account for every eventuality the
introspection program may encounter. This limitation is inherent to the use of dynamic
methods and is a well-known problem in program testing. In this section, we describe
the results of our experiments on the reliability of the generated introspection programs,
techniques for improving their coverage, and the motivation behind our use of dynamic
analysis.
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Testing To empirically test the reliability of programs generated using Virtuoso, we ex-
amined how the reliability of a single program (pslist, described in Section 3.6.1) was
affected by training. We generated 24 traces of pslist running under Windows XP, taking
a trace once every five minutes, starting just after the desktop appeared. During this time,
we did the following actions:
• Opened a connection to a remote machine with PuTTY.
• Browsed web pages with Google Chrome and Internet Explorer.
• Played a game of Minesweeper.
• Closed a non-responsive instance of Internet Explorer, and sent a crash report.
• Played a game of Solitaire.
No special effort was made to induce a wide variety of system states such as low-memory
conditions. Along with each trace, we also captured a snapshot of the memory and CPU
state.
We then used cross-validation to estimate the reliability of the program as a whole: for
each k in the range {1 . . . 12} we took 50 random subsets of size k from the set of all traces
captured,7 used these traces to generate an introspection program, and then tested the
reliability of the program on the (24−k) images corresponding to the remaining traces. We
judged that the generated program had executed correctly if it produced the same output
as the training program for that image. Figure 17 shows the results of this testing. Each
point represents the mean reliability of programs generated from k traces.
We note that reliability appears to increase linearly with the number of traces used;
since the reliability is bounded above by 1, it most likely approaches an asymptote as more
traces are added and the number of unexplored paths in the program grows smaller. We
also ran the generated programs on their training images, and, as expected, achieved a
success rate of 100%, validating the correctness of our trace merging algorithm.
7For k = 1 there are only 24 subsets, so our number of subsets in this case is 24.
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In examining the data more closely, however, we observed that traces taken earlier in
time (closer to system boot) were more reliable. To test this effect, we created an additional
test data set of 24 images, again captured once every five minutes starting shortly after
system boot. We then generated the pslist program from the first trace captured during
our cross-validation test and no others. To our surprise, we found that this program had
100% reliability on our new test data set.
By inspecting the source code to the Windows Research Kernel [84], we determined
that the Windows operating system stores the image name of the process lazily, waiting
to generate the attribute until the first time some program requests it. So the first trace
includes all the code needed to generate the process name, whereas later traces simply read
the already-initialized data. When programs produced from these latter traces encounter
a case where the process name is not yet initialized, they will lack the code necessary to
do so. Thus, this caching effect may cause the cross-validation numbers given above to
overestimate the difficulty of building reliable programs; in this case, the natural testing
strategy of booting the system and taking several traces would have yielded a reliable
program.
Improving Coverage In any case where testing finds that the generated program fails to
function correctly, we can take a new trace based on the failing snapshot that should work
correctly in that case. Although we will not be able to run the program precisely from the
point where the failure occurred, in practice we have found that failing states tend to persist
long enough that we can take a new trace that covers the failed snapshot. This allows us
to iteratively improve coverage based on gaps found during training, until we reach a point
where no further gaps are found. In future work, we hope to explore how techniques from
the software testing community can help make this approach more rigorous. For example,
we may be able to perform static analysis of the OS code to reveal missing branches, and
then apply symbolic or concolic execution to determine what system state is necessary to
go down that branch and improve coverage.
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Static vs. Dynamic Analysis A natural question is why, given the coverage issues
associated with dynamic analysis, our approach does not make use of static analysis. Al-
though we considered static analysis, a number of difficulties make it an unattractive choice
in this context. First, static analysis relies on the ability to reliably identify all the code
associated with a piece of functionality. In the general case, accurate disassembly of x86
code is undecidable [78], and even on non-malicious code, it can be quite difficult. Second,
our slicing approach would be much less accurate if performed statically, particularly in the
presence of dynamic jumps (which are common in kernel code, which makes extensive use
of function pointer-based indirection) and dynamically allocated memory. Finally, static
analysis requires much more domain knowledge about the target operating system: at min-
imum, the executable file format and the details of the loader must be known just to find
the code to analyze.
To demonstrate the reasons why static analysis is inappropriate in this case, it is useful
to look at a recent system, BCR (Binary Code Reutilization) [18], which also attempts to
extract portions of a binary program for later re-execution, but does so using static analysis.
First, we note that BCR does not use a purely static approach: it relies on dynamic analysis
in its disassembly phase to resolve the targets of dynamic jumps. The authors do not
clearly indicate how their system deals with any coverage issues that may arise from this
use of dynamic analysis. Second, BCR employs significant amounts of domain knowledge to
perform its code analysis. The executable file format, system API calls, and the mechanism
by which imported functions are resolved must all be known in order to extract assembly
functions. This reliance on domain knowledge both restricts the generality of BCR and
limits the kinds of code it can extract—for example, BCR is unable to extract functions
that make system calls directly. Virtuoso, by contrast, relies on no such domain knowledge
and works with any code constructs supported by the x86 architecture.
Even if it were possible in our case to statically find every code path that could be
taken by the program, it may not be desirable. For example, consider the case of a program
written for Linux that retrieves sensitive information from the /proc filesystem. At some
point in the execution of this program, the kernel will likely perform a check along the lines
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of if (uid == 0). Although this check is a valid part of the overall program, it does not
actually affect the value computed by the program. If we use dynamic analysis and collect
traces that succeeded, we will only ever see the branch where this condition evaluated true,
and the check will not be incorporated into the resulting program. Although this is, strictly
speaking, incorrect, it has the side effect of generalizing the program: whereas the original
code could only be executed in a context where the current user was root, the generated
introspection utility will be able to compute the correct result from the context of any
user. Additional research is required to determine if these “undesirable” branches can be
automatically eliminated using a static approach.
3.6.3 Security
The main motivation in the design of Virtuoso is to enable the rapid creation of secure
introspection-based programs. Were security and unobtrusiveness of no concern, it would
be sufficient to deploy an in-guest agent that queried existing OS APIs and simply trust
that they had not been compromised. However, as security is a concern, we must test that
our system does, in fact, provide the hoped-for isolation from malicious changes to the guest
operating system.
To demonstrate that the generated programs are immune to malicious changes in kernel
code, we generated our Windows process lister (pslist, described in Section 3.6.1) on
a clean Windows XP system. Next, we obtained the Hacker Defender [36] rootkit, which
(among many other stealth techniques) hides processes by injecting into all processes on the
system and hooking API calls using inline code modification. We configured it to hide any
process named rcmd.exe. We then renamed a copy of Notepad to rcmd.exe, and infected
the system. After infection, we checked that rcmd.exe was no longer visible from the Task
Manager. We then ran our generated introspection program, and found that it successfully
listed both our hidden process and the rootkit’s own userland component (hxdef100.exe).
Beyond verifying that our program is immune to existing rootkits that alter kernel
code, we also need to consider the possibility that someone might actively attempt to evade
our introspections. First, because Virtuoso attempts to faithfully replicate the functioning
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of actual system APIs, vulnerabilities that allow attackers to evade the standard APIs
will be reflected in the generated introspection programs. Data-only attacks (i.e. Direct
Kernel Object Manipulation, or DKOM) also poses a challenge to our system, because in
this case even uncompromised OS APIs will report incorrect results. For example, the
standard Windows process listing API can be evaded by rootkits that directly manipulate
the process data structure to unlink a malicious process, hiding it from the EnumProcesses
API. Careful combinations of existing introspections can still thwart this attack, however:
by calling getpid every time the CR3 register changes and comparing this list against the
one returned by pslist, hidden processes can still be detected. Further research is necessary
to see if such defenses can be found for other kinds of data-only attack.
Second, an attacker may attempt to take advantage of the fact that Virtuoso uses
dynamic analysis to cause it to malfunction. Specifically, he may attempt to set the free
variables used by the program in such a way as to cause some conditional branch that
does not have full coverage to be exercised. The opportunity for evasion afforded by this
is minimal: if an attacker does find a way to reliably manipulate the system into a state
that causes an introspection program to fail, the fix can be generated quickly, as the attack
could be used for a new training run that would update the existing introspection program.
Extra care must be exercised in this case, however: if the attack also alters code that the
introspection depends upon, updating the introspection program could cause malicious code
to be incorporated into the generated program. Kernel code integrity checks (i.e., verifying
that the code seen in training matches that found in an uncompromised version of the OS)
would help in this scenario, but can be difficult to implement in practice, and would require
more domain knowledge than we currently assume.
Additionally, we note that our dynamic slicing method allows us to quantify precisely the
set of global kernel data that a given introspection depends on (note that data from userland
is read from the training data, and is not available to the attacker for manipulation). Even
within this set of kernel data, only a subset may be susceptible to attacker manipulation:
as Dolan-Gavitt et al. [33] describe, arbitrary modification of global kernel data can cause
system instability. Ultimately, this problem is best resolved by improving training, and we
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hope to explore automated means of improving coverage in future work.
The general problem of defending against malware that is VMI-aware, and has the ability
to tamper with kernel data structure layouts and algorithms, remains open. Such malware,
which would affect most current VMI solutions, has been discussed in other work [5], and
defending against it is a difficult problem. Although we consider this problem out of scope
for Virtuoso, we hope to explore more general defenses in future work.
Finally, if a vulnerability is found in the APIs that support the introspection, an at-
tacker may attempt to compromise the security of the monitor by causing it to execute
malicious code. Because the runtime environment has no facility for translating new code,
it is effectively a Harvard architecture, so standard code injection techniques are not pos-
sible against programs generated by Virtuoso. However, in recent years a new technique,
return-oriented programming [106], has demonstrated that malicious computation can be
performed by chaining together snippets of code linked by dynamic jumps (e.g., returns),
and subsequent work has shown that this allows for exploitation of Harvard architecture
devices [20]. Despite these developments, we believe that the relatively small size of our
programs (the largest in our test set has only 4030 basic blocks, and only 140 of these con-
tain a dynamic jump), combined with the fact that the runtime environment executes code
at the granularity of a basic block (i.e., it is not possible to execute only part of a block),
will make it impossible to construct the necessary set of gadgets. More work, however, is
necessary to prove this intuition definitively.
3.6.4 Performance
Performance results for the programs described in Section 3.6.1 are shown in Figure 18. The
tests were carried out on a Intel R© CoreTM 2 Quad 2.4 GHz CPU machine with 4 gigabytes
of RAM running Debian/GNU Linux unstable (kernel 2.6.32-amd64). Each test was run
100 times, and the results were averaged.
Of the three operating systems shown, the results for Linux stand out as being partic-
ularly slow. We investigated this result further and found that the overhead was caused by
the interface Linux uses to retrieve system information. In contrast to Haiku and Windows,
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Figure 18: Runtime performance of generated programs. Times given are in milliseconds,
and are averaged over 100 runs.
which have specific system calls to inspect the state of the system, Linux exposes these
details through the /proc filesystem. This means that the code that implements tools such
as pslist needs to open files, list directories, and so on, all of which results in much more
code being executed than on Windows and Haiku.
Although the times shown are not currently fast enough to enable online monitoring,
we stress that our current implementation is unoptimized and translates the x86 code to
Python, which it then runs in an environment that is also written in Python. One per-
formance improvement would be to port the runtime to C and generate x86 binary code
that can be run on the host (after transforming potentially dangerous instructions into
safe equivalents, redirecting memory loads and stores to the guest VM, and so on). We
expect that this would provide performance at least on par with QEMU, which uses similar
techniques in its whole-system emulation. It is also worth noting that even unoptimized,
the programs generated by Virtuoso are fast enough for use in forensic analysis of memory
dumps.
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3.7 Limitations and Future Work
Although Virtuoso currently supports many useful introspections on a variety of operating
systems, there are still a number of areas in which it could be extended. In this section, we
describe the current limitations of Virtuoso and how we might deal with these cases.
Multiple address space support: Perhaps the most significant limitation of Virtuoso is
its inability to correctly handle traces that span multiple virtual address spaces (that is,
traces in which another process than the training program appears). In the simplest case,
the other processes do no work related to the introspection at hand, but they are difficult
to filter out because the trace will also contain portions of scheduler code to switch to the
other process, and identifying and removing this code automatically is difficult. Virtuoso
currently sidesteps this issue by running its training programs with high priority (e.g., using
start /realtime on Windows and chrt on Linux).
More difficult, however, is the problem of analyzing and extracting programs that make
use of interprocess communication (IPC). Solving this problem is particularly important
for supporting introspection of microkernel architectures, where many tasks are performed
by collections of cooperating processes. The major challenge here is that although we may
be able to extract the relevant code running in each process, there will be data from other
processes that must be read from the guest operating system at runtime. The generated
program, then, will need to have some way of finding the appropriate cooperating process
at runtime in order to read this data; this is likely to require significant domain knowledge.
More research is required to determine the extent to which this can be automated.
Self-modifying code: As we mention in Section 3.6.3, the runtime environment of Virtu-
oso is effectively a Harvard architecture machine, with no facility for loading new code. This
means that we do not support self-modifying code. Although this has not caused problems
with any of our introspections (operating systems rarely make use of self-modifying code),
such support is necessary for working with malicious code, an area we hope to explore in
the future.
Relocation and ASLR: Currently, Virtuoso assumes that the modules containing the
data it needs have not been relocated. This assumption may not hold in general, however:
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modules may be loaded at different base addresses for a variety of reasons, including security
(i.e., Address Space Layout Randomization, or ASLR).8 If this occurs, data read from those
modules will be found at a different address, and the introspection program may not be
able to locate it correctly. Although this problem can be resolved by incorporating more
domain knowledge (such as the mechanics of the executable loader), doing so would make
supporting new operating systems more difficult. One possible solution to this problem is to
attempt to relocate portions of the generated program at runtime by scanning the memory
of the guest operating system for the relevant code and then applying the appropriate offset
for accesses to memory.
Aside from improving the analysis capabilities of Virtuoso, we also hope to examine
its use in areas outside the realm of introspection. For example, by tracing calls made
by programs such as ls, we might be able to produce programs that can understand the
format of undocumented filesystems without relying on native filesystem drivers. Such
analysis capabilities could aid significantly in cross-platform interoperability efforts.
Finally, there are some minor implementation details that could be improved. In par-
ticular, we could do away with needing to know the details of malloc for specific operating
systems by adding support for x86 hardware exceptions and extracting the page fault han-
dler. As we already detect page faults in our runtime environment (they currently raise an
exception), we would just need to extract the page fault handler code and cause memory
exceptions to trigger this code (similar to the way the TPR is currently handled—see Sec-
tion 3.5.2 for details). This would eliminate the only piece of OS-specific knowledge used
by Virtuoso, allowing it to generalize to any x86-based operating system.
3.8 Conclusion
We have presented Virtuoso, a system for automatically generating introspection tools that
can retrieve semantically meaningful information based on low-level data sources. By apply-
ing a novel whole-system executable dynamic slicing technique, Virtuoso turns a task which
8The alert reader will note that the version of Linux used enables ASLR by default. However, this did
not affect our introspections, as the only libraries randomized are in user space, and we take userland data
references from training.
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once took hours or weeks of reverse engineering by an expert into one that requires only a
small amount of effort by a programmer of modest skill and a few minutes of computation
time—and in doing so, helps ensure that introspection programs exactly model the behavior
of the operating system. Moreover, its analysis capabilities are operating system-agnostic,
removing the need for developers to constantly play catch-up as OS vendors release new
versions of their products. These contributions help narrow the semantic gap, and should
remove a significant roadblock in the areas of forensic analysis, virtualization-based security
and low-artifact malware analysis.
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CHAPTER IV
TAPPAN ZEE (NORTH) BRIDGE: MINING MEMORY ACCESSES
FOR INTROSPECTION
4.1 Motivation
Many security applications have a need to inspect the internal workings of software. Host-
based intrusion detection systems, malware analyses, and digital forensics all depend to some
degree on being able to obtain information about software that is by design undocumented
and hidden from public view. Thus, to operate correctly, security software is typically built
on reverse engineering, the art and practice of elucidating the undocumented principles on
which software is built.
Unfortunately, reverse engineering is expensive, time consuming, and requires a high
degree of expertise. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that, to protect against tam-
pering, security applications are often hosted in environments separated from the target
being inspected, such as a separate virtual machine. Because of this, their visibility into
the target is often limited to low-level features such as memory and CPU state, and any
higher-level information must be reconstructed based on reverse engineered knowledge.
This problem, which we will refer to as the introspection problem, has been approached
by a number of recent research efforts such as Virtuoso [32] and VMST [40]. Existing
systems, however, have a number of limitations. First, they focus on retrieving kernel-
level information. However, a great deal of security-relevant information exists only at
user-level, such as URLs being visited by the browser, instant messages and emails sent by
desktop clients, and system and application log messages. Second, they require that the
desired information be accessible through some public interface (a public API in the case
of Virtuoso, and a userland program or kernel module in the case of VMST). This means
that some security-relevant information may be inaccessible to such tools. Finally, Payne
et al. [95] argue that many security applications need some form of active monitoring ; that
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is, they need to be notified when certain system events occur. Current solutions to the
introspection problem provide no way of locating places in the system where it would be
useful to interpose.
In this chapter, we attempt to address the limitations of past solutions by examining a
rich source of information about system and application activity: memory accesses observed
at runtime. Our key insight is that a memory accesses made at different points in a program
can be treated as streams of related information. For example, when visiting a URL, a web
browser must write to memory the URL that is being visited, and it will generally do so
at the same point in the program. By intercepting memory accesses made at this program
point we can observe all URLs visited. These program points, which we call tap points,
provide a natural place to interpose to extract security-relevant information, and could be
integrated into an active monitoring system such as Lares [95].
There are several challenges that must be overcome to make use of tap points. The first
is the sheer amount of data that must be sifted through. In ten minutes’ worth of execution
on a Windows 7 system, for example, we observed a total of 18.9 million unique tap points
which read and wrote a total of 32.8 gigabytes of data. To overcome this challenge, we make
use of techniques from information retrieval and machine learning, described in Section 4.4,
to quickly zero in on the tap points that read or write information relevant to introspection.
Second, simply setting up an environment in which one can observe every memory access
made by the whole system (OS and applications) poses a challenge. Whole-system emulators
such as QEMU [12] provide the necessary basis for such instrumentation, but intercepting
and analyzing every memory access online is not practical: the resulting system is so slow
that network connections time out and the guest OS may think that programs have become
unresponsive. To solve this problem, we add record and replay to QEMU, which allows
executions to be recorded with low overhead. Our heavyweight analyses are then run
on the replayed execution to analyze every memory access made without perturbing the
system under inspection. We describe our system, Tappan Zee Bridge (TZB),1 in detail in
















Figure 19: Three different ways of defining a tap point: (a) as a single stream of information
from the CPU to RAM ; (b) split up according to program and location within program ;
(c) split up according to program, location within program, and calling context.
Section 4.5.
Finally, previous systems have required significant effort to support new architectures.
This problem has become more pressing in recent years, as ARM-based devices such as
smartphones have exploded in popularity. Because TZB looks at memory accesses, rather
than inspecting binary code, it naturally supports a wide variety of architectures with
minimal effort. To demonstrate this, our evaluation includes the ARM architecture in
addition to x86, and the techniques we describe easily generalize to other architectures.
4.2 Defining Tap Points
At the heart of our approach is an abstraction on top of memory accesses made by the
CPU, the tap point. A tap point is a point in a system at which we wish to capture a series
of memory accesses for introspection purposes; however, the exact definition of “a point in
a system” will make a great deal of difference in how effective our approach can be.
A naive approach to defining tap points would be to simply group memory accesses
by the program counter that made them (e.g., EIP/RIP on x86 and R15 on ARM). This
approach fails in two common cases: first, memory accesses made by bulk copy functions,
such as memcpy and strcpy, would all be grouped together, which would commingle data
from different parts of the program into the same tap point. In addition, looking only at
the program counter would conflate accesses from different programs.
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Instead, we define tap points as the triple
(caller, program counter, address space)
Including the caller and the address space (the CR3 register on x86, and the CP15 c2 register
on ARM) separates out memory accesses into streams that should, in general contain the
same type of data.2 Figure 19 shows the effect of choosing various definitions of a tap
point when looking for the place where the browser writes the URL entered by the user
(“google.com”). At the coarsest granularity (a), one can simply look at all writes from the
CPU to RAM; however, the desired information is buried among reams of irrelevant data.
Separating out tap points by program and program counter (b) is better, but still combines
uses of strcpy that contain different information — in this case, a filename and a URL. By
including the calling context (c), we can finally obtain a tap point that contains just the
desired information.
It is possible that some tap points may require deeper information about the calling
context (for example, if an application has its own wrapper around memcpy), but in practice
we have found that just one level of calling context is usually sufficient. In addition, because
TZB uses a whole-system emulator that can watch every call and return, we can obtain the
call stack to an arbitrary depth for any tap point. This makes it easy to add extra context
for a given tap point, if it is found that doing so separates out the desired information.
Examples of tap points that require more than one level of callstack information are given
in Sections 4.6.1.2 and 4.6.1.3.
Conversely, one might wonder whether this definition of a tap point may split up data
that should logically be kept together. To mitigate this problem case, we introduce the idea
of correlated tap points: we can run a pass over the recorded execution that notices when
two tap points write to adjacent locations in memory in a short period of time (currently
5 memory accesses). The idea is that these tap points may be more usefully considered
jointly; for example, a single data structure may have its fields set by successive writes.
2Making use of tap points defined this way in the real world is slightly more difficult, since a program’s
address space will differ and its code may be relocated by ASLR. These complications can be overcome with
a minor amount of engineering, however.
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These writes would come from different program counters, and hence would be split into
different tap points, but it may be more useful to examine the data structure as a whole.
By noticing this correlation we can analyze the data from the combined tap point.
4.3 Scope and Assumptions
The goal of Tappan Zee Bridge is to find points at which to interpose for active monitoring.
More precisely, our goal is to speed the current entirely manual process by which applica-
tions or operating systems are reverse engineered in order to locate tap points for active
monitoring. It should be noted that we do not aim to surpass those manual efforts. We
have no automatic way, for instance, of knowing for certain if a tap point will fail to output
crucial data or, alternately, spew out superfluous information under some future conditions.
This is a separate problem to which we see no ready solution. Static analysis of candidate
tap points or extensive testing are good stop-gaps, but nothing short of fully understanding
enormous binary code bases can really give complete assurance that a tap point won’t miss
or cause false alarms in the future.
In this section, we explore how our definition of a tap point and our focus on active
monitoring shape the scope of our work.
First and most obviously, our focus on memory accesses necessarily limits our scope to
information that is read from or written to RAM at some point. Although this is quite
broad, there are notable exceptions. For example, TRESOR [89] performs AES encryption
without storing the key or encryption states in RAM by making clever use of the x86 debug
registers and the AES-NI instruction set. Aside from such special cases, however, this
assumption is not particularly limiting.
Second, our goal of finding tap points suitable for active monitoring motivates a design
that treats memory accesses at tap points as sources of streaming data. Our algorithms,
therefore, typically work in a streaming fashion as the system executes, remembering only a
fixed amount of state for each tap point. Although this is a natural fit for active monitoring,
where events should be reported as soon as possible, it makes handling data whose spatial
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Figure 20: Patterns of memory access that we might wish to monitor using TZB.
Third, the encoding of the data sought must be to some extent guessable. For example,
to search for a string, one must know what encodings are likely to be used by the system to
represent strings. In general this is not a severe limitation, but it does come up; we discuss
one such case in Section 4.6.2.2.
Finally, the use of calling context in the definition of a tap point raises the question
of how much context is necessary or useful. Our current system uses only the most recent
caller, but we have seen both situations where this is not enough and where it is too much.
Overall, however, one level of calling context has proved to be a reasonable choice for a
wide variety of introspection tasks.
To better illustrate the boundaries of our technique, consider Figure 20, which plots
the address of data written by different tap points over time for four patterns of memory
access. In the bottom two quadrants, we have cases that are challenging, but currently
well-supported by TZB. In the bottom-left, a standard memcpy implementation on x86
makes a copy in 4-byte chunks using rep movsd, and then does a two-byte movsw to get the
remainder of the string. Because the access occurs across two different instructions, TZB
sees two different tap points. Our tap point correlation mechanism correctly deduces that
the accesses are related, however, because they operate on adjacent ranges in a short span
of time.
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The case shown in the bottom right quadrant would be tricky if we looked only at
memory access spatially and not temporally. Here, a utility function writes data out to a
serial port by making one-byte writes to a memory-mapped I/O address.3 Because TZB
sees these memory writes in temporal order, ignoring the address, the data is seen normally
and the analyses we describe all operate correctly.
The upper quadrants show cases that are currently not handled by TZB. In the upper
left, memmove copies a buffer in reverse order when the source and destination overlap. Thus,
when viewed in temporal order, a copy of a string like “12345678” would be seen by TZB
as “56781234”. This case is unlikely to be handled by TZB without a significant redesign,
as its view of memory accesses is inherently streaming.
Finally, the upper right, which represents the case of dmesg on Linux, is an example
of the “dilemma of context”. Although the function, do syslog, that writes log data to
memory is called from multiple places (creating multiple tap points), it writes to the same
contiguous buffer. Unlike the memcpy case, a significant amount of time may pass before
the next function calls do syslog, and so our tap correlation, which only considers memory
accesses within a fixed time window, will not notice that the tap points ought to be grouped
together. We believe that this case could be overcome with additional engineering work,
but this is left to future work.
4.4 Search Strategies
To find useful tap points in a system—places from which to extract data for introspection—
using Tappan Zee Bridge, one begins by creating a recording that captures the desired OS
or application behavior. For example, if the end goal is to be notified each time a user
loads a new URL in Firefox, one would create a recording of Firefox visiting several URLs.
This recording is made by emulating the OS and application inside of the dynamic analysis
platform PANDA (described in more detail in Section 4.5.1), which can capture and record
all sources of non-determinism with low overhead, allowing for later deterministic replay.
Next, one can run one or more analyses that seek out the desired information among all




























Figure 21: The workflow for using TZB to locate points at which to interpose for active
monitoring.
memory accesses seen during the execution. Analyses in TZB take the form of PANDA
plugins that are called on each memory access made during a replayed execution and, at
the end, write out a report on the tap points analyzed. Finally, the tap points found
should be validated to ensure that they do, in fact, provide the desired information. Such
assurance can be gained either by examining the data in the tap point in new executions,
or by examining the code around the tap point. This workflow is illustrated in Figure 21.
In this section, we describe three different ways of finding tap points grouped according
to a standard epistemic classification scheme [101]: searching for “known knowns”—tap
points where the content of the desired data is known; searching for “known unknowns”—
tap points where the kind of data sought is known, but its precise format is not; and finally
“unknown unknowns”—tap points where the type and format of the data sought are not
known, and we are instead simply trying to find “interesting” tap points.
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4.4.1 Known Knowns
The simplest case is finding data that one knows is likely to be read or written by a tap
point, and where the encoding of the data is easily guessed. For example, to find a tap point
that can be used to notify the hypervisor whenever a URL is entered in a browser, one can
visit a known sequence of URLs, and then monitor all tap points, searching for specific byte
sequences that make up those URLs. The same holds for other data whose representation
when written to memory is predictable: filenames, window titles, registry key names, and
so on. For this kind of data, simple string searching is usually sufficient to zero in on the
few tap points that handle the data of interest, and in our experience it is one of the most
effective techniques for finding useful tap points.
4.4.2 Known Unknowns
A second tap point application involves finding tap points for things about which we have
limited knowledge. We can easily assemble corpora of exemplars to represent a semantic
class: English prose, kernel messages, or mail headers. These examples need not come from
tap points but can easily be collected directly from interacting with the operating system
itself. From such a corpus, we can readily build a statistical model, with which we can build
a distance measure for scoring and ranking tap points by how close their contents are to
the model.
In addition to such statistical methods, we can also search using an oracle. This is the
case, for example, with tap points that write encryption keys. Although the exact key may
not be known in advance, we can check whether a given byte string is a valid decryption
key by trying to decrypt our sample data.
4.4.3 Unknown Unknowns
The final strategy for finding useful tap points is also the least focused. If there is no specific
introspection quantity sought, one might instead wish to find interesting tap points, for
some suitable definition of “interesting.” To support this scenario, TZB offers a form of
unsupervised learning—clustering—to group together tap points that handle similar data.
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The idea is that one can then examine exemplars from each cluster, rather than being forced
to look through a large number of tap points. Thus, our use of clustering functions as a
form of data triage.
4.5 Implementation
In this section, we describe both the dynamic analysis platform employed to build TZB,
but also TZB-specific algorithmic and data-structure solutions.
4.5.1 PANDA
TZB makes extensive use of the Platform for Architecture-Neutral Dynamic Analysis (PANDA),
which was developed by the authors in collaboration with Northeastern University.
PANDA is based upon version 1.0.1 of the QEMU machine emulator [12]. QEMU is
an excellent and common choice for whole-system dynamic analysis for two main reasons.
First, performance is good (about 5x slowdown over native). Second, every basic block of
guest code is disassembled by the host in order to emulate, which means that there are
opportunities to interpose analyses at the basic block or even instruction level, if desired.
QEMU lowers instructions to an intermediate language (IL) in order to employ a single
back-end code generator, the Tiny Code Generator (TCG). This IL means dynamic analyses
can potentially be written once and re-used for all 14 architectures supported by QEMU.
Further, this version of QEMU is capable of booting and running modern operating systems
such as Windows 7 (earlier versions of QEMU such as 0.9.1 cannot).
There are three main aspects to PANDA that make it very convenient for building dy-
namic analyses. First, PANDA provides a plug-in architecture that readily permits writing
guest analyses in C and C++. Plug-in code is executed from a number of standard call-
back locations: before and after basic blocks, memory read and writes, etc. This is not
unlike the schemes employed in other whole-system dynamic analysis platforms such as
BitBlaze [112] and S2E [22]. In addition, plugins can export functionality that can then be
used in other plugins, allowing complex behavior to be built up from simple components.
From a software engineering perspective, PANDA’s plugin architecture allows the various
analyses supported by TZB to be cleanly separated from the main emulator, which makes
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for a much more comprehensible and maintainable codebase.
The second aspect of PANDA that makes it an excellent dynamic analysis platform is
nondeterministic record and replay (RR). In our formulation of RR, we begin a recording
by invoking QEMU’s built-in snapshot capability. Subsequently, we record all inputs to the
CPU, including ins, interrupts, and DMA. Recording imposes a small overhead (10-20%)
but not enough to perturb execution. During replay, we revert to a snapshot and proceed
to pull CPU inputs from a log when required. Unlike many other RR schemes, we do not
record and replay device inputs, which means we cannot “go live” at any point during re-
play. But we can perform repeated replays of an entire operating system under arbitrary
instrumentation load without worrying about this perturbing application or operating sys-
tem operation. This capability is vital to TZB: without record and replay, the heavyweight
analyses we perform would make the system unusably slow.
The final aspect of PANDA worth mentioning is its integration of LLVM. QEMU lowers
basic blocks of guest code to its own IL, which PANDA can, additionally, re-render as basic
blocks of LLVM code via a module extracted from S2E. We omit further discussion of this
capability as it is not used by TZB.
4.5.2 Callstack Monitoring
As explained in Section 4.2, tap points need information about the calling context. Keeping
track of this information requires some knowledge about the CPU architecture on which the
OS is running, and so we decided to encapsulate this task into a single plugin. TZB’s other
analyses can then query the current call stack to arbitrary depth by invoking get callers
and not worry about the details described in this section.
To track call stack information, the callstack plugin examines each basic block as it
is translated, looking for an (architecture-specific) call instruction (currently, we look for
call on x86 and bl and mov lr, pc on ARM). If the block includes a call instruction, then
we push the return address onto a shadow stack after each time that block executes.
Detecting the return from a function does not require any architecture-specific code.
Before the execution of every basic block, we check whether the address we are about to
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execute is at the top of the stack; if so, we pop it. We only need to check the starting
address of the basic block, because by definition a return terminates a basic block, so the
return address will always fall at the beginning of a block.
We note that these techniques may fail if traditional call-return semantics are violated.
For example, if a program emulated calls and returns by manually pushing the return
address and using a direct jump, it would not be detected as a call. However, for non-
malicious compiler-generated code, we have found that the algorithm described here works
well.
4.5.3 Fixed String Searching
Searching for fixed strings is one of the most effective tools for finding useful tap points.
Because we have to sift through many gigabytes of data that pass through tap points during
any given execution, it is vital that string search be efficient in both time and space.
To satisfy these constraints, we developed stringsearch, a plugin which requires only
one byte of memory per search string and per tap point. This one-byte counter tracks, for
a given tap point, how many bytes of the search string have been matched by the data
seen at the tap point so far. Whenever a byte is read from or written to memory, we can
check what the next byte in the search string is using this position, and compare it to the
byte passing through the tap point. If it matches, the counter is incremented; if it does
not match, the counter is reset to zero. When the counter equals the length of the search
string, we know that the search string has passed through the tap point, and we report a
match. Note that because the counter is only one byte, our matcher only supports strings
up to 256 bytes long; this cap could be easily raised to 65,536 bytes by using a two-byte
counter, at the cost of doubling the memory requirements. Thus far, 256-byte strings have
been more than sufficient.
This effectively implements a very simple deterministic finite automaton (DFA) matcher.
Indeed, we believe that it should be possible to efficiently implement a streaming basic
regular expression matcher that requires only an amount of memory logarithmic in the
number of states needed to represent the expression. We leave this generalization to future
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work, however.
4.5.4 Statistical Search and Clustering
Collecting bigram statistics on data that passes through each tap point is an efficient way
to enable “fuzzy” search based on some training examples, as well as enabling clustering.
To implement this we collect bigram statistics for all tap points seen in execution, as well
as for the exemplar; the data seen at each tap point is thus represented as a sparse vector
with 65,536 elements (one for each possible pair of bytes).
To search, we can then sort the tap points seen by taking the distance (according to
some metric) from the exemplar. For our metric, we have chosen to use Jensen-Shannon
divergence [74], which is a smoothed and symmetrized version of the classic Kullback-
Leibler divergence [67] (also known as information gain). We also examined the Euclidean
and cosine distance metrics, but found their performance to be consistently worse. Jensen-
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where H is Shannon entropy.
Bigram collection is done by maintaining, for each tap point, two pieces of information:
(1) the last byte that passed through the tap point, so that we can see bigrams that span
a single memory access; (2) a histogram of all byte pairs seen at the tap point. The latter
of these must be maintained sparsely: because our bigrams are based on bytes, a dense
histogram would require 65,536 integers’ worth of storage per tap point. Given that most
of the executions examined in this chapter contain upwards of 500,000 tap points, this would
require more than 120GB of memory, which is clearly infeasible (and wasteful, since most
of those entries would be zero).
Instead, we store the histogram sparsely, using a C++ Standard Template Library
std::map<uint16 t,int>. This keeps memory usage down without sacrificing any accu-
racy, but it does introduce some extra complexity when processing the resulting histograms,
as our search software must support sparse vectors rather than simple arrays. Because of
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this additional complexity, we opted to implement the search and clustering algorithms
ourselves, after some initial prototyping using SciPy’s sklearn toolkit.
Our clustering is based on the venerable k-means algorithm [117], but using the Jensen-
Shannon divergence described in the previous section. As in the statistical search case,
we use bigram statistics for our feature vectors. Initialization uses the KMeans++ algo-
rithm [4], which helps guarantee that the initial cluster centers are widely separated. We
evaluate the performance of this clustering compared to an expert labeling in Section 4.6.3.
Our statistical search tool is implemented in 246 lines of C++, and computes the Jensen-
Shannon divergence between a training histogram (dense) and a set of sparse histograms.
Our K-Means clustering tool is 481 lines of C++ code, and outputs a clustering of the
sparse histograms using Jensen-Shannon divergence as a distance metric.4 Both tools are
multithreaded, which greatly speeds up the computation.
4.5.5 Finding SSL/TLS Keys
We have also implemented a PANDA plugin called keyfind, which locates tap points that
write SSL/TLS master secrets. The SSL/TLS master secret is a 48-byte string from which
an SSL/TLS-encrypted session’s keys are derived; thus, if a tap point that writes the master
key can be found, encrypted network traffic can be decrypted and analyzed.
The plugin operates on a recording in which a program initiates an encrypted connection
to some server and an encrypted packet sent by the client (captured using, e.g., tcpdump).
The keyfind uses each 48 bytes accessed at each tap point as a trial decryption key for a
sample packet sent by the client. If the decrypted packet’s Message Authentication Code
(MAC) verifies that the packet was decrypted correctly then we can conclude that the tap
point can be used to decrypt SSL/TLS connections made by the program under inspection.
In Section 4.6.2.1 we show how this technique can be used to spy on connections made
by the Sykipot malware, without performing a (potentially detectable) man in the middle
attack.
4The use of this distance metric is justified theoretically because Jensen-Shannon distance is a Bregman
divergence [8] and empirically because our clustering typically converges after around 30 iterations.
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Table 5: Tap points found that write the URL typed into the browser by the user.
Browser Caller PC
Deb Epiphany (arm) WebCore::KURL::KURL+0x30 WebCore::KURL::init+0x70
Deb Epiphany (amd64) webkit frame load uri+0xc3 WebCore::KURL::init+0x368
Win7 IE8 (x86) ieframe!CAddressEditBox:: Execute+0xaa ieframe!StringCchCopyW+0x50
Win7 Firefox (x86) xul!nsAutoString::nsAutoString+0x1a xul!nsAString internal::Assign+0x1d
Win7 Chrome (x86) msftedit!CTxtEdit::OnTxChar+0x105 msftedit!CTxtSelection::PutChar+0xb8
Win7 Opera (x86) Opera.dll+0x2cf6c6 Opera.dll+0x142783
Haiku WebPositive (x86) BWebPage::LoadURL+0x3a BMessage::AddString+0x26
4.6 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the efficacy of our various tap point search strategies, described
in Section 4.4, at finding tap points useful for introspection. Our experiments are motivated
by real-world introspection applications, and so for each experiment we describe a typical
application for the tap points found. Each experiment was also generally performed on a
variety of different operating sytems, applications, and architectures in order to evaluate
TZB’s ability to handle a diverse range of introspection targets.
For the sake of readability, we have attempted to use symbolic names for addresses
wherever possible in the following results. It is hoped that these will be more meaningful to
the reader than the raw addresses, but we emphasize that debug information is in no way
required for TZB to work.
4.6.1 Known Knowns
4.6.1.1 URL Access
Monitoring visited URLs is likely to be useful for host-based intrusion detection and preven-
tion systems. For example, an IDS may wish to verify that outgoing requests were initiated
by a human rather than malware on the users’s machine, or match URLs visited against a
blacklist of malicious sites. This poses a challenge for existing introspection solutions, as
URL load notification is not generally exposed by a public API, and the data resides in a
user application (the browser).
To find URL tap points, we created training executions by visiting a set of three URLs
(Google, Facebook, and Bing) in the following operating systems and browsers: Epiphany
on Debian squeeze (armel and amd64); Firefox 16.0.2, Opera 12.10, and Internet Explorer
8.0.7601.17514 on Windows 7 SP1 (x86); and WebPositive r580 on Haiku (x86). We used
the stringsearch plugin to search for the ASCII and UTF-16 representations of the three
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Table 6: Tap points found that write the SSL/TLS master secret for each SSL/TLS con-
nection.
Client Caller PC Process
Deb OpenSSL (arm) tls1 generate master secret+0x9c tls1 PRF+0x90 openssl
Deb OpenSSL (amd64) ssl3 send client key exchange+0x437 tls1 generate master secret+0x108 openssl
Deb Epiphany (arm) md write+0x74 md5 write+0x68 epiphany
Deb Epiphany (amd64) md write+0x60 md5 write+0x49 epiphany
Haiku WebPositive (x86) tls1 generate master secret+0x65 tls1 PRF+0x14b WebPositive
Win7 Chrome (x86) chrome!NSC DeriveKey+0x1241 chrome!TLS PRF+0xa0 chrome.exe
Win7 IE8 (x86) ncrypt!Tls1ComputeMasterKey@32+0x57 ncrypt!PRF@40 lsass.exe
Win7 Firefox (x86) softokn3!NSC DeriveKey+0xe85 freebl3!TLS PRF+0xbb firefox.exe
Win7 Opera (x86) Opera.dll+0x2eb06e Opera.dll+0x50251 opera.exe
URLs, and then validated each tap point found to ensure that it wrote only the desired
data. The results can be seen in Table 5.
4.6.1.2 TLS/SSL Master Secrets
Monitoring SSL/TLS-encrypted traffic is a classic problem for intrusion detection systems.
Currently, hypervisor- or network- based IDSes that wish to analyze encrypted traffic must
perform a man-in-the-middle attack on the connection, presenting a false server certificate
to the client. Not only does this require the client to cooperate by trusting certificates
signed by the intrusion detection system, it also takes control of the certificate verification
process out of the hands of the client—a dangerous step, given that many existing SSL/TLS
interception proxies have a history of certificate trust vulnerabilities [51].
Instead of a man-in-the-middle attack, we can instead use TZB to find a tap point that
reads or writes the SSL/TLS master secret for each encrypted connection, giving us a “man-
on-the-inside”. Because this secret must be generated for each SSL/TLS connection, if we
can find such a tap point, it can then be provided to the IDS to decrypt and, if necessary,
modify the content of the SSL stream.
To find the location of these tap points, we ran a modified copy of OpenSSL’s s server
utility that prints out the SSL/TLS master key any time a connection is made. We then
recorded executions in which we visited the server with each of our tested SSL clients,
and noted the SSL/TLS master secret. Finally, we used stringsearch to search for a tap
point that wrote the master key, and verified that the tap wrote exactly one master key
per connection. For this test, we used: OpenSSL s client 0.9.8 on Debian squeeze (armel),
OpenSSL s client 0.9.8 and Epiphany 2.30.6 on Debian squeeze (amd64), and Firefox 16.0.2,
Google Chrome 23.0.1271.64, Opera 12.10, and Internet Explorer 8.0.7601 on Windows 7
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Table 7: Tap points found for file access on different operating systems.
Target Caller PC
Debian (amd64) getname+0x13e strncpy from user+0x52
Debian (arm) getname+0x88 strncpy from user+0x10
Haiku (x86) EntryCache::Lookup+0x27 hash hash string+0x1b
FreeBSD (x86) namei+0xd1 copyinstr+0x38
Windows 7 (x86) ObpCaptureObjectName+0xcb memcpy+0x33
SP1 (x86). The results are shown in Table 6.
There is one particular point of interest to observe in these results. In the case of
Epiphany on Debian, we found that one level of callstack information was not sufficient—
with only the immediate caller, the tap point contains more data than just the SSL/TLS
master secret. This is because the version of Epiphany uses SSLv3 to make connections,
and the pseudo-random function (PRF) used in SSLv3 has the form
MD5(SHA1(. . .))
The other implementations instead use TLSv1.0, where the PRF has the form
MD5(. . .)⊕ SHA1(. . .)
This final XOR operation is done from a unique program point, so the tap point that results
from it contains only TLS master keys. This points to a potential complication of using
tap points for introspection: it is not always clear in advance how many levels of call stack
information will be required.
We were successful in locating tap points for all SSL/TLS clients tested. We note that
uncovering similar information using traditional techniques would have required significant
expertise and reverse engineering of both open source and proprietary software.
4.6.1.3 File Access
Monitoring file accesses is a requirement for many host-based security applications, including
on-access anti-virus scanners. Thus, locating a tap point at which system-wide file accesses
can be observed is of considerable importance. However, because previous approaches to
the introspection problem [32,40] passively retrieve information from the guest and are not
event-driven, they cannot be used in this scenario.
86
To find such a tap point, we created recordings in which we opened files in various
operating systems. Specifically, in each OS we created 100 files, each named after ten
successive digits of π. The operating systems chosen for this test were: Debian squeeze
(amd64), Debian squeeze (armel), Windows 7 SP1 32-bit, FreeBSD 9.0, and Haiku R1
Alpha 3 (all on x86). We then searched for tap points that wrote strings matching the
ASCII and UTF-16 encodings of the filenames using the stringsearch analysis plugin.
The UTF-16 encodings were included because it was known that Windows 7 uses UTF-16
for strings pervasively, allowing us to surmise that on Windows URLs would likely be UTF-
16 encoded. Finally, we looked at the tap points found by stringsearch, and validated
them by hand.
The results are shown in Table 7. For most of the operating systems we had no difficulty
finding a tap point that contained the name of each file as it was accessed. The one exception
was Windows 7, where the most promising tap point not only wrote file results, but also
a number of unrelated objects such as registry key names. As in the SSL case, the root
cause of this was insufficient calling context: in Windows several different things fall under
the umbrella of a “named object”, and these were all being captured at this tap point. We
found that four levels of calling context were sufficient to restrict the tap point to just file
accesses; the “deepest” caller was IopCreateFile (which, despite its name, is used for both
opening existing files and creating new ones).
4.6.2 Known Unknowns
4.6.2.1 SSL Malware
The need to snoop on SSL-encrypted connections arises in malware analysis as well. Two
features distinguish this case from that of intercepting the traffic of benign SSL clients
presented in the previous section. First, the ability to decrypt the traffic without a man in
the middle is even more important: in contrast to benign clients, we cannot assume that
malware will accept certificates signed by our certificate authority. Second, we cannot rely
on having access to the server’s master secret, as the server is under the attacker’s control.
This means that our previous strategy of using a simple string search for the master secret
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Table 8: Tap points that write the system log (dmesg) on several UNIX-like operating
systems. All tap points were located in the kernel, except for Minix, which is a microkernel.
We were unable to find a tap point analogous to dmesg in Windows.
OS Caller PC Kernel? Rank
FreeBSD (x86) msglogstr+0x28 msgbuf addstr+0x19a Yes 1
Haiku (x86) ring buffer peek+0x59 memcpy generic+0x14 Yes 1
Debian (arm) N/A do syslog+0x18c Yes 4
Debian (amd64) N/A do syslog+0x163 Yes 4
Minix (x86) 0x190005ee 0x190009d4 No 8
Windows 7 (x86) Not Found Not Found ? ?
will not work here.
Instead, we located the tap point in the SSL-enabled malware using our keyfind plugin,
which performs trial decryption on a packet sent by the malware using each possible 48-byte
sequence written to memory as a key and verifies whether the Message Authentication Code
is valid. Although this is much slower than a string match, it is the only available option,
since the key is not known in advance.
To test the plugin, we obtained a copy of a version of the Sykipot trojan released
around October 31st, 2012 [44] (MD5: 34a1010846c0502f490f17b66fb05a12). We then
created a recording in which we executed the malware; simultaneously, we captured network
traffic using tcpdump. We noted that the malware made several encrypted connections to
https://www.hi-techsolutions.org/, and provided one of the encrypted packets from
these connections as input to the keyfind plugin. The plugin found the same tap point as
the Windows 7 IE8 experiment described earlier, indicating that both the malware and IE8
likely use the same underlying system mechanism to make SSL connections. The key found
was able to decrypt the connections contained in the packet dump.5
4.6.2.2 Finding dmesg
System logs are an invaluable resource, both for security and system administration. In
an introspection-based security system, for example, one might want to find a tap point
that contains the system’s logs so that they can be stored securely outside the guest virtual
machine. However, because the format of system logs is particular to each OS, we need
5The malware also has a second layer of encryption, which is custom and not based on SSL; we did not
attempt to decrypt this second layer.
88
some mechanism that can find tap points that write data that “looks like” a log based on
an exemplar. The statistical search described in Section 4.4.2 is a good fit for this task:
by training on the output of dmesg on one OS, we can find dmesg-like tap points on other
systems.
To locate these system log tap points, we first created a training exemplar by running the
dmesg command on a Debian sid (amd64) host and computing the bigram probabilities for
the output. We then created recordings in which we booted five operating systems (Debian
squeeze (armel), Debian squeeze (amd64), Minix R3-2.0 (i386), FreeBSD 9.0-RELEASE
(i386), and Haiku R1 Alpha 3 (i386)), and computed the same bigram statistics. We then
sorted the tap points seen in each operating system boot according to their Jensen-Shannon
distance from the training distribution, and manually examined data written by the tap
point for each of the top 30 results in each operating system. Table 8 shows, for each
operating system tested, the tap point that we determined to be the system log, and its
rank in the search results.
We can see that in all cases the correct result is in the top 10. There are two additional
features of Table 8 that bear mentioning. First, the reader will note that the two Debian
systems have a caller of “N/A”. This is because the memory writes that make up dmesg
are done in do syslog, which is called from multiple functions. In these cases, including
the caller splits up information that is semantically the same. We detected this case by
noticing that several of the top-ranked results in the Linux experiments had the same
program counter, and that they appeared to contain different sections of the same log.
Second, the tap point found for Haiku was also incomplete—some lines were truncated. By
using our tap point correlation plugin, we determined that we were missing a second tap
point that was correlated with the main one; the two together formed the write portions
of a memcpy of the log messages. Once this second tap point was included, we could see all
the log messages produced by Haiku.
We also attempted to find an analogous log message tap point on Windows 7, but were
not successful. This is a result of the way Windows logging works: rather than logging
string-based messages, applications and system services create a manifest declaring possible
89
log events, and then refer to them by a generated numeric code. Human-readable messages
are not stored, and instead are generated when the user views the log. This means that
there is no tap point that will contain log messages of the type used in our dmesg training,
and the methods described in this chapter are largely inapplicable unless a training example
for the binary format can be found. However, because the event log query API is public [82],
existing tools such as Virtuoso [32] might be a better fit for this use case.
Anecdotally, the ability to uncover a tap point that writes the kernel logs has also been
useful for diagnosing problems when adding support for new platforms to QEMU. For an
unrelated research task, we attempted to boot the Raspberry Pi [1] kernel inside QEMU, but
found that it hung without displaying any output early on in the boot process. By locating
the dmesg tap point, we discovered that the last log message printed was “Calibrating delay
loop...”; based on this we determined that the guest was hung waiting for a timer interrupt
that was not yet implemented in QEMU.
4.6.3 Unknown Unknowns: Clustering
To test the effectiveness of clustering tap points based on bigram statistics and Jensen-
Shannon distance, we carried out an experiment that compared the clusters generated
algorithmically to a set of labels generated by two of the co-authors manually examining the
data. We created six recordings representing different workloads on two operating systems
(Windows 7 and FreeBSD 9.0). From FreeBSD, we took recordings of boot, shutdown,
running applications (ps, cat, ls, top, and vi), and a one-minute recording of the system
sitting idle, for a total of four recordings. On Windows we created two recordings: running
applications (cmd.exe, dir, the Task Manager, Notepad), and one minute of the system
sitting idle.6
Next, we sampled a subset of the tap points found in each recording. Given that the
vast majority of tap points do not write interesting information, we opted not to sam-
ple uniformly from the all tap points found. Instead, we performed an initial k-means
clustering with k = 100, and then picked out tap points at various distances from each
6Although we would have preferred to include Windows boot and shutdown recordings, at the time our
replay system had a bug (now fixed) that prevented these recordings from being replayed.
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cluster center. We chose the tap point at σ standard deviations from the center, for
σ ∈ {0, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 2.0} for a total of 2,926 samples.7 Finally, we dumped
the data from each of the sampled tap points, blinded them by assigning each a unique id,
and then provided the data files to our two labelers. Each labeler independently assigned
labels to each of the samples using the labels described in Table 9, and the two labelers
then worked together to reconcile their labels.
Finally, we ran a k-means clustering with k = 10; 10 was chosen because it was a round
number reasonably close to the number of labels our human evaluators gave to the data.
We then used the Adjusted Rand Index [47] to score the quality of our clustering relative to
our hand-labeled examples. The Adjusted Rand Index for a clustering ranges from -1 to 1;
clusterings which are independent of the hand labeling will receive a score that is negative
or close to zero. As can be seen in Table 10, our clustering did not match up very well
on the hand-labeled samples. Note, however, that labeling criteria were selected without
knowledge of the sizes of categories or whether or not the distance metric would effectively
discriminate, so it is perhaps unsurprising that the correspondence is poor.
There is some hope, however. Regardless of the apparently poor clustering performance
with respect to hand-labeling, we decided to determine if the clusters from our 100-mean
clustering of FreeBSD’s boot process contained new and interesting data and if finding that
data would be facilitated by them. First, we determined to which of the clusters data from
the FreeBSD’s dmesg and filename tap points (found in Sections 4.6.2.2 and 4.6.1.3) was
assigned. We were heartened to learn that these two text-like tap points had been sent to the
same cluster. We proceeded to explore this cluster of approximately 5000 tap points, and
found that, indeed, the vast majority of the tap points contained readable text of some sort.
Further, in the course of about thirty minutes of spelunking around this cluster, we found
not only kernel messages and filenames but a stone soup of shell scripts, process listings
kernel configuration, GraphViz data, and so on. A selection of these tap point contents
is provided in Appendix A. We did not exhaustively examine this cluster, but plan to do
7The alert reader will note that this is smaller than the 4,800 samples one would expect from taking 8
samples from 100 clusters in each of 6 recordings. This is because some clusters did not have very high
variance, and so in many cases there were fewer than 8 samples at the required distance from the center.
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Table 9: Labels given to the sampled tap points by human evaluators, along with the
number of times each occurred.
Abbrv. Description Count
bp binary pattern 2318
rd repeated dword 400
mz mostly zero 141
rq repeated quadword 19
fnu filenames unicode 8
woa words ascii 8
wou words unicode 7
inu integers unicode 6
bu binary uniform 5
ura URLs ascii 5
rs repeated short 4
fna filenames ascii 2
rb repeated byte 2
vr very redundant 1
Table 10: Quality of clustering as measured by the Adjusted Rand Index, which ranges








so soon, as it appears to contain much of interest for active monitoring. If clustering has
focused us on one out of 100 clusters, this is potentially a big savings.
4.6.4 Accuracy
Leaving aside the clustering results for the moment, the analyses implemented in TZB are
extremely effective at helping to identify interposition points for active monitoring. In the
evaluations based on string searching, we found that the number of tap points we had to
look at manually was at most 262 (URLs under IE8) and in the best case we only had
to examine two tap points (for SSL keys under Firefox, Opera, Haiku, and OpenSSL on
ARM). The number of tap points that need to be examined is related to how widely the
data is propagated in the system and how common the string being searched for is; thus, it
is natural that URLs visited in the browser would appear in many tap points, whereas the
SSL/TLS master key would not. Qualitatively speaking, we found that once the candidate
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tap points had been selected by stringsearch for a given execution, it took at most an
hour to find one that sufficed for the task at hand.
For the dmesg evaluation, we also examined the quality of the results found for each
operating system using the standard “Precision at 10” metric, which is just the number of
results found in the top 10 that were actually relevant to the query. In this case, this is
simply the fraction of results in the top 10 that appeared to contain the system log (even
if it was incomplete). Based on this metric, the precision of our retrieval was between 20%
(on Minix) and 100% (on Haiku). This means that if one looked at all of the top 10 entries,
it is guaranteed that one would find the correct tap point.
4.7 Limitations and Future Work
Although TZB is currently very useful for finding interception points for active monitor-
ing, it is not currently usable in every scenario where introspection is needed. Because the
interception points are triggered by executing code, they are only usable in online analy-
sis. However, the need for introspection also arises in post-mortem analysis, specifically in
forensic memory analysis. Whereas previous solutions such as Virtuoso [32] were able to
operate equally well on memory images or live virtual machines, TZB is only applicable to
the live case. In future work, we hope to combine Virtuoso-like techniques with TZB to
produce offline programs that can locate in memory the buffers on which TZB’s tap points
operate.
Another limitation of TZB is its reliance on callstack information to locate interposition
points. In current systems, keeping track of an arbitrary number of callers for each process
is prohibitively expensive; although stack walking is faster (since it only needs to be invoked
when the monitored code is executed), it is insecure, unreliable, and not available on every
architecture. We hope to examine how existing solutions such as compiler modifications [23,
122] or dynamic binary translation [108] can be used to efficiently maintain the shadow
stack information needed for TZB. We also note that Intel’s Haswell architecture, which
as of this writing has just been released, has hardware support for keeping track of calls
and returns [129]; this would provide an excellent base on which to build a low-overhead
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security system based on TZB tap points.
Code generated at runtime (i.e., JIT or injected code) may make re-identification of a
discovered tap point difficult or even impossible. Given the rise of languages that depend
on JIT runtimes, better solutions are needed for this scenario, and the problem of how to
make use of tap points in JIT code should be explored further.
Finally, as seen in Section 4.6.3, the clustering results are promising, but not yet fully
developed. We hope to gain a better understanding of the data found in tap points and
seek out better features and models for clustering in future work.
4.8 Related Work
Although, to our knowledge, there is no existing work on mining the contents of memory
accesses for introspection, we drew inspiration from a variety of sources. These can be
roughly grouped into three categories: work on automating virtual machine introspection,
research on automated reverse engineering, and efforts that examine memory access pat-
terns, typically through visualization. In this section, we describe in more detail previous
work in these three areas.
Virtual machine introspection has been targeted for automation by several recent re-
search efforts because of the semantic gap problem: security applications running outside
the guest virtual machine need to reconstruct high-level information from low-level data
sources, but doing so requires knowledge of internal data structures and algorithms that is
costly to acquire and maintain. To address this problem, researchers have sought ways of
bridging this gap automatically. Virtuoso [32] uses dynamic traces of in-guest programs to
extract out-of-guest tools that compute the same information. However, because it is based
on dynamic analysis, incomplete training may cause the generated programs to malfunction.
Two related approaches attempt to address this limitation: process out-grafting [115] moves
monitored processes to the security VM while redirecting their system calls to the guest
VM, allowing tools in the security VM to directly examine the process, while VMST [40]
selectively redirects the memory accesses of tools like ps and netstat from the security
VM so that their results are obtained from the guest VM. TZB extends these approaches
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by finding points in applications and the OS at which to perform active monitoring.
Based on the observation that memory accesses in dynamic execution can reveal the
structure of data in memory, several papers have proposed methods for automatically de-
ducing the structure of protocols [19, 28, 75], file formats [29, 76], and in-memory data
structures [70,77,110]. One particular insight we have drawn from this body of work is the
idea that the point in a program at which a piece of data is accessed, along with its calling
context, can be used as a proxy for determining the type of the data. TZB leverages this
insight to separate out memory accesses into streams of related data.
Finally, there has been some research on examining memory accesses made by a single
program or a whole system, typically using visualization. Burzstein et al. [16] found that by
visualizing the memory of online strategy games, they could identify the region of memory
used to decide how much of the in-game map was visible to the player, which greatly reduces
the work required to create a “map hack” and allow the player to see the entire map at
once. Outside the academic world, the ICU64 visual debugger [80] allows users to visualize
and modify the entire memory of a Commodore 64 system, enabling a variety of cheats and
enhancements to C64 games. Although TZB does not use visualization, it shares with this
previous work the understanding that memory accesses can be a rich source of information
about a running program.
4.9 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented TZB, a system that automatically locates candidate
memory accesses for active monitoring of applications or operating systems. This is a
task that previously required extensive reverse engineering by domain experts. We have
successfully used TZB to identify a broad range of tap points, including ones to dynamically
extract SSL keys, URLs typed into browsers, and the names of files being opened. TZB
is built atop the QEMU-based PANDA platform as a set of plug-ins and its operation is
operating system and architecture agnostic, affording it impressive scope for application.
This is a powerful technique that has already transformed how the authors perform RE
tasks. By reframing a difficult RE task as a principled search through streaming data
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provided by dynamic analysis, TZB allows manual effort to be refocused on more critical
and less automatable tasks like validation.
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CHAPTER V
IDENTIFYING FUNCTIONALITY IN PREVIOUSLY-UNSEEN
MALWARE
5.1 Motivation
When faced with a new malware sample, an analyst’s goal is typically to quickly develop a
high-level understanding of its functionality and capabilities. Typically, this is done through
a combination of manual static analysis (i.e., analyzing a disassembly of the malicious binary
by hand) or by some kind of behavioral analysis (e.g., running the malware in a sandbox
and examining its interactions with the outside world—files created, network connections
made, etc). The former is extraordinarily time consuming and requires significant expertise
but can produce a detailed and complete understanding of the malicious code; on the other
hand, a behavioral analysis is trivial to carry out and requires very little time but is unlikely
to give a full picture of the malicious behavior.
In this chapter we propose a middle ground that attempts to provide a high-level picture
of an unknown binary’s functionality based on dynamic features of its execution. Specifi-
cally, for each function in an unknown binary, we will attempt to find the closest-matching
function in our library of previously-seen functionality. An important distinction here is
that we would like our algorithm to perform well even if no exact match can be located;
that is, we hope to match similar functionality across different binaries. In the general case,
of course, performing this task is impossible—deciding the equivalence of two functions is
equivalent to the halting problem. However, our work follows in the grand tradition of tack-
ling undecidable problems by sacrificing certainty and instead using heuristics and looking
for approximate matches.
Our overall approach is depicted in Figure 22. First, a collection of labeled training
examples is gathered; these training examples are programs whose functionality lies in the
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Figure 22: The design of our function matching system. Training samples are executed,
producing dynamic features; at the same time, labels are statically extracted and associated
with the dynamic features. Finally, to label a new sample, the sample is executed and the
same features are collected. The new sample can then be labelled by looking at the labels
given to the closest-matching features in the training set.
functionality in malware samples one would want a labeled corpus of malware to train on).
Next, the training programs are run, and dynamic features of their execution are gathered;
this associates each labeled function with a set of dynamic features. Finally, to identify
functionality in an unknown program, we run it and collect the same dynamic features as
in the training set; these features are then compared with those from the functions in the
training set and the closest matches are reported.
Aside from malware analysis, we believe the techniques described in this chapter may
also be useful in a number of other areas. When auditing closed-source software for vul-
nerabilities, for example, researchers often must locate code that is more likely to contain
bugs, such as parsing or authentication code; our techniques could help quickly narrow
down which functions deserve manual analysis.
5.2 Related Work
Our work seeks to recover high-level information about binary executions by comparing
unknown functions’ execution with a library of known and labeled executions in order to
automatically label behaviors in unknown malware. Although, to the best of our knowl-
edge, our technique and application is novel, there is a great deal of work related to each
component.
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An enormous body of work exists on analyzing and detecting malware. Static approaches
such as semantics-aware malware detection [24] attempt to demonstrate the equivalence of
two functions using techniques from compiler theory and thereby establish that a function
is derived from a previously seen malicious function. BitShred [49] and iLine [50] also use
static features to identify previously seen functionality; in the former case a Bloom filter of
byte sequences is used, whereas the latter looks at a variety of static features such as code
section size, file size, and cyclomatic complexity. While the use of such static features can
allow analysis of large volumes of software (since it is not necessary to execute the software
and collect dynamic features), static techniques are typically not robust to transformations
that preserve functionality while radically changing the structure of the code.
Other approaches have sought to use high-level dynamic behaviors for malware detec-
tion, either by using system calls as a proxy for behavior [71] or looking at whole-system
changes in state [6]. Such work has typically treated the problem as one of machine learning
classification, where an unknown program as a whole is to be classified as malicious or non-
malicious; for example, Rieck et al. combines clustering and behavioral classification based
on a vector representation of the actions taken by a malware sample. While we believe our
techniques may serve as useful input to such a system, we are concerned with the more
fundamental and fine-grained problem of identifying the behavior of individual functions in
malicious and benign programs.
Closest to our own work appears to be the work of Egele et al. [34], which is due to
appear at the 2014 USENIX Security Symposium but is, at the time of this writing, not
available. Their technique, dubbed Blanket Execution (BLEX), forces each function to
be evaluated in a controlled, randomized environment and logs its side effects. These side
effects are then used to match unknown functions against previously seen ones. The authors
report that the correct result for function matches appeared in the top ten results 77% of
the time across all programs tested; although it is difficult to tell from just the abstract of
the paper, it appears that our techniques significantly outperform BLEX.
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5.3 Design and Implementation
In this section we describe the design and implementation of our system for performing
functionality matching using dynamic features.
5.3.1 Label Extractor
Our current system assumes that source code is available for the programs in the training
set. Given that, we wish to automatically extract labels that describe each function in
each binary in our training set. If source code is not available, it would also be possible in
principle to have a human analyst label the functions in the training set; while this would
be extremely time consuming, it might actually produce a more accurate labeling.
Since our focus is on malware, which is seen in greatest abundance on the Windows
platform, we developed a label extractor based on debugging information produced by
Visual Studio, i.e. PDB files. For each binary, we use the Debug Interface Access SDK [81]
to extract the local variables associated with each function, and to create a mapping between
each function and the source lines it was compiled from. We then use a simple Python script
to examine the source of each function and extract any nearby comments and associate them
with the function; for simplicity, we treat the comments a simple set of words.
Because we expect comments to be written in natural language, we additionally normal-
ize comments by performing stemming (normalizing each word so that inflected and derived
forms are reduced to a common base) and stopword removal (removing common words that
provide no descriptive value; in English examples are “the”, “and”, “of”, etc.). Stemming
and stopword removal are implemented using the Python NLTK package [14]. Because it is
common, particularly in technical writing, to use a mix of the author’s native language and
English when writing comments, we attempt to automatically detect the language of each
word before applying the appropriate stemmer and stopword list. For language detection
we use the langid.py package [79]; however, this process is still highly inaccurate given
the difficulty of identifying a language from just one word. We hope to improve on this in
future work.
The local variable and source line extractor consists of 60 lines of C# code. The comment
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extractor consists of 133 lines of Python code, including natural language normalization.
The final output is a serialized Python dictionary mapping function names to the words
and variable names that describe the function.
5.3.2 Feature Extractors
Feature extraction is perhaps the most important component of the system, as it provides
the basis for the matching. All features used are dynamic: they are obtained by actually
running each program. The intent is that these features will be robust to simple structural
changes to the code such as obfuscation, compiler optimizations, and so on. We also hope
that it will be able to detect similarities in two different implementations of the same
algorithm.
We currently extract two features: bigram frequencies for bytes read and written by each
function, and the sequences of system calls made by each function and its callees. We discuss
each in detail in this section. Feature extraction is performed using the PANDA dynamic
analysis platform, described in Section 4.5.1. Both training programs and programs to be
analyzed are run inside PANDA to generate a recording; feature extraction is then performed
by replaying the executions with the feature extraction plugins described below enabled.
As an optimization, feature extraction plugins only extract features from a pre-specified list
of relevant processes.
5.3.2.1 Bigram Frequencies
As each function executes, it will read and write memory. As in TZB (see Chapter 4
for details), we can create a histogram of the content of memory reads and writes by
instrumenting every read and write in the system. Unlike with TZB, we do not group
each read and write by a tap point; instead, we group together the reads and writes made
throughout the entire function. Thus for each function we will compute two histograms:
one for reads and one for writes. Histograms are stored as sparse arrays in a binary log file
for later analysis. The bigrams plugin is implemented in 207 lines of C++ code.
Because functions for which we observed very little data are unlikely to have a strong
signature that can be used for a matching, we currently exclude any function whose reads
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and writes were each less than 80 bytes. This parameter was determined more or less
arbitrarily, and further experimentation is needed to determine the optimal threshold. In
practice, we have had good results with the current value.
5.3.2.2 System Calls
Another important dynamic feature is the sequence of system calls each function executes.
Because system calls are the only way a binary can effect persistent changes to the state
of the system, virtually every program of interest will make system calls. These calls may
therefore be useful in identifying similar functions across different programs.
For each function, we record not only the system calls made at top level, but also those
made by its callees. For example, suppose that a function F1 executes {sc1, sc2} and then
calls F2, which executes {sc3, sc4} and then returns to F1, which finishes by executing
{sc5}. In this case, the calls recorded for F1 would be {sc1, sc2, sc3, sc4, sc5}, while the calls
recorded for F2 would be just {sc3, sc4}.
In PANDA, this is implemented using a combination of the sc chain, syscalls, and
callstack plugins. The main feature extraction is implemented in sc chain, which reg-
isters a callback in syscalls to be notified every time a system call executes. When it
does, the callstack plugin is called to get the current call stack, and the current system
call number is logged for every function in the stack; the list of system calls made so far
for each function is kept in a working set until the function returns. In addition to the
function address, a counter is used to keep recursive calls to the same function separate.
The sc chain plugin also registers a callback in the callstack plugin in order to receive
a notification whenever a function returns. When a function returns, sc chain removes its
entry from the working set and writes out the observed system call sequence to a log file.
The log file produced by the plugin, then, will contain one entry for each time the function
executed, and each entry will list all system calls seen during its execution.
All three plugins are written in C++. The sc chain plugin is 184 lines of code, and the
syscalls and callstack plugins (which are a part of PANDA and not developed as part
of this current work) are 1006 lines and 325 lines of code, respectively.
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5.3.3 Feature Matching
Feature matching is accomplished by simply taking the features from each function observed
in the execution of the target program and computing a distance measure to each function
in the training set. We can then look at the top N functions (usually 10) and investigate
whether they are functionally similar to our target function. We can also then apply the
labels given to the top matches from our training set to the unknown function, potentially
giving a high-level description of its functionality.
The complexity of this pairwise distance computation is O(kn), where k is the number
of functions in the target program and n is the number of functions in the training set.
Because this can be quite intensive, we hope to use techniques from information retrieval
in future work to speed up the search process.
For the bigram histogram distance computation, we use the same Jensen-Shannon de-
scribed in Section 4.5.4. To measure the distance between sequences of system calls, we
currently use Levenshtein [72] distance.
5.4 Experiments
5.4.1 Carberp
To explore the effectiveness of our chosen features in identifying common functionality, we
performed an experiment with real-world malware. Although this is in general a significant
challenge, as most malware does not come pre-labeled, we were able to take advantage of
the fact that in recent years the source code of some malware families has been leaked.
Specifically, we chose to examine the Carberp malware family, which was leaked in June
2013 [64].
The Carberp source code leak consists of a large number of different modules, including
the code to several other malware families. The main bot projects, which are contained
in the BJWJ (for “Black Joe White Joe”) are primarily banking trojans; however, they can
be extended through plugin functionality to support VNC backdoors, Bitcoin mining, and
distributed denial of service [56]. There are several flavors of the bot available in the main
103
project, which appear to share a common core but have slightly different features and func-
tionality. For our experiments, we chose to train on the RU Az project and test on the Full
project. As an example of the differing behavior between bot variants, we observed that
the RU AZ sample hooked several system APIs (NtClose, NtDeviceIoControlFile, NtQuery-
DirectoryFile, and NtResumeThread), whereas Full did not hook any APIs but did inject
itself into explorer.exe.
Figure 23: The Carberp builder UI, which injects an encrypted configuration section into a
binary. Translations provided by the author with help from Sarah Montgomery and Google
Translate.
Building Carberp from the leaked sources is not trivial; the Visual Studio project files
provided are apparently incomplete and required a number of manual changes (primarily
adding missing source files) before a successful build could be generated. Each project was
built in its “Release” configuration, and we modified the build process so that debugging
symbols would be generated in PDB format (as required by the label extractor described in
Section 5.3.1). Once the initial binary is built, it must have a specific configuration added to
it using a “builder” program (shown in Figure 23); this essentially injects an RC4-encrypted
section into the executable that can then be decrypted and read when the bot starts up.
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The configuration contains variables such as the host to contact for command and control
(C&C), the interval to wait when contacting the C&C servers, the encryption key used for
communication, and plugin-specific configuration options (for example, the host to submit
Bitcoin mining results to).
We configured our Carberp binaries to connect to a host under our control, but did
not set up any C&C infrastructure; as a result, it is possible that we did not observe the
full range of behaviors present in the malware. However, the problem of obtaining good
coverage of malware is a both well-studied [26,88] and orthogonal to the problem of function
matching, so we will not explore it further in this work.
5.4.1.1 Feature Extraction and Labeling
We extracted labels for each sample as described in Section 5.3.2. Because Carberp’s source
code comments are in Russian, we used the Python NLTK package (specifically the Snowball
stemmer) to perform word stemming and stopword removal; no modifications were needed
to the variable names since the authors used English. The end result of this process was a
mapping between a function name and a bag of words describing that function.
To obtain our features, we created a recording of each sample using PANDA. Each
sample was executed, and we then waited ten minutes to allow time for the infection and
initial communication to occur. We then replayed each with a custom process monitoring
plugin that tracked the current process, as well as trapping calls to NtCreateUserProcess
and NtTerminateProcess. This allowed us to determine which processes were involved in
the execution of each sample, which we used to guide the actual feature extraction. For
RU Az, only the initial RU AzBuild.exe process is used. In Full, an explorer.exe process
is created, into which the bot binary is injected; execution then continues in the new process.
We also observed both samples attempting to connect to a command and control server (our
own) using the communication protocol documented by Gegeny [43].
We extracted the dynamic features described in Section 5.3.2 using the bigrams and
sc chain plugin; the former collects byte bigram statistics for memory read and written
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by each basic block, while the latter logs the system calls executed by each function (in-
cluding those executed in called subroutines). These plugins are described in more detail
in Section 5.3.2.
5.4.1.2 Evaluation
Because are fortunate enough to have two Carberp builds that share a common core (see
Figure 24, we get a certain measure of ground truth for free. Since a both binaries have a
number of functions in common, we can evaluate whether our matching algorithm correctly








Figure 24: Code overlap in Carberp variants. The RU Az and Full variants display different
runtime behavior but share a common core of 139 functions.
Using the Jensen-Shannon metric described in Section 5.3.3, we scored each function
in RU Az against each function in Full; in other words, we used Full as our training set
and evaluated our performance on RU Az. For each function that was executed in both
programs, we checked whether it appeared in the top N closest matches according to our
metric. By varying N , we can then produce an ROC curve demonstrating our performance
at various thresholds. Because writes and reads are tracked separately, we evaluated each.
The results are shown in Figure 25.
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Figure 25: Probability of detection for the top N ranked functions, based on the Jensen-
Shannon distance between the bigram frequencies of data read and written by each function.
5.4.2 Zeus
Zeus [118] is another widely-distributed banking trojan. Like Carberp, its source has been
leaked to the internet [66] and is available on GitHub [3], allowing us to compile the bot with
debug information and run it. Unlike Carberp, compilation was relatively simple, although
a few typos in the source code had to be corrected. Zeus also provides its builder UI and
manual in English as well as Russian, obviating the need to translate. We modified its (PHP-
based) build process to generate debugging symbols, and built three variants: ZeusFull,
which was configured with all available features; ZeusFullFast, which was configured with
the same features as ZeusFull but compiled with optimization for speed rather than size
(/O2 rather than /O1 in Visual Studio), and ZeusFullDebug, which was built with Zeus’s
debug flag enabled, causing the bot to write log messages to a file.
We also installed the Zeus C&C server, which consists of a set of PHP scripts backed
by a MySQL database. The bots were configured using the Zeus builder and set to contact
our C&C server (depicted in Figure 26).
5.4.2.1 Feature Extraction and Labeling
Feature extraction and labeling is slightly more complicated for Zeus than Carberp because
Zeus injects itself into every other process on the system upon execution. This allows
it to implement a purely usermode “rootkit” by hooking the usermode calls to system
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Figure 26: The Zeus builder UI, configured to inject our own C&C server into the bot
binary.
functions rather than the kernel functions that implement those calls. However, it also
means that there are a significantly larger number of processes to track when performing
feature collection. To enable this, we developed a Volatility [124] plugin that searches for
processes containing our Zeus binary, and modified our process monitoring plugin to create
a memory dump just before any process exits. By doing so, we can compile a full list of
processes relevant to the malware execution, as well as the ranges in memory where the
code exists, even if it has been injected into another process.
Labeling is also complicated; rather than simply writing comments in either Russian
or English, the authors of Zeus use a mix of the two, often mixing in Russian words into
English sentences and vice versa.1 Russian words are also present in both the standard
CP1251 encoding and transliterated into the Roman alphabet. Stopword removal can be
accomplished by just removing stopwords for both languages; however, stemming requires
that we detect the correct language on a word-by-word basis and apply the appropriate
stemmer.
1In linguistics, this is referred to as code switching.
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Each replay was created by following the same procedure:
1. Download bot binary to the desktop inside PANDA virtual machine.
2. Begin recording.
3. Allow bot network connections through the firewall.
4. Wait for the bot to delete itself from the desktop.
5. Start Internet Explorer, and
• Visit http://google.com.
• Visit http://vk.com, a popular Russian social networking site.
6. Close Internet Explorer.
7. End the recording.
The web sites visited in Internet Explorer are an attempt to elicit more behaviors from
the malware, as it contains code to perform man-in-the-browser attacks on popular web
sites.
We then replayed each recording and collected the same features as for Carberp.
5.4.2.2 Evaluation
In the case of Zeus we know that all three execution traces are built from the same source
code, but with different optimization and debugging options. They should therefore have
approximately the same behavior making a close matching feasible. In our experiment, we
attempted to identify functions in ZeusFullFast and ZeusFullDebug by matching them
against functions from the basic ZeusFull. As before, ROC curves for both reads and
writes are shown.
5.4.3 Discussion
To put these results in perspective, we can look at a related work by Egele et al. [34]; their
system, BLEX (blanket execution), matches functions based on their dynamic side effects
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Figure 27: Probability of detection for the top N ranked functions, based on the Jensen-
Shannon distance between the bigram frequencies of data read by each function. The
functions to be identified were drawn from the debug ((a) and (b)) and optimized ((c) and
(d)) versions of Zeus and matched against the plain Zeus binary.
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Table 11: The effect of requiring a minimum threshold of data before including a function’s
reads and writes. Figures given are the fraction of functions in the test binary that were
correctly matched in the top 10 in the training set.
Reads Writes
No Threshold Threshold No Threshold Threshold
RU Az in Full 39% 72% 54% 88%
ZeusFullDebug in ZeusFull 90% 95% 65% 87%
ZeusFullFast in ZeusFull 83% 92% 67% 84%
and achieves high coverage through forced execution. Over all functions tested, their blanket
execution system had an accuracy at N = 10 of 77%. Based on the abstract provided (the
authors unfortuntaely declined to provide a preprint upon request), it appears that our
Zeus results show significatnly better performance than BLEX at N = 10 at 92-95%.
Our choice to discard functions with too little data, described in Section 5.3.2, turns
out to have a large impact on performance. If we relax this constraint, our performance on
Carberp drops to 39% on reads and 54% on writes for N = 10, and our performance on
Zeus shows a similar decline (see Table 11). This appears to be caused by two factors. First,
functions with very little data all look roughly the same and are likely to be confused with
one another by our matching algorithm. Second, including these small reads and writes
makes it more likely that incidental reads and writes to the stack such as return addresses
and frame pointer; because the data from such reads and writes will change from run to
run, this adds noise to the histogram that makes matching more difficult.
5.5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter we demonstrated a new technique for matching functions in unknown mal-
ware binaries using dynamic features. From our preliminary results, we believe the technique
is quite promising and deserving of further study; even with the preliminary nature of our
current algorithms and evaluation, our performance exceeds the state of the art in some
cases.
The original premise, that different implementations of the same high-level functionality
might also be matched, remains an open question. Due to the difficulty of obtaining ground
truth in malware samples, we hope to perform an extensive evaluation between two parallel
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non-malicious code bases, such as the Linux and FreeBSD kernels or the GNU coreutils
and their BSD counterparts. Because functional equivalence is easier to determine in these
cases (e.g., the sort utility clearly does the same thing in both its GNU and BSD variants;
however, it is less clear that any two malware functions are equivalent), we can get an
accurate evaluation of how well our chosen features match new implementations of the
same functionality.
We also have a number of ideas that may improve the accuracy of the matching. First,
we noticed that the highest matches for a given function were its callees and callers. This
makes sense: functions will typically pass data they handle to subroutines, so the data
signature of many functions will look similar to their neighbors on the callstack. In future
work we hope to explore methods of factoring out this similarity, which is not useful for
identifying the particular functionality of a given routine, by subtracting out the histograms
of its neighbors. The resulting residue may then better capture the unique dynamic data
handled by that function.
It may also be possible, by incorporating domain knowledge, to come up with dynamic
data signatures that identify certain classes of functions. For example, a recent paper [126]
located functions that implement decryption of DRM-protected media by noting that such
functions have inputs that are both highly random and high-entropy, but outputs that are
non-random. Similarly, it should be possible to locate decompression routines by looking at
the compressibility of input and output data. We hope to explore whether there are other
such signatures that can be used to identify unknown malware behaviors in future work.
Our initial results indicate that dynamic signatures may prove much more robust to the
types of function changes,such as compiler optimizations, that often baffle static function
matching techniques, and we have hope that they may be extended to automatically provide
high-level information about unknown implementations as well. Such a capability would





In this thesis we have presented a number of novel techniques that uncover high-level se-
mantic information about closed-source programs and operating systems for security. The
algorithms presented in Chapters 2–4 have significantly improved the feasibility of virtual
machine based intrusion detection and memory forensics by reducing the “semantic gap”
between high- and low-level views of vulnerable operating systems. We also presented a new
technique that provides the first steps toward a general system for understanding the behav-
ior of unknown programs; moreover, we found that this technique outperformed the state of
the art on the simpler task of matching functions between different compiler optimization
levels.
We conclude by discussing several large, open problems in both program understanding
and intrusion detection that can operate without trusting the OS.
6.0.1 The “Strong” Semantic Gap
In a recent paper surveying virtual machine introspection techniques [48], Jain et al. noted
that most work on the semantic gap (including our own) is forced to assume that despite
malicious modification, the underlying semantics of the system’s data structures remain
unchanged. This assumption has been challenged, however, by attacks such as Direct Kernel
Structure Manipulation (DKSM) [5], which alters the layout of kernel data structures and
thereby invalidates the semantic meaning learned by systems such as those described in
Chapters 2 and 3. Jain et al. name this more difficult challenge, of maintaining security
monitoring in the face of semantic manipulation attacks, the “strong” semantic gap problem,
and conclude that there has been very little research on it.
In the limit, it seems clear that without imposing constraints (either in the threat
model or, preferably, through controls enforced by hardware) on modifications malicious
code running at the same privilege level as the operating system can make, maintaining
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security monitoring is impossible. For example, kernel malware may simply set up its own
small operating system and scheduler and share time between it and the main OS; while
this may seem farfetched, some proof-of-concept rootkits [2] do go so far as to replace the
OS scheduler with their own.
Can automated reverse engineering and program understanding be made to work even
in this highly adversarial scenario? That is, could we devise analyses that are both fast and
accurate enough to analyze a potentially unknown operating system and extract actionable
security information about its behavior? Or, failing that, what is the minimum set of
restrictions we need to enforce in order to guarantee that our semantic assumptions cannot
be violated?
6.0.2 Understanding Embedded Systems
While understanding software has been the focus of this thesis, the proliferation of embedded
computing devices poses new challenges. In such systems, simply analyzing the software on
the device may be insufficient to evaluate its security and protect it from attack. Instead,
we may need to understand how its hardware peripherals work—what the valid ranges of
inputs and outputs are, what states it can get into, what attack surface it exposes to the
world, and what effect its hardware can have on the physical world (e.g., can your printer
actually be forced to catch fire?).
Some of these questions are well beyond the scope of our techniques: it is unlikely we will
be able to apply software analysis to reverse engineer the physical properties of hardware,
for example. However, it may be possible in some cases to infer certain properties of the
hardware through close analysis of the software interfaces used to communicate with it.
In some preliminary work not reported in this thesis, we were able to infer constraints on
values returned from embedded hardware peripherals by performing symbolic execution [59]
on its firmware and solving path constraints that followed a successful (non-crashing) path
through the firmware boot process. It remains an open question, however, how much we
can discover about hardware in this way—complicated peripherals may have complicated
state machines or even be full-fledged computing devices in their own right, which places
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fundamental limits on what fully automated techniques can achieve. As with undecidable
problems in program analysis, however, a great deal of progress may be achievable with
careful application of heuristics and assumptions about common cases.
6.0.3 Reverse Engineering-Friendly Construction
The programs and systems that are the targets of our analyses in this thesis were all designed
to be, if not actively hostile (in the case of malware), then at least indifferent to the needs of
outsiders wishing to understand their internal details. In addition to developing ever-more
powerful ways to tease out the hidden implementation details of such systems, we might
instead turn the question around and ask whether we can construct programming languages
and tools that expose the internals of a program in a self-documenting way. For example, a
compiler might be able to automatically produce parsers for the in-memory data structures
used by a program, or generate a list of useful hook points throughout the code, such as
places where data crosses marked security boundaries.
In the realm of hardware this is likely to be even more difficult, both because of the lack
of standardized tools for hardware design and the reticence of hardware manufactures to
give out what they consider trade secrets. Nevertheless we may seek methods that augment
the tools used in hardware design so that they produce machine-readable descriptions of
the device’s functionality and the protocols needed to interact with it. This would provide
numerous benefits for security analyses: the descriptions could inform static analyses of the
firmware that interacts with such hardware, and dynamic analyses that rely on being able to
emulate hardware platforms could potentially automatically generate emulated peripheral
models. As a side benefit, having such open hardware descriptions readily available would
open up such embedded systems to alternative operating systems, improving user freedom.
Conclusion
The solutions to these problems will determine the privacy and security of the next genera-
tion of computing devices. It is vital that we have ways of quickly understanding the attack
surface and vulnerabilities of embedded systems that can affect the physical world, be able
to quickly reverse engineer novel malware, and provide protection for legacy systems until
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they can be replaced by newer and hopefully more secure versions.
Even at the level of the common user, it is important that we have at our disposal robust
automated techniques for understanding the software we use. Events such as the discovery
of censorship and surveillance in the Chinese version of Skype [60] have shown that reverse
engineering can be a way of combating infringements on human rights, and the proliferation
of advertising as the primary way of monetizing mobile applications and web sites means
that we must be even more vigilant and aware of what private information is exposed to
software eager to profile and target us.
If we seek to have control over the computing systems that have increasingly become
enmeshed in our lives, we must start by understanding how they work and what they do,
and automated program analysis techniques are a vital part of achieving this.
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APPENDIX A
SAMPLE TAP POINT CONTENTS FROM TZB









russian|Russian Users Accounts: :charset=KOI8-R: :
lang=ru_RU.KOI8-R: : :passwd_format=md5: :co
pyright=/etc/COPYRIGHT: :welcome=/etc/motd: :sete
nv=MAIL=/var/mail/$,BLOCKSIZE=K,FTP_PASSIVE_MODE=YES:
nss_compat.so.1dhclientShared object ‘‘nss_compat.so.1’’ n
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Figure 28: Detail from rendering of Graphviz file captured from a FreeBSD boot tap point,
apparently depicting disk geometry
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